From Social Media to Social Movement: Developing a Secondary Stakeholder Model for the Information Age – The Case of Deepwater Horizon

Michele A. Jurgens

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From Social Media to Social Movement:

Developing a Secondary Stakeholder Model for the Information Age

– The Case of Deepwater Horizon

Michele A Jurgens

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Ph.D. in Business

2014
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Date: June 16, 2014
Dedication

I’d like to dedicate this work to my mother, who was always just wonderful, all the time, and to my father, who suggested I get a PhD way back when I was trying really hard to do anything but study.

I’d also like to dedicate this work to my children who deserve tremendous credit for putting up with me when I was inundated with work and far too grumpy. I would also like to thank my ex-husband for not saying, ‘I told you so’.

Because of all that these people have done to help me along the way, this dissertation is as much theirs as mine.
To reach this point in my studies, I would never have made it if it were not for the unending support of my advisors Pierre Berthon and Linda Edelman. Pierre has been my stolid ally from the start and has guided me through all of these long years of juggling studies, teaching, and work. He has always hung in there and even been kind enough to follow me down several ‘rabbit holes’ - allowing me to learn a great deal about how to do research in the process. Linda has provided the structure and encouragement I needed to keep moving forward. She has also been a wonderful friend. Both Linda and Pierre have been wonderful role models of how to be a kind and successful academic.

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Abstract

From Social Media to Social Movement:

Developing a Secondary Stakeholder Model for the Information Age

- The Case of Deepwater Horizon

Michele A Jurgens

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:

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Secondary stakeholders are thought to differ from primary stakeholders in that they interact with the firm mainly for the purpose of changing its ethical, societal, and environmental policies and practices. Research on secondary stakeholders has shown that they are successful in influencing their corporate targets despite the relative lack of power, legitimacy, and urgency of their requests. One explanation for the success of secondary stakeholders can be found in the ‘political process model’ from the social movement literature. The political process model describes and predicts how social movements are formed and the conditions that are necessary for them being sustained and successful. Originally developed to explain state-level social action, such as the civil rights movement or the French revolution, the political process model sees successful
stakeholder action as a function of political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing structures. King (2008) suggests that this model can be used to shed light how secondary stakeholders influence their corporate targets. However, the political process model was developed in the pre-internet era and social media and the internet connectivity have had a significant impact on the way that social movements communicate, coordinate and act. This research seeks to update the political process model to the internet age by posing the question: How does social media and internet connectivity change the political process model for secondary stakeholders?

To answer this question this research looks at the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the rise of stakeholder outrage against BP, and the way in which social media was used by stakeholders to influence the company. The study contributes to existing stakeholder theory by developing the political process model into a ‘stakeholder process model for the internet age.’ Specifically, the enhanced framework redefines and introduces new elements into the traditional political process model: ‘Political opportunities’ are differentiated and redefined as ‘pre-existing conditions’ and ‘disruptive events’; ‘framing processes’ and ‘mobilizing structures’ are reinterpreted; and ‘stakeholder action’ differentiated into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ influence strategies. The implications of the new model for theory and practice are explored.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This study addresses a gap in the stakeholder literature by integrating new knowledge about the use of social media and internet connectivity to explain how secondary stakeholders are able to influence their targets. Using a social movement lens and building upon the conceptual framework of the ‘political process model’ for stakeholder movements, this research increases our understanding of how the elements of the political process model have changed in the 21st century and as a result of the use of social media and internet connectivity (King, 2008a). The Deepwater Horizon spill was studied because it was one of the first major incidents in which social media and internet connectivity was used extensively against a firm in the context of a stakeholder protest. Secondary stakeholders were able to play an important role and were, in fact, driving the movement against BP. This situation contrasts with traditional explanations about the ways in which firms are influenced by their stakeholders. Extend research posits that firms listen to primary stakeholders who by the resource dependent nature of their relationship with the firm have greater power, legitimacy and urgency in their request (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). This study’s conclusions suggest that secondary stakeholders used social media and internet connectivity in a manner that enhanced their ability to impact the firm and other stakeholders. As such, they may have partially overcome their relative disadvantage vis-à-vis primary stakeholders through the use of internet connectivity and social media.
From extend literature, we know that secondary stakeholders can be distinguished from, and are at a comparative disadvantage to, primary stakeholders with regards to their ability to influence a target firm; the firm is not dependent upon its secondary stakeholders for key resources nor do secondary stakeholders generally benefit from the attributes of power and legitimacy as do primary stakeholders such as employee groups or important suppliers and partners (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). As such, secondary stakeholders must develop public interest in their cause and thereby raise concerns among primary stakeholders in order to have an impact on the firm (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Perrault, 2012).

Recent work on secondary stakeholders’ strategies has drawn on social movement theory with the aim of finding a theoretical foundation to explain when and why these groups take action (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008; Lounsbury, 2001; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003; Scully & Segal, 2002). It has contributed to a move away from a firm-centric view of firm-stakeholders relations and towards a more holistic perspective on secondary stakeholders as individuals and organizations in their own right. While this set of authors has been inspired by, and borrowed from, the social movement literature, few have attempted to develop or adapt a social movement model for secondary stakeholders. An exception to this is King (2008a). He posits that the social movement literature’s ‘political process model’ can be used to better understand firm-stakeholder relations and
posits that stakeholder influence is greatest when those groups’ take advantage of political opportunities (such as a change or event that weakens the target corporation),
develop mobilizing structures for organization and discussion, and use framing to draw media attention and turn public opinion against the target firm (Goodwin & Jasper, 2012; King, 2008; McAdam; McCarthy; Zald, 1996; Tilly & Wood, 2009). In explaining the political process model’s applicability to stakeholder theory, he says, “Although it was designed primarily to assess the actions of state-oriented social movements, many of the key insights from social movement theory may help us understand corporate stakeholders. The firm and the state are both social institutions with varying levels of openness that have many constituents. Both are relatively closed to outside interest groups, but both also try to actively manage their constituents …many organizational theories, especially those of the macro-level, emphasize the institutional and resource constraints that shape organizational behavior, social movement theory provides an interest-based explanation for change” (King, 2008a, p. 3). King also makes it clear that this approach is particularly well-adapted to understanding secondary stakeholders, “The contribution … is to focus our attention on the process whereby managers come to recognize the consequentiality of secondary stakeholders and their associated claims. I use social movement theory as a framework for understanding this process” (p. 2).

King’s (2008 a) model, however, does not take into account the role that social media and internet connectivity are now playing. Social media represent a new ‘tool’ in the influence strategy arsenal and research in related domains suggests that social media and
internet connectivity are having an important effect on social movements and consumer activism. For example, several authors posit that social media have altered the interactions between corporations and their consumers by increasing transparency and the outlets for consumers to post complaints (Pitt, Berthon, Watson, & Zinkhan, 2002; Watson, Pitt, Berthon, & Zinkhan, 2002). Social media and internet connectivity have also been shown to change the manner in which activists pursue their causes to governments, corporations and the public at large, for example, by making it easier, faster, and less expensive to interact with fellow activists across geographies (Baringhorst, 2008; Bennett, 2003; Shirky, 2011).

The study makes a contribution by analyzing the case of the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and subsequent spill in 2010 off the coast of Louisiana. The rig was owned by Transocean Ltd., but leased to BP. BP rapidly came under pressure from secondary stakeholder groups for its ineffective response and repeated underestimation of the damage produced by the spill. The course of events suggests that secondary stakeholders acted rapidly and effectively to uncover information pertinent to the public’ understanding of BP’ role in the oil spill. Secondary stakeholders also appear to have been vigilant concerning BP’s and its partners’ response to the spill and took action to influence these groups’ behavior. This study explored how these stakeholder groups were successful in their efforts, how they used framing, political opportunities and mobilizing structures in their influence strategies, and how they used social media and the internet to enhance their efforts. The study’s findings led to a refining of the political process model
with the integration of social media and internet connectivity, and represent a theoretical contribution to stakeholder theory in the area of secondary stakeholder influence strategies.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Three literature streams have provided valuable input to this study. First, the stakeholder literature and, in particular, that part of the stakeholder literature dealing with secondary stakeholders and their strategies for influencing their target firms. Second, in order to gain a thorough understanding of the political process model, I have examined the use of the political process model in the study of social movement and King’s explanation of his version thereof for use in exploring stakeholder-firm relations (2008a). Finally, recent literature on social media and the internet are relevant and, in particular, we are concerned with the research on social media and the internet’s impact on social movements.

The literature review below is thus split into three sections: 1. Stakeholder Theory & Secondary Stakeholders; 2. The Political Process Model; and 3. The Impact of Social Media and the Internet.

