Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-9-2025

Faculty Advisor(s)

Susanne Reardon

Department

HNR 460 Honors Capstone

Project Track

Scholarly Project Track

Abstract

White-collar crime comprises nonviolent, financially motivated offenses by individuals and corporate entities. The social costs are immense, yet the prosecution of such crimes is comparatively small compared to other forms of non-violent crime, often resolving with opaque settlements rather than prosecution. This study examines why under-prosecution is so prevalent in white-collar crime, how it undermines democratic trust, and what reforms could be implemented to improve accountability. Under-prosecution will be operationalized through a mixed-methods design, accounting for the most observable proxies. First, the share of filings involving white-collar offenses; second, the prevalence of deferred or non-prosecution agreements (hereinafter referred to as DPAs and NPAs, respectively); third, sanction severity; fourth, time-to-disposition; and fifth, the individual vs. corporate defendant frequency.

Quantitative analysis of enforcement data compiled from the Department of Justice, the United States Sentencing Commission, and the Securities Exchange Commission will be paired with case studies, providing insight into charging decisions, executive accountability, and transparency to the public. Findings reveal a “settlement-first” enforcement structure, contributing to comparatively low sanctions for harm, limited individual accountability in corporate cases, and lengthy, opaque decisions. These patterns, as interpreted through the fraud triangle, will detail how opportunity, pressure, and rationalization lead individuals and corporate entities into corporate crime and how they simultaneously weaken deterrence. Reforms such as guardrails on DPAs/NPAs, as well as calibration of sanctions scaling with harm and resource reinforcement, will be proposed to bolster enforcement and restore public confidence in equal justice under the law.

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