2.1 Stakeholder Theory & Secondary Stakeholders

In the stakeholder literature, there have been several efforts to categorize stakeholder groups and a common distinction is that between primary and secondary stakeholders (Carroll, 1991; Mitchell et al., 1997; Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002). By definition, primary stakeholders (e.g. employees, shareholders, suppliers/partners, etc.) provide vital
resources to ensure the continuation of that organization whereas secondary stakeholders (e.g. activists, special interests groups, local community organizations, etc.) generally do not, or only provide resources that can be substituted or easily replaced. Secondary stakeholders are those who influence, or are influenced by, the corporation, but who are not essential to the corporation for survival (Clarkson, 1995). Secondary stakeholders may champion social and political issues to the firm that are traditionally dealt with by interacting with governments, and these stakeholders may be concerned with bringing about institutional or ‘field-level’ change, as well as changes in the practices or behavior of a single corporation (Baron, 2001; Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007). Primary stakeholders may also be concerned with broader societal issues; however, their primary purpose for interacting with the firm is thought to be the maintenance of the mutually beneficial financial relationship that has been established. Those relationships may involve, for example, the exchange of goods and services or the provision of capital for the firm’s growth and development. While the demands of primary stakeholders may raise important strategic issues for the firm, secondary stakeholder demands are thought to raise ethical and societal issues which potentially could damage the corporation’s reputation if not addressed (Goodpaster, 1991; Laan, Ees, & Witteloostuijn, 2007). For the purposes of this study, I distinguish between primary and secondary stakeholders along the lines described here. Primary stakeholders will be thought of those groups that interact with the firm with a view to their financial interests whereas secondary stakeholders will be thought of as those groups that interact with the firm for the purpose of changing its ethical, societal, and environmental policies and practices.
In their efforts to influence the firm, secondary stakeholders are at a disadvantage as compared with primary stakeholders (Frooman, 1999; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Theory suggests that corporations accord saliency to stakeholders based on the stakeholder’s power, the urgency of the request and the legitimacy of the stakeholder and the issue (Mitchell et al., 1997; Perrault, 2012). Power is accorded on the basis of resource dependence – the degree to which one party is dependent upon the other for the resources it provides – and on the ability of one party to impose its will in the relationship. Legitimacy in this context is the “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchmann, 1995). Secondary stakeholders, who are removed from the day-to-day workings of the firm and are sometimes individuals or small groups, comparatively lack many of the attributes of power and organizational legitimacy vis-à-vis the corporation. They raise ethical and societal issues relative to the firm operations and must rely on the urgency of the request and the legitimacy of the issue – together defined as “issue prominence” – in order to provoke a response from their target firm(s) (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Perrault, 2012). Issues for which there already exists a consensus of public opinion, for which the negative consequences are important, or for which there is close proximity of the consequences to the stakeholder group, are, for example, more likely to be issues on which stakeholders mobilize and influence the firm (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; T. Rowley & Berman, 2000). Secondary stakeholders will therefore go to considerable efforts in order to draw media and public attention to their cause and increase the issue’s perceived
legitimacy and importance (Greenwood, 2007). Take, for example, shareholder resolutions that call for immediate action on climate change (Clark & Crawford, 2011). Their primary purpose, consistent with what is known as ‘private politics’, is to draw attention to the issue being championed and to contribute to the mobilization of other stakeholders (Baron, 2001; Derville, 2005). Media and public attention alone will raise awareness of the potential for a moral or ethical issue, and the right kind of media coverage can alter perceptions and opinions in the direction desired by these secondary stakeholders (Hart & Sharma, 2004; B. Neville, Bell, & Menguc, 2005; Sharma & Henriques, 2005). Secondary stakeholders can also have an impact on the strategic interests of primary stakeholders. For example, firm partners who in the past had no reason to be concerned with the firm’s practices may, as a result of secondary stakeholders’ efforts, perceive that their own strategic interests or reputation may be threatened by the questionable actions of the firm. If serious enough, partners may choose to break off their relations with the firm (Greenwood & Van Buren III, 2010; Hoffman, 1999). A table summarizing the differences between primary and secondary stakeholders with regards to influences on the firm can be found in Appendix 1.

With regard to the question of how secondary stakeholders influence their target firm, Frooman (1999) draws on Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) theory of resource dependence and suggests that secondary stakeholders use primarily indirect and coercive influence strategies such as boycotts, letter and email-writing campaigns, protests, etc. as well as more subtle methods such as lobbying or attempting to influence key decision-making.
Indirect influence strategies are those whereby a group attempts to convince stakeholders with *direct* influence on the corporation to speak (act) out on behalf of the cause. An ecology group might, for example, try to influence consumer groups or the government to put pressure on corporations selling prepared foods to stop using high fructose corn syrup (Frooman & Murrell, 2005; Frooman, 1999). Coercive strategies are those that try to force change upon the firm and are in contrast to *cooperative* strategies that try to diplomatically cajole and/or reward the firm for altering its behavior. Frooman’s table of stakeholder influence strategies is presented below. According to Frooman’s approach, secondary stakeholders would fall into the box in the top left corner, where they are no dependencies, either on the part of the firm or the secondary stakeholder.

Diagram #1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is the firm dependent on the stakeholder?</th>
<th>Is the stakeholder dependent on the firm?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Indirect/withholding (low interdependence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Direct/withholding (stakeholder power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Indirect/usage (firm power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Direct/usage (high interdependence)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Frooman, 1999, p. 200)

Subsequent empirical studies have shown support for Frooman’s (1999) proposition that stakeholders strategy choices are influenced by their level of dependence on those firms (Darnall, Henriches, & Sadorsky, 2009; Frooman & Murrell, 2005; Sharma & Henriches, 2005; Tsai, Yeh, Wu, & Huang, 2005). For example, Sharma and Henriches’s (2005)
study found that the strategies chosen by stakeholders in the Canadian forest products industry were consistent with Frooman’s model and that they obtained a response from their focal firm.

Yet, influence strategies – both direct and indirect, coercive and cooperative - have been found to vary according to the phase in the protest campaign and according to whether the group is radical or more moderate (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007; Winn, 2001; Zietsma & Winn, 2008). Zietsma and Winn’s (2008) model suggests a change-process perspective whereby stakeholder influence strategies are chosen according to the stage in the process of change, from the initial state in which the firm’s practices are first challenged through to the end state when new practices have replaced the other ones. In their research, stakeholders (as well as firms) used a wide range of strategies, coercive and cooperative, to try to gain influence over their target. The authors suggest that stakeholders are primarily motivated to gain influence by creating ‘influence chains’ which connects several stakeholders (secondary and primary) together in a coalition, and by managing ‘influence flows’ which involve managing the framing of the issue and its perception by the public, the media, and the parties involved.

Another pair of authors - Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) – have suggested that the choice of secondary stakeholder influence strategies is based on, 1) stakeholders’ motives for either de-institutionalization or re-institutionalization of firm practices, and, 2) the degree to which the group is radical or less so (reformist). They point out that while
groups might begin at a starting point that is more moderate, escalation will ensue if the demands are not met and thereby lead to a change to more radical strategies. It appears that both radical and reformist groups will seek to increase the legitimacy of their demands by seeking support from other powerful and legitimate actors and stakeholders. Radical groups, however, are more willing to use illegal or dramatic means to achieve legitimacy (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). In an examination of the tactics used by employees who attempt to influence their firm’s policies on diversity, researchers’ observations suggest that re-institutionalization of diversity friendly practices, symbolic impact (rather than material), and gains (rather than damage) were the focus of the employees efforts (Scully & Segal, 2002). Empirical research has also shown that in certain instances indirect strategies are favored by all groups over direct strategies (Frooman & Murrell, 2005).

For additional reference and clarification, Appendix 2 provides a list of coercive and compromise strategies that stakeholders might use, and Appendix 3 provides an overview of four predictive models of stakeholder influence strategies.

Several researchers have suggested that stakeholders’ strategies are influenced by the characteristics of the firm(s) they target (Gardberg & Newbury, 2010; Hendry, 2006; Lenox & Eesley, 2009). Lenox and Eesley (2009) showed that, with regard to ecological activism, the more a firm polluted, the less likely it was to respond to stakeholder pressure, yet the more attractive it would be to the activist organization if it were to gain
firm compliance with their demands. The study also showed that the greater the firm’s financial reserves, the greater the ability of the firm to resist activists’ pressure tactics and the higher the marginal cost to the activist organization of a campaign against such a firm. Rehbein, Waddock and Graves (2004) found that firm size was a factor in identifying which firms were targeted. Larger, more visible firms were preferred over smaller firms. A study by Hendry (2006) also found that large firms were a target, but in addition found that firms with a large environmental impact would be more likely to be chosen, as well as those that have been targeted in the past for similar offenses.

Social movement theory has inspired much of the recent research on secondary stakeholders (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008; Lounsbury, 2001; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003; Scully & Segal, 2002). Researchers have looked more closely at the characteristics of secondary stakeholders, their motivations, and their interactions with one another. In this vein, we can identify the works of Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003), Wolfe and Putler (2002), and Gardberg and Newburry (2010), as providing valuable insight into the characteristics and demographics of protest groups and their members.

Rowley and Moldoveanu (2004) propose that an individual whose identity is strongly connected with a particular activist group is more likely to take action than an individual whose connections with such groups is more broad-based. They also argue that a group or activist that has successfully mobilized in the past is more likely to mobilize in the future. In support of this notion, empirical work has shown that demographic
characteristics of individuals, thought to be indicative of social identity, are associated with certain patterns of protest (Gardberg & Newburry, 2010).

A study by Wolfe and Putler (2002) challenges the assumption that stakeholders within a particular role-defined group have similar goals and aims, for example, that all employees, or all shareholders, or all ‘green’ activists have the same perspective. They argue that in certain instances stakeholders viewpoints will differ within groups and a consensus among stakeholders within the group on what policy to pursue should not be assumed. Moreover, the authors found that in certain instances, stakeholders will be willing to override their self-interest in the pursuit of a large symbolic goal they find to be important. Issue then is of importance as well.

The issue of stakeholder heterogeneity was also the subject of research that tested whether stakeholders from the same group – customer/users – but that were from communities with different wealth profiles were treated differently by their utility supplier (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). The authors showed that rich (powerful) communities were able to extract a better level of ecological performance from the firm than those stakeholders and communities that were poor (and less powerful).

Social movement theory also allows us to consider stakeholders’ actions in the broader context of institutional and social change. A single stakeholder request may be part of a much larger strategy managed by the stakeholder group, and a single stakeholder may
engage in actions together with other stakeholders with each group’s role and behavior altering in whatever fashion best suits the needs of the cause. Van Huijstee and Glasbergen (Van Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2010a; Van Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2010b) looked at the relations between two NGOs and a firm over time and showed that stakeholder groups can play different roles (good guy – bad guy) vis-à-vis the firm, that they are aware of each other’s role, and that at times they will use their different positions in a way that allows them to be more effective at influencing the target firm.

Another interesting perspective on intra-stakeholder networks has been provided by Neville and Menguc (2006) who developed the notion of ‘stakeholder multiplicity’. They suggest that the extent to which there is congruence between the perspectives of different stakeholders is important to the success of stakeholders’ strategies via-avis the firm. They posit that the more that claims are complementary and the less that they are competing, the more likely it is that the firm will find the demands of the stakeholder groups to be salient and will act on them.

Friedman and Miles (2002) developed a framework that combines “institutional theory with a realist theory of social change and differentiation”. They suggest that implicit or explicit contracts between stakeholders and the firm can provide insight into the behavior of the parties towards one another. In addition they suggest that the degree to which the two parties have compatible or incompatible interests also has an important impact on the choices of stakeholders and firms alike. Both of these factors are subject to change over
time. For example, the relationship between an organization such as Greenpeace and a large corporation might be described as, ‘contingent’ (i.e. no recognized contract operating) and ‘incompatible’ at one point in time and ‘necessary’ (i.e. an implicit or explicit contract is needed) and ‘incompatible’ once both parties recognize the advantages that a minimum level of cooperation might provide.

To summarize, secondary stakeholder strategies and the success of those strategies appear to be influenced by several factors: stakeholder characteristics, target firm characteristics, firm-stakeholder network relationships, and resource dependence between the stakeholder group and the firm. Below is a graphic showing the various factors and their relationship to stakeholder choices based on extant literature. As shown below, firm reaction to stakeholder strategies feedback to influence firm-stakeholder relations and inter-firm relations, which in turn influences stakeholders’ choices of subsequent influence strategies. Firm reaction also impact stakeholder strategies directly – if the firm cedes to stakeholder demands, for example, stakeholders are likely to stop protesting.
While insightful to our general understanding of stakeholder actions, for the purposes of this study not all of these approaches adequately address the topic of secondary stakeholders influence strategies. Network theory, for example, on which Neville and Menguc (2006) and Pajunen (2006) based their works, assumes that stakeholders are connected in some way. This does not account for the independent protester, the geographically distant protester, or other secondary stakeholder groups or entities that do not have existing working or personal relationships with the target firm. With regard to Frooman’s (1999) proposal that stakeholder strategies are driven by resource dependence, the results of Frooman and Murrell’s (2005) own test of the model suggests that of the
two types of resource dependence, only the stakeholders’ degree of dependence on the firm influenced the choice of strategy (coercive or cooperative). More concerning, Frooman’s predictions do not entirely align with those of De Bakker and Den Hond (2007), and Zietsma and Winn (2008) who all suggest that phase in the protest process is a strong predictor of the choice of influence strategies. In short, there is a great deal that has yet to be explained with regards to secondary stakeholders’ ability to influence their target firms and, therefore, room for additional development of the literature in order to better explain secondary stakeholders’ influence strategy choices.

2.2 The Political Process Model

The model that provides the framework for this study’s examination of BP’s stakeholders with regards to the Deepwater Horizon spill was proposed by King (2008). King’s framework represents the application of the political process model, from the social movement literature, to the specific context of stakeholder-firm relations. The social movement research community grew up in the vanguard of the social and political upheavals of the 1960’s and 70’s. It is said to have begun when, “…the late Charles Tilly revolutionized the study of collective action in the 1960’s by redirecting attention from the motivations and choices of protestors to their demographic, economic, and political contests” (Goodwin & Jasper, 2012, p. 3). His initial ideas, later developed and expanded by Doug McAdam and Charles Tarrow, contributed significantly to our understanding of how agency and structure interact to bring about change in a political or social system.
Known as the ‘political process theory’ of social movement, it embraces Tarrow’s (1996) observation that our environment both enables and constrains us. This theory has dominated the social movement literature for over 30 years (Bevington & Dixon, 2005; Goodwin & Jasper, 2012). In one modern observation on social movements, Frances Fox Piven (2006) has argued that if ordinary people are going to alter the institutions in which they are enmeshed they must get angry, rise up and ‘disrupt’ things. New issues are brought to the fore and disruption represents a kind of veto power on the workings of existing institutions and networks of power.

The political process theory on social movement has informed and inspired work on stakeholders in several ways. First, authors have observed a convergence between activists’ tactics directed at governments and those tactics directed at firms; several authors have labeled this as a trend towards ‘private politics’, the transfer of political protest activity from the public arena in which activists target their efforts against political or governmental institutions, to the private arena in which activists target their efforts towards large private companies or organizations (Baron, 2001; Clark & Crawford, 2011; Gebhardt, 2010; Lenox & Eesley, 2009; E. M. Reid & Toffel, 2009). This is thought to be due in part to the increasing power of corporations, notably multinational corporations that now rival governments in their resources and scope of influence, and in part to improved chances for the success of activists’ strategies when they target a firm vulnerable to public opinion (Hendry, 2006). Regarding the latter, activists efforts are said to be more effective when their interests can be concentrated (vs. diffuse) on a specific, preferably narrow issue that involves a specific corporation rather
than when they encompass broad ideas such as ‘climate change’, ‘pollution’, etc. (Stone, 2012; Wilson, 1980).

Secondly, a social movement perspective on stakeholder theory has contributed to a move away from viewing firm-stakeholder relations in the ‘spoke and wheel’ formation originally proposed by E. R. Freeman (1984) and towards a more holistic view of stakeholders as individuals and organizations in their own right - not as simply dangling attachments to the firm. In this vein, we can identify the works of Rowley and Moldoveau (2003), Wolfe and Putler (2002), Gardberg and Newburry (2010), and Den Hond and De Bakker (2007), described above. Drawing on the social identity theory branch of the social movement literature, these authors have provided valuable insight into the characteristics and demographics of protest groups and their members – radical or moderate, homogenous or diverse, minority or white, etc..

Thirdly, social movement theory allows us to consider stakeholders’ actions in the broad context of institutional and social change. A single stakeholder request may be part of a much larger strategy managed by the stakeholder group, and a single stakeholder may engage in actions together with other stakeholders with each group’s role and behavior altering in whatever fashion best suits the needs of the cause (Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2010; Zietsma & Winn, 2008). There are both long term ‘wars’ fought between the parties and punctual ‘battles’ that are either planned or arise unexpected and that can
determine the course of the ‘war’ for change in the targeted institutions and governments (Tilly & Wood, 2009). Social movement theory thus brings a much more dynamic vision of stakeholder-firm relations to the discussion of stakeholder theory. This dynamic ‘social change’ perspective can be seen in the work of Hoffman (1999) on how institutional fields can be created around an issue and contested over a 20-30 year time frame, in the work of Reid and Toffel (2009) on how initiatives by activists taken at the institutional level over time bring a firm to alter its policies, in the work of van Huijstee and Glasbergen (2010) on how NGOs work to play different roles in a semi-coordinated manner over time to influence the target firm, and in the work of Zietsma and Winn (2008) on how stakeholders use ‘influence chains’ and ‘influence flows’ in their strategies to protest the Canadian forest industry practices. It can also been seen in the work of Lounsbury (2001) and Lounsbury and Ventresca (2003) who studied recycling practices in the educational community and found that the presence of an activist group at the field-level altered the adoption of practices in different institutions.

King (2008) suggested that the political process model could be used to gain a deeper understanding of firm-stakeholder relations. He posits that stakeholder influence is greatest when those groups’ take advantage of political opportunities (such as a misstep by the target corporation), develop mobilizing structures for organization and discussion, and use framing to draw media attention and turn public opinion against the target firm. The ‘political process model’ has gained widespread recognition for its application to social movements, but has also more recently come under some critique (Bevington &
Dixon, 2005; Gamson & Meyer, 1997; Goodwin, Jasper, & Khattra, 1999; Goodwin & Jasper, 2012). Chief among the critiques is the broadly defined nature of ‘political opportunities’ – opportunities open the way for political action, but they can also be created by political activists (Gamson & Meyer, 1997; Goodwin et al., 1999). Another is the lack of specificity or relevance of the theory – Bevington and Dixon (2005) point out that social activists seek not only to know that ‘political opportunities’, ‘mobilizing structures’ and ‘framing mechanisms’ are important, but also to know ‘how’ they can create those mechanism more effectively.

King (2008a) partially addressed the issues with the political process model by attempting to provide precise definitions for each element. What has yet to be determined is whether or not King’s definitions adequately reflect these elements in the stakeholder-firm context; King’s own empirical research found a correlation between activist actions and firm responses, but did not explore the definitions or the application of the political process model in a specific case or instance (King, 2008b).

A visual interpretation of King’s model is presented below. Political opportunities, framing mechanisms and mobilizing structures are ‘input’ variables that lead to successful stakeholder action – the ‘outcome’ of a social movement against the firm.
Let’s examine for a moment King’s definition of ‘political opportunities’ based on McAdam, McCarthy and Zald’s work from their book, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (McAdam; McCarthy; Zald, 1996). King (2008 a) defines political opportunities as:

a) Major firm-level changes in corporate structure and leadership, including mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, and promotion of a new CEO.

b) Expressions of internal ally support (among top executives or board directors).

c) Increased industry competitiveness and increased failure rates of dominant incumbents.

d) Government action taken against an industry or corporation.

One issue that can be raised with this definition is whether or not King has overlooked important aspects of ‘political opportunities’ from the original research on that topic. For example, his definition above does not also include action or events including company decisions, strategy changes, unintended events or accidents, court cases, random events, etc. The decision of a firm to use or not to use a specific supplier, to build or not to build
a factory in a given location, to compensate or not to compensate employees for a possible wrong, or to react or not to react to an environmental event or to new environmental research are all possible examples. Punctual occurrences of this type are identified as ‘political opportunities’ in the literature on the political process model, but are absent from King’s 4-part definition above (Gamson & Meyer, 1997; Kingdon, 1984; Stone, 2012). Research in the stakeholder area would also suggest that such events are important and serve as catalysts to stakeholder mobilization indicating that the definition of ‘political opportunities’ in the stakeholder context should perhaps encompass them (T. Rowley & Berman, 2000).

A related concern is whether King (2008 a) has overlooked elements specific to the firm-stakeholder relationship, but not recognized in the broader ‘political process model’. The political process model includes the three elements mentioned above – ‘political opportunities’, ‘mobilizing structures’ and ‘framing mechanisms’ – and King has included the same three in his framework for firm-stakeholder relations. But, for example, it is widely recognized that firm-stakeholder relations are strongly impacted by social and cultural trends with regards to ethical and moral standards. What is considered to be acceptable practice at one time may not be in another. Changes in social norms or other institutional factors may be important ‘political opportunities’ and firms that do not alter their behavior in accordance with social norms may gradually become increasingly vulnerable (Friedman & Miles, 2002; Goodpaster, 1991; Hillman & Keim, 2001). These factors are not included in King’s three-part framework which raises questions about how
such elements and others should be represented in this framework or if they should be at all.

To conclude, the political process perspective on social movements is proving to be a useful lens in which to examine the actions of secondary stakeholders vis-à-vis their target firms. King’s suggestion that the political process model could be applied to secondary stakeholder-firm relations and his initial framework provide a very useful starting point in the development of a social movement-based model for secondary stakeholders. Yet, there is a good deal yet to be done to develop the framework into a workable tool. This dissertation work has provided the opportunity to carry King’s framework to the next level of articulation and development.

2.3 The Impact of Social Media & the Internet

The fore-mentioned research has significantly advanced our understanding of secondary stakeholders and their actions yet many of these ideas and research projects date from before the advent of social media and no major study has looked at the changes that social media have brought to secondary stakeholder influence strategies. This may be an important oversight. Research on social media in the marketing and political science domains affirms that these tools are changing the way that activists and consumer groups gain support for their causes. Studies indicate that social media are making it easier for protest groups to organize across geographical boundaries, or to conduct outreach to
potential new members (Shirky, 2011; Walgrave, Bennett, Van Laer, & Breunig, 2010; Weinberg & Williams, 2006). Other studies suggest that social media are facilitating protest dialogue, a process thought to be a precursor to mobilization (Bennett, 2003), and fostering the creation of new techniques for protest such as the creation of spoof Twitter sites, or the sharing of You-Tube videos like the one against Joseph Kone’s ‘children’s army’ in Uganda (Invisible Children, 2012; Pitt et al., 2002).

For the purposes of this study in which the use of both social media and other internet-based tools is important, I define ‘social media’ as, the set of behavior and practices, enabled by the internet, web 2.0 and related technologies, that allows for the creation, development, and sharing of information, ideas, and services directly between individuals, groups and organizations across the planet. This definition draws upon perspectives provided by Li and Bernoff (2008), the authors of Groundswell, who describe the internet and social media based phenomenon as having its roots in technological developments, but its future driven by social interaction. Li and Bernoff (2008) define it as “a social trend in which people use technologies to get the things they need from each other, rather than from traditional institutions like corporations” (p. 9). Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) define it as follows: “Social Media is a group of internet-based applications that builds on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content” (p. 61).
A social media site or tool is simply a platform or better, a *backdrop*, to the core activity which is the sharing of information and ideas directly between parties without the interface of a supra-organizing entity that edits, compiles, summarizes, restricts, or otherwise controls the communication between one party and another. In a very concrete fashion, this purpose-driven behavior turns the traditional notion of information creation and diffusion on its head. In the traditional mode, trusted, presumably reliable organizations such as the government, corporations, information entities such as libraries or research organizations provided (pushed) information to the public – consumers – who then relied on that information in order to make decisions. Those decisions could be about consumption, investment, politics, life-style, career-choice, or any other topic of interest. In this new world, information creation and diffusion can be, and is being, managed by individuals themselves. Corporations, organizations, governments are no longer the sole or preferred source for information. Herne, Foth and Grey (2009) describe it as follows, “…participatory culture, enabled by recent technological innovations, (that) shifts the communication flows away from a central business-to-consumer model. The trend is towards consumer-to-consumer or even ‘prosumer-to-prosumer’ flows of communication as consumers start to produce content on their own using new media applications and services” (p. 2). Hart-Cohen (2012) has a more general description, “Within the current usages of ‘social media’, … the ‘social’ collapses into a term of mediation and stands for the range of connecting instances in which media performs linkages across platforms and virtual places. These linkages frequently take the form of conversations between persons…” (p. 1).
The internet is a tool which is well adapted to meet the needs of the social activist. With a push of a button, the activist can connect with every individual he/she ever got, or tried to get, join their cause. Better yet, he/she can transmit facts, arguments, and visual evidence throughout the world in a matter of seconds. Protests and events can be organized in a matter of minutes with the use of social media (Juris, 2012; Tapscott & Ticoll, 2003). Why stand around outside in the cold protesting when one can create a powerful worldwide internet event similar to the one mounted against the Ugandan guerilla leader Joseph Kony from a desktop. In an essay in *Foreign Affairs* magazine Clay Shirky (2011) points out that, “social media has become the coordinating tool for nearly all of the world’s political movements” (p. 2). And in a recent survey of 53 activist organizations in the US, 100% of the 169 respondents indicated that the social media helps them accomplish their advocacy goals (Obar, Zube, & Lampe, 2011).

Bennett (2003) has found that social media is revising the traditional manner in which protestors associate with one another. In particular, he maintains that, “…an important sub-text of this movement is media democracy, centered on the conversion of media consumers into producers, …all channeled through personal digital networks” (p.145). He goes on to point out that, “… effects at the network level include the formation of large and flexible coalitions exhibiting the ‘strength of weak ties’ that make those networks more adaptive and resistant to attack than coalitions forged through leader-based partnerships among bureaucratic organizations” (p.146). The polycentric,
distributed networks of protesters connected via the net and social media may be better equipped to tackle protest directed at global corporations and transnational targets. He explains, “Many activists believe that labor, environment, rights and other policies of their governments have been weakened by pressures from global corporations and transnational economic regimes such as the World Trade Organization. The resulting capacity of corporations to escape regulation and win concessions from government has created a political sphere beyond normal legislative, electoral, and regulatory processes…” (p. 148). He goes on, “…newly emerging forms of political action are being aimed beyond government nearly everywhere in the post-industrial North…. These nimble campaigns aimed at corporations and transnational trade and development targets lend themselves to the repertoires of digital communication…” (p. 148).

In recognition of the importance that on-line networks play in a social movement, several authors are looking specifically at the configuration of social media and network ties within communities (Asur, Huberman, Szabo, & Wang, 2011; Choudhary, Hendrix, Lee, Palsetia, & Liao, 2012; Grabowicz, Moro, Pujol, & Eguiluz, 2012; Romero, Huberman, Galuba, & Asur, 2010). Choudhary et al (2012) studied the Egyptian uprising and found that the most influential tweets were provided by major news organizations: Al Jazeera, CNN, etc. Asur et al (2011) looked at how trending topics remain popular and found that for a topic to trend for a long time, it requires many people to contribute actively to it. Romero et al (2010) showed that the majority of Twitter users act as passive information consumers and do not forward the content they receive. Grabowicz et al (2012) showed
that there were strong parallels between on-line and off-line networks in Twitter and that although personal interactions were more likely to occur between those of the same network, new information was more likely to be passed through links connecting different groups.

Juris (2012) approached the question of social network configuration from another perspective. He drew on his research and personal experience with the ‘Occupy’ movement to suggest that there may be differences within the family of digital networking tools between those that favor the ‘logic of networks’ and allow activists to develop sustained and somewhat complex discussions and exchanges regarding tactics and strategy, and those that favor the ‘logic of aggregation’ and allow one to “blast out vast amounts of information, links, and updates via person-to-person, ego-centered networks, that take advantage of powerful ‘small-world’ effects to generate massive viral communication flows.” He points to Twitter and smart phones as particularly effective with regard to the ‘logic of aggregation’.

Social media also appears to be altering the method of execution of traditional strategies while simultaneously creating unexpected added benefits. Based on her study of a German anti-corporate campaign, Baringhorst (2008) points out that the social media and the internet allowed that movement to extend beyond the traditional spatial limits (i.e. geographic limits). It also permitted a rapid consensus of opinion and reaction around a single visual image or story that then served as a visual code for the community and was
sufficient for the creation of a sense of community and social capital despite the geographic separation. In studying the 2004 Howard Dean campaign for democratic presidential nominee, Weinberg and Williams (2006) found that on-line use of ‘Meet-Up’, a community building website, increased off-line campaign contributions, volunteering activity, and advocacy on behalf of Dean. Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez (2011) have suggested that social media also had an important impact on the Obama presidential campaign of 2008 that went beyond educating the public and raising money to include ‘getting out the vote’ and virtually organizing the grassroots mobilization and activity, particularly by or for young people.

Corporations and marketing specialists have also acknowledged the impact of social media. Aula (2010) writes, “…what is important is that social media content cannot be controlled in advance and that content cannot be managed in the same way as, for example, conventional media such as TV or newspapers. In practice, that means that it is almost impossible for organizations to control conversations about themselves” (p.44). Concretely, Aula’s point is that social media allows for customer generated information or content and consumer to consumer communication and sharing that is not subject to corporate oversight. User-generated-content can be created through reviews, shoppers’ surveys, on-line discussions, video-sharing, even through conversations in virtual worlds, all of which impacts the behavior and views of consumers with regard to the firm (Liu & Karahanna, E; Watson, 2011). With such tools at their disposal, individuals who want to say something about a firm, its products, or its practices have ample opportunity to do so.
As summarized by Fournier and Avery (2011), “Branding had become an open-source activity, via which anyone and everyone had a say in matters of the brand” (p.194).

A good example of open-source branding is the popularity of anti-brand sites and spoofing. Consumers can often go to great lengths to target a corporation. In some case, webpages or websites are set up to make fun of or to ‘spoof’ actual websites. For example, a BP Twitter feed was set up to satirize BP and BP’s CEO Tony Hayward with what sounds like the voice of Hayward saying, “Black Sandy Beaches are very trendy in some places” (Fournier & Avery, 2011). Pitt, Berthon, Watson and Zinkhan (2002) point out that some sites have been set up so effectively that anyone looking for the real firm on a search engine can’t fail to find the spoof site as well. In other cases, sites are set up to allow disgruntled customers to vent. One of the more successful anti-brand sites was set up for dissatisfied United customers, ‘www.untied.com’. The site’s founder claimed that in 2000 over 200,000 people visited the site. Compounding the challenge faced by firms, Berthon, Pitt, Plangger and Shapiro (2012) point out that local events seldom remain local and general issues seldom remain general with global trends being reinterpreted locally.

As a result, some authors are suggesting that social media is facilitating an alteration in the power relationship between consumers/activists and firms. In looking at the impact of social media on consumer ‘price making’ (vs. price taking), Pitt et al (2001, 2002) have suggested that social media and the internet have given consumers’ more power vis-à-vis
the corporation due to reduced search costs and the ability to engage in bidding or
consumer-to-consumer transactions. The notion that consumers’ willingness to pay might
be changing is a topic that was looked at by Parent, Plangger and Bal (2011). The authors
felt that this rather central concept in marketing needed to be reconsidered in light of
social media and re-baptized, ‘willingness to participate’. “The ‘old’ WTP, or
willingness-to-pay, is a concept derived from and used in business strategy; it refers to a
consumer’s motivation to pay a price … a result of their perception of that good or
service’s higher value. We suggest that in an internet connected, social media-enabled
world, this willingness is better reflected as consumer engagement, or active involvement
with a brand, product, service, or company through acts like creating content…” (p. 220).
They go on to explain how firms are able to leverage the power of their on-line
communities to either lower costs, increase loyalty or both. Drawing on French and
Raven’s power theory, Rezabakhsh, Bornemann, Hansen, and Schrader (2006) have
developed the argument that consumer power has increased due to higher market
transparency, consumers’ increased ability to inflict punitive sanctions on companies via
exit and voice, and consumers’ increased opportunity to play a more active role in the
product value chain, thereby influencing both prices and features.

In the preceding pages, two major branches of the literature on social media have been
reviewed – the branch dealing with activism and social media, and a second branch
dealing with corporate marketing and communications and social media. These two were
identified as being the most pertinent for a discussion of stakeholder influence strategies
by activist groups. Researchers in both branches of the literature indicate that social media is bringing about a shift in the power balance between activists and/or consumers on the one hand and firms on the other. With regard to activists, this is explained by social media’s ability to allow activists to ‘do more with less’ (i.e. to accomplish more with fewer resources in terms of manpower and money), and by the assistance social media tools provide in allowing activists groups to create and coordinate networks on a world-wide basis and, notably re-dress an imbalance of power that had built up between local or regionally based activists group and large multinationals. With regard to the consumer, the power transfer is explained by consumers’ greater access to information which allows them to be more rational buyers, and by consumers’ increased ability to ‘sanction’ firms with more avenues for expression and the possibility for collective action. Consumers are becoming more price-makers than price-takers.

The second theme found in the literature relates to Skirky’s (2011) notion of the importance of the access to conversation. Both research branches point to importance that on-line dialogue is beginning to have in the formation of ideas, political opinions, like-minded communities, etc. Such dialogues have been shown to be vitally important in bringing about individual action and, in the past, these dialogues have occurred only in the physical arena. The movement of these dialogues into on-line communities that stretch across the world can potentially change the manner in which people create political or social identities, frame their observations and ideas, and then translate those into action. Aula (2010) has his notion of ‘ambient publicity’, while Bennett (2003) talks
about ‘media democracy’. Both point to the new role that socially networked individuals are playing in the construction of the public perception of events and institutions.

For the reasons outlined above, the impact of social media on stakeholder influence strategies merits further investigation. Both the greater ease with which activists can organize and mobilize, and the increased ability of all consumer and activists to frame their issues and create a conversation around a topic, may have implications for the functioning of the political process model and the impact of stakeholder influence strategies. This study proposed to fill that gap by taking into account social media’s impact on secondary stakeholders’ influence strategies and the operationalization of the political process model.

In the following sections, the research questions which guided this study of secondary stakeholder influence strategies in the Deep Water Horizon incident are presented.
Chapter 3: Methodology

This research is exploratory and aimed at contributing to theory-building. Gioia and Pitre (1990) define theory broadly as, “any coherent description or explanation of observed or experienced phenomenon” and theory-building as, “the process or cycle by which such representations are generated, tested, and refined” (p. 587). This study contributes to the process of theory-building by exploring the use of a recognized broad-level theory in the social movement literature for use in a specific context in another domain – that of firm-stakeholder relations. This research’s contribution is more specifically the refinement of the political process model for use in explaining stakeholder-firm relations in the internet era. It also sets the stage for the development of a mid-level theory that can explain and predict successful secondary stakeholder action against a firm.

This study adopts an inductive approach to process of theory-refining in this context. Inductive research is based on inductive reasoning in which the researcher moves from observation to pattern identification to tentative hypothesis and finally to theory (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). Deductive research moves in a reverse order, from theory to confirmation thereof. As explained in the literature review section of this dissertation, theory is as yet poorly developed in the area of secondary stakeholder-firm relations. Constructs such as King’s (2008 a) political process model for stakeholder-firm relations are tentative and cause and effect relations between secondary stakeholders’ actions and firm responses are as yet inconclusive or incomplete. It is not clear as yet whether how
the political process model might be applied to firm-stakeholder relations. Moreover, the model was developed before social media and internet connectivity were introduced and it has been suggested that these tools have significantly impacted social movement related processes (Aula, 2010; Bennett, 2003; Shirky, 2011). An inductive approach is therefore suited to the purposes of this work.

This study also reflects an interpretive tradition. It is aimed at explaining secondary stakeholders’ perceptions and behavior vis-à-vis firms with whom they engage. It thus entails the study of relationships and interactions and these are essentially social and perceived by nature. For such a study, Gioia and Pitre (1990) suggest that positivist/functional approaches may be less well adapted than those based on subjectivist/interpretive traditions (see also Burrell and Morgan 1979). When, “what is ‘out there’ becomes very much related to interpretations made ‘in here’ (internal to both the organization members under study and the researchers conducting the study), subjectivist/interpretive approaches are better adapted” (p. 587). An understanding of the position of the parties impacted by the Deepwater Horizon spill was gained through interpretation of these parties’ comments and actions, and these were used to understand subsequent events and relations between stakeholders and the firm. Karl Weick (1989) describes this process as ‘sensemaking’ and quotes Dublin (1976) who describes this approach to research as, “making sense of the observable world by ordering relationships among elements that constitute the researcher’s focus of attention in the real world.” (Dubin, p. 26; Weick, p. 519) Consistent with the interpretive perspective, it should be
recognized that this study’s results reflect both my own interpretive bias and that of the subjects studied.

In terms of the type of theory this research ultimately will contribute to developing, it is helpful to recall the taxonomy describes by Gregor (Gregor, 2006). The author defines five separate types of research: 1) Analysis; 2) Explanation; 3) Prediction; 4) Explanation/Prediction; and 5) Design and Action. In its original conception, the political process model is a theory of social political movement, a Type 4 theory (explanation/prediction) that applies to broad movements for social change in a political and social system. In applying it to the different and more limited context of firm stakeholder relations, neither the explanatory nor the predictive elements of the model can be assumed to hold. The model must therefore be re-conceived starting from the definitions and clarification of elements in the model and their relationships. Ultimately, this research should contribute to the development of a separate mid-level theory – tentatively named the ‘stakeholder process model’ – that is likewise a Type 4 theory, explanation/prediction, but that displays its own characteristics, definitions, and predicted outcomes. This study represents a step in the process of developing such a theory. From the perspective of theory-building, this study’s primary aims are to validate the applicability of the political process model to the firm-stakeholder relationship context and to develop the explanatory capabilities of the model for this context. This study therefore does not attempt to test the predictive capabilities of the model, although conceptually, they are understood to be present. The study method used here, a case
study, is adequate for the purposes of developing appropriate definitions, clarifying the relationships between the elements of the model, and explaining firm-stakeholder relationships within the context of a secondary stakeholder protest. Indeed, this is the purpose of this study. Moreover, these elements will be necessary for building a strong mid-level explanatory/predictive theory (Gregor, 2006).

3.1 Research Questions: In keeping with theory-building objectives, this study addressed ‘how’ questions that allow the researcher to adopt an exploratory approach and to tease out differences that might otherwise be missed if another approach had been used (Yin, 2009). The following questions guided this study’s investigations:

1. How does social movement theory, as explained by King’s (2008 a) model, explain the interplay between BP and its stakeholders following the Deep Water Horizon incident?

2. How has social media changed the role that framing, opportunities and structures play in the life of a protest and, over time, in the social movement.

3.2 Case Method: To address the research questions above, a single case study was chosen. This study falls under the category of an ‘exploratory case study’ whose purposes are to contribute to the theory-building described above. Both Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009) suggests that such cases are appropriate when the level of research concerning a phenomenon is limited and there are little or no hypotheses that can be applied to the
given subject of study. Indeed, as suggested by the literature review above, our understanding of secondary stakeholders’ influence strategies is limited and the advent of social media has further complicated our ability to use existing theoretical models to explain secondary stakeholders’ behavior vis-à-vis firms. Yin (2009) also suggests that the case method is appropriate when the subject of the study is contemporary, which is the case here with regards to the study of the impact of social media.

Yet even for an exploratory case, Yin (2009) advises that some structure should be given to the study. Eisenhardt (1989) echoes Yin in writing that the use of a priori constructs will help to shape the research design. King’s (2008) article suggesting that the political process model can be applied to the study of stakeholder-firm relations provides the initial construct on which to base the exploration of secondary stakeholder influence strategies. King’s model however should not be understood as well-developed. He provides tentative definitions and several possible angles of interpretation of the political process model for the purposes of stakeholder-firm analysis, yet the model is at a very early stage of development (see the literature review above for details). Moreover, the political process model from the social movement literature, on which King based his work, has not been revised to account for the advent of the internet and social media. With so many factors potentially influencing the reliability of existing constructs around firm-secondary stakeholder relations, the decision to adopt an exploratory case study method is largely justified.
3.3 Research Setting – Deepwater Horizon spill: As a context for the study, the BP Deepwater Horizon has been chosen as an illustrative case in order to further our understanding of the ‘political process model’ as it is applied to firm-secondary stakeholder relations. The study explores secondary stakeholders’ influence strategies in reaction to the Deep Water Horizon spill of 2010. Such behavior can be considered to be typical of those found in other protest actions in the 21st century, including the BP stakeholders’ use of social media.

It could be argued that the Deepwater Horizon spill was an event too widely publicized or too unusual in the scope of the damage inflicted to be used as an illustrative case. The magnitude of the incidence could be thought to impact the external validity of the study for use as an illustrative case. Yet many dramatic incidents of the past, such as the study of the Cuban missile crisis, the Columbia flight disaster, or the events at Mann Gulch have proved to be excellent opportunities to study human and social interactions in organizational settings (Allison, 1971; Starbuck & Farjoun, 2005; Weick, 1993). The dramatic nature of events does not necessarily alter human reactions, though it may amplify them. There is, for example, in this case no reason to suppose that the actors in the Deepwater Horizon incident would behave differently if the spill were a little more or less important in size. In the category of important ecological events, the Deepwater
Horizon can be considered illustrative in terms of the reactions and behavior of the parties concerns.

Because the Deepwater Horizon spill represents a major ecological incident in the 21st century, it was well documented and thereby provides a very rich and easily accessible source of information for study. For example, by May 1, merely eight days after the initial explosion, there were already over 300 articles per day appearing in the English print media referencing the topic. By June 15 there were over 850 articles appearing per day (based on a Proquest data search). This does not include the communication that could be found on social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook and on the various blogs. The Deepwater Horizon spill therefore is an excellent case for the study of illustrative secondary stakeholder and firm behavior due to the easy access to data on that behavior. The day-by-day course of events can be followed easily and suggests that stakeholders acted rapidly and effectively to help uncover information pertinent to the public’ understanding of BP’ role in the oil spill. Stakeholders’ positions on various aspects were widely documented, thanks to the press, but also to such events as the US Congressional hearing that began within the first 90 of the explosion. The reactions of BP and its CEO, Tony Hayward, are also well documented by the press and by citizen groups who attended the many meetings and events organized by BP on the Gulf. Comments and claims by certain groups can be easily cross-referenced for veracity with observations and documentation from other sources. In many situations where corporate stakeholders are involved, researchers do not have the luxury of having such excellent access to
stakeholder-firm dialogue; much of the discussion occurs behind closed doors, but, for the Deepwater Horizon spill, a great deal occurred under the glaring scrutiny of the public eye. These circumstances make the Deepwater Horizon spill a very good case study for our purposes.

3.4 Unit of Analysis: This study set out to analyze the interplay between BP and its stakeholders following the Deep Water Horizon oil spill as it progressed towards a full-fledged social movement against BP. This approach includes looking at BP’s secondary stakeholders’ reactions to the spill and BP’s actions and interactions with both secondary and primary stakeholders, government agencies, and the public following the spill. This approach fits well with the use of the political process model as a lens for examining these relationships and interactions. The political process model is structured around explaining a ‘movement’, in this case, the development of a social movement against BP subsequent to the Deepwater Horizon spill.

Given the original framing for this study, it was anticipated that there would be a single unit of analysis with regards to the BP spill, i.e. a single social movement by stakeholders against BP. As the research unfolded, what had appeared to be a single phenomenon – ‘the movement’ - was later discovered to be an event occurring at two levels: 1) the level of the ‘movement’ in which one observes the development of negative stakeholder sentiment against BP, and 2) the level of an issue in which one observes punctual discussions or events that arise around a topic that subsequently impacts the larger
movement against BP. This observation in itself represents a finding of the research (see ‘analysis’ and ‘findings’ for more information). These issues are topics around which groups rally and enter into discussion or debate. Issues develop as the result of a divergence of interest and perception about the benefits and costs of a particular event or decision (Stone, 2012). Each issue identified in connection with the Deepwater Horizon spill gave rise to discussion and debate and sometimes protests by stakeholders. Each movement around an issue had a separate set of stakeholders, a different start point and end point, and progressed largely independently of the other issues and the larger movement against BP - although there were observable interconnections. Most importantly for this study, each of these issues ultimately fed into the development of the movement as a whole against BP.

Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that case studies can involve multiple levels of analysis within a single study. She gives the example of Mintzberg & Waters’ (1982) study of a grocery empire in which multiple strategic changes were examined within the context of broad corporate-wide change (Eisenhardt, 1989). The study of the Deepwater Horizon appears to have a similar structure. While in what Bonoma (1985) describes as the “drift stage” of the case study process in which the researcher is “ready to learn from the naturalistic phenomenon as they present themselves”, a pattern of multiple issues coming to the fore, being debated, and then feeding into the movement against BP as a whole, or dying away was observed (p. 205). The evolution of each of the 15-18 issues identified exhibited this pattern. In some cases, these issues were social movements in their own right, for
example, the movement against off-shore drilling is a particularly contentious one that has been going on since the oil spill in 1969 off the coast of Santa Barbara. The revived discussion around the off-shore drilling topic and the manner in which discussions were evolving at the time of the Deepwater Horizon spill had major implications for the evolution of BP-stakeholder relations. I therefore decided to use the political process model as an approach for analyzing each of these issues.

Because of this new understanding gained early on in the course of the research, the study’s unit of analysis was altered to add a set of embedded cases (the issues) within the study of the broader phenomenon (‘the movement’) (Yin, 2009). The units of analysis for this study are therefore: 1) the stakeholder ‘movement’ of protest against BP, and 2) the ‘issue’, an embedded unit, defined as a topic or concern around which stakeholders rallied and whose evolution had an important impact on BP and subsequent events connected with the Deepwater Horizon spill.

The following diagram explains further the relationship between the issues, stakeholders, and the target of a stakeholder protest, over the stages of a stakeholder movement. The stages are described below as: emergent, coalescing, and (fully emerged) stakeholder movement. In the emergent stage, an issue of importance or concern to a group of stakeholders emerges. Several different stakeholder groups and several different issues may exist or emerge. Initially, the issues and their stakeholders exist independently of one another; there is little connection between stakeholder groups; little attempt is made
at this stage to engage with other groups supporting other issues. The organizational targets at this stage may be several. A stakeholder groups may hold the government, a corporation, as well as several other parties potentially responsible for the issue that has been raised.

Diagram #4 Conceptual Relationship between Issues, Stakeholders, and Protest Targets

In the coalescing stage, stakeholder groups begin to be aware of each other and their respective issues. There may be an attempt by some to develop ties with other groups and to make connections between their respective issues (Zietsma and Winn call these influence chains) (Zietsma & Winn, 2008). Framing alters in this phase as groups attempt to identify messages which appeal to the stakeholders of multiple groups. Targeting
efforts narrow to focus in on fewer organizations. In the final phase, stakeholder groups ban together and coordinate their efforts closely. They may organize joint protest efforts, or issue simultaneous press releases. The issues they champion become closer related and the framing and messaging of the separate issues build upon one another to project a common impression. These efforts are now cumulative rather than isolated or simply parallel. In this final stage, a target has been determined and stakeholders’ efforts are concentrated on influencing a single target rather than multiple targets.

This diagram and the relationships described therein considered in the context of this study suggest that the exploration of the role of issues, as well as stakeholders and their targets is merited. The choice of using the political process model to explore issues as embedded cases is justified by the important role that issues play in the development of a stakeholder movement and close relationship that exists between stakeholders, issues and their target.

3.5 **Nature of data collected and sources:** This study relied upon data in four forms. First, there was information provided by the traditional media and press in the form of newspaper articles, magazines, and news website articles. Second, there was information coming from individuals posting comments and links to blogs, targeted media sites such as ‘Mother Jones’, and other social media expression sites (Facebook, for example). Third, there were YouTube videos and other visual commentary uploaded by individuals and groups directly to YouTube. Finally, there was information coming from special
interest group websites such as the Gulf Restoration Network, Louisiana Bucket Brigade, etc..

While the journal articles and other traditional sources should be considered as secondary sources, the social media site posting, the blog postings, the YouTube videos and other such user content based data are closer to being ‘primary sources’ due to their candid and unmediated nature. Hookway (2008), for example, suggests that blogs can be thought of as the on-line version of a diary in which the person expresses his/her feelings and opinions in an open letter or ‘op-ed’ without the stigma of being identified as the author due to the autonomous nature of many blog postings. Cowton (1998) even suggests that secondary sources may be sometimes preferable to primary sources for research on socially or politically sensitive topics because of the difficulty with social desirability response bias with the interviewer present. The range of sources used in this study is sufficiently reliable and varied to provide a thorough understanding of the events surrounding the Deepwater Horizon spill.

With regards to the choice of sources, the following approach was used. For more general information concerning events connected with the Deepwater Horizon spill, the mainstream journals such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Associated Press based articles, and the wire services such as the Environmental New Service wire were the most useful. These sources provided thorough coverage of the spill and assisted in the construction of a reliable timeline of events. In particular, the New York Times
began daily coverage of the spill entitled: “Day -: The Latest on the Oil Spill” which was most helpful for following along with developments (“Day 45: The Latest on the Oil Spill,” 2010).

For regional reactions, journals based on the Gulf including the Times-Picayune, the La Houma Courier, and the Orlando Sentinel, for example, were useful. The UK journals including the Times, the Financial Times, and the Guardian reported extensively on the BP spill and they often provided a more BP-centric view on events, for example commenting on the implications of an event for BP and/or its management team. More investigative journals such as the Christian Science Monitor or the Wall Street Journal provided in-depth reporting on particular issues. This study also relied on some CNN, MSNBC and Fox TV coverage to complement the journals. This was obtained in a more haphazard fashion as certain issues were researched on the internet. But by triangulating the information provided from these varied sources, it was possible to gain a broad understanding of the course of events and of the major issues that came into play over the three month period of the Deepwater Horizon spill.

To absorb more subjective perspectives on events, a different set of sources was used including the blogs, the specialized and political news websites (such as Mother Jones), and the industry specific websites (such as Rigzone). To be sure that a roughly equal selection of views from both ends of the American political spectrum was included, a list of Technocrati’s list of top blogs was crossed with that of Blogs.com list of top ten to
arrive at a draft list of political blogs ("Technocrati Top 100," 2014, "Top 10," 2014). The blogs in questions were also checked to be sure that they were active and popular in 2010. Based on the ease of accessing information from 2010, several political blogs were chosen for use. They included DailyKos, Hotair.com and Reason.com. Several news sites/special interest sites were also chosen: Mother Jones, OilDrum, and Rigzone. Other sources came up as suggested links to articles in sites such as HuffingtonPost Green; Grist, Reuters, CNNMoney, etc.

A YouTube search was carried out on the BP explosion and BP spill and over 400 videos were found. All of those with over 40 views were retained. Many were songs, photographic chronicles of events, and personal commentaries, but others were recordings of press interviews, links to websites with scientific and/or technical information, recordings of conspiracy theory commentators, or recording of meeting with BP officials and local residents or groups. CNN Cooper Anderson TV reporting was a very popular topic for uploading. These sources are very rich in what Geertz calls ‘thick description’ as they provide clues to how people are feeling about the events, how they relate events to other concerns in their life, how they interpret the events and their potential impact (Geertz, 1994). There were also a large number of recordings of the underwater oil leakage, footage that was made publicly available following the Congressional hearing and that was uploaded to YouTube by private citizens.
Finally, the websites of specific groups involved in the protests against BP were looked at. Several of these sites had only limited information about events from 2010 and were a bit disappointing as sources. The groups had changed over the material on their sites and the archives search function of their websites was either absent or not very effective. The groups included, for example, the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the Louisiana Bucket Brigade, the Gulf Restoration Network, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Natural Resources Defense Council.

Below is a table indicating the sources and the number of articles from each source.

Table #1 Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Source</th>
<th>Source Name Examples</th>
<th>Number of Entries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blog/Social Media</td>
<td>Mother Jones, Oldrum, DailyKos, Hotair</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YouTube</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire Feeds</td>
<td>Environmental News Service, CEO Wire, McClatchy</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webpages</td>
<td>Bloomberg, Rigzone, MSNBC, Reuters, Huffington Post</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television/Radio</td>
<td>CNN, NPR</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines/trade journals</td>
<td>Texas Monthly, Oil Daily</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall goal of my data collection activities was not to achieve ‘representativeness’ or comprehensiveness, but rather to gather enough information for me to correctly interpret the import of the events surrounding the BP spill and the variety of responses of stakeholder groups involved in those events. A snowball or convenience sampling
approach was used to identifying sources whereby a link or information referenced on one site was followed to its source and then added to my data base. The advantage of this technique for this study is that it replicates internet user behavior and the networked way in which they find information (Choudhury & Hari, 2006). For the purposes of this study, it was also important to ensure that information coming from the different sources was not unduly influenced by the views of one group or another, but that it took into account the variety of perspectives that existed. Networked links from multiple blogs and websites representing different perspectives on the spill were also pursued. In all, a data base of 581 entries was collected and over 300 YouTube videos.

All of the data was summarized and entered into a data set and coded according to issue, stakeholder, publication source, authors, dates, etc. For each of the articles or web posts, exact quotes from the article and by the various stakeholders was lifted from the article and entered into the data entry file. This permitted me to examine all of the recorded comments by a particular stakeholder group over the 30-day periods by simply scrolling down the data file. Duplicates in the data file were avoided/eliminated.

3.6 Scope of data collection: As indicated in the previous section, the data search conducted for this study was not intended to be comprehensive. Choices that were made to limit the amount of data collected was done in a heuristic and iterative fashion and continued throughout the data collection process, as suggested by Miles, Huberman and Saldana (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 70). A choice was made from the outset
to limit this research to a timeframe covering roughly the first three months of the Deepwater Horizon spill – from the time of the explosion on April 21, 2010 to the time that the well was successfully capped on July 16th, 2010. The choice of this timeframe relates to the theoretical purposes of this study. This study explores the rise of a social movement against BP in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill. While subsequent events are certainly interesting and newsworthy, the study thereof would not contribute significantly to our understanding of how a social movement against BP came about. The social movement against BP reached its peak in mid-to-late June 2010 and although certain groups continue to express their dissatisfaction with BP even today, much of the initial anger directed at BP had subsided by the end of the summer of 2010.

Another important choice made was to limit the study of the Deepwater Horizon events to those aspects that impacted firm-stakeholder relations. Initially, it wasn’t evident what the best approach would be for doing that, but after having read through a collection of all published journal articles available on Proquest over the first two weeks of the Deepwater Horizon event – from April 21 to May 1, 2010, I chose to concentrate on researching a ‘short list’ of stakeholders and BP. From May 1st onward only those articles that concerned one or more of the roughly 48 stakeholder groups were included in the data set. This group was made up of both primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders includes employees and their families, the investor community and shareholders, BP customers and partners - particularly those in the gulf region - and government bureaus responsible for regulating oil drilling in the Gulf. Secondary
stakeholders including ecology groups from across the country and the world, local Gulf communities, water-based businesses impacted by the spill such as fishing or shrimp farming, tourist-based business in the gulf region, researchers and data gathering organizations, and US government and semi-governmental units studying oil, environmental or biological issues - this list not being exhaustive.

When it became apparent that various issues around the events of Deepwater Horizon spill were going to be important, research then further concentrated data collection to focus on those 16-18 issues. In the latter phases of the study and in the analysis phase the issues were re-classified and/or reduced to arrive at a final list of roughly seven to eight.

Finally, stakeholders groups for analysis were reduced to those stakeholder groups which appeared to have an impact on subsequent events, in some cases, carrying out additional searches to find out more about their activities and perspectives. A good example here is the Louisiana Bucket Brigade which is a local ecology group that was active very early on in the spill and continued to be mobilized throughout the period studied. Study was also limited to Gulf stakeholders in the Louisiana region. This region was impacted earlier on and more significantly than others. In addition, their politicians were more vocal and the legacy of Katrina was a factor particular to this region which also appeared to play a role in their actions following the BP spill.
Below is a table with the list of stakeholder groups identified, broken down by primary/secondary stakeholder category.

Table #2 Deepwater Horizon Spill Stakeholders: Primary and Secondary Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Stakeholders</th>
<th>Secondary Stakeholders</th>
<th>Secondary stakeholders, continued</th>
<th>Secondary stakeholders, continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BP shareholders</td>
<td>Ecology specialists</td>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankers, financial community</td>
<td>Fishermen &amp; boat owners</td>
<td>Safe Climate Campaign</td>
<td>Hands Across the Sand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Coast Guard</td>
<td>Academic researchers &amp; scientists</td>
<td>Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution</td>
<td>Gas Oil Out!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama Administration</td>
<td>Gulf Coast residents</td>
<td>Louisiana Bucket Brigade</td>
<td>Sierra Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halliburton</td>
<td>Gulf Coast businesses</td>
<td>Gulf Restoration Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron</td>
<td>American Petroleum Institute</td>
<td>Environmental Action Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transocean</td>
<td>Energy industry consultants</td>
<td>Audubon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families of oil rig workers</td>
<td>Louisiana Gas &amp; Oil Association</td>
<td>Friends of the Earth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean-up crews &amp; subcontractors</td>
<td>Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association</td>
<td>Defenders of Wildlife</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities in Gulf states</td>
<td>International Association of Oil &amp; Gas Producers</td>
<td>Public Citizen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State authorities in Louisiana, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi</td>
<td>International Association of Drilling Contractors</td>
<td>National Resources Defense Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressmen from Louisiana, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi</td>
<td>State authorities from other states</td>
<td>Environmental Defense Fund</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration</td>
<td>Congressmen from other states</td>
<td>Environment Florida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Minerals Service</td>
<td>Other US Government agencies</td>
<td>Conservation International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil &amp; Gas companies: Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron...</td>
<td>Other countries’ governments</td>
<td>Oceana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP customers</td>
<td>National workers unions</td>
<td>Mobile Bagkeeper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A number of otherwise important areas of possible exploration have, therefore, been deliberately left out of the scope of this study. First, this study did not concentrate of gathering data on whether or not BP was actually guilty of wrong-doing with regards to the Deepwater Horizon spill. Relatively little data was available in the first three months on this topic and the interest of this research is not on BP’s actual ‘guilt’, but rather on gathering data on the perceptions of BP held by stakeholders and the public. Second, this study does not gather extensive technical information on the efforts done at the bottom of the ocean to stem the leak(s). The results, or lack thereof, and the perception of the efforts by the parties concerned – NOAA, Coast Guard, BP, Transocean, etc. – seemed to be more important than the actual technical details, although many individuals in the public domain appeared to revel in discussions around those technical issues on social media (see for example, ‘Oil Drum’ for May-July 2010). Third, this study does not chronicle tit-for-tat exchanges between stakeholders and BP, but rather focuses on the broader scope of events leading to growing frustration among stakeholders with BP.

In the following sections, the iterative process of data collection and exploration is described in greater detail.
3.7 Data Collection and Analysis Process: As an inductive and interpretive study, the process used to arrive at the conclusions is of importance. Consistent with common practice in such a study, the process was iterative. While Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009) both propose orderly approaches to case study research, my own more closely resembles that described by Bonoma (1985). Bonoma suggested four phases in theory-building case study research:

1) ‘Drift’ phase – in which the researcher attempts to immerse him/herself in the data, ‘soaking in’ the information and rejecting a priori notions about the subject and environment.

2) Design phase – in which the researcher attempts to develop tentative explanations about the topic and to structure these into a model which is then refined throughout the rest of the process.

3) Prediction phase – in which the researcher explores the predictive capabilities of the model and adjusts the model as the result of these considerations.

4) Disconfirmation phase – in which the researcher attempts to further explore the limits of the generalizations of the model based on the evidence at hand. He/she looks for disconfirming examples which do not fit, or poorly fit, the model developed.

The purposes of this study are to develop the political process model for use in analyzing firm-stakeholder relations. The most relevant of the above phases for the purpose of this study is therefore the ‘design’ phase in which the model is developed and refined. That being said, the research process touched upon all of Bonoma’s four
phases and was iterative in that I went back and forth between phases several times. In particular, I found myself in the ‘drift’ phase several times in the process. In this phase, I was attempting to push the boundaries of what was known of existing theory searching for alternative explanations. It is also worth noting that, as suggested by Bogden & KnoppBiklen (2002), the iterative process of moving between data and conclusions continued throughout all of the phases.

The table below provides a step-by-step description of the process followed during the data collection and analysis phase of this study. Items italicized represent important breakthroughs in the theory building process. As indicated, the final step in this study was the final refinement of the political process model.

**Table#3 Data Collection & Analysis Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>My Research Choices</th>
<th>My Actions</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- ‘Drift’ Phase</td>
<td>- Design Phase</td>
<td>- Prediction Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start -Inductive approach; looking at stakeholder-firm relations in Deepwater Horizon Spill</td>
<td>Read everything published in first two weeks of the spill</td>
<td>Identified initial list of 48 stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research angle - Focus on issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder-BP interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social movement represented not one, but many issues.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified 16-18 issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked on developing a timeline of events</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would use timeline to structure data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed a Timeline over three months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broaden data search - triangulating data from different sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked at social media, YouTube, special interest sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StudyScope reduction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Went back to issues list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-classified &amp; reduced list of issues to 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Went back to stakeholder list and looked for dominant groups/parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shorter list of key stakeholders – reduced emphasis on ecology groups and oil industry groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Began studying the issues one by one</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked at the first issue that came up – safety – using political process model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model seems to fit pretty well</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried other issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model mostly worked with other issues as well, but model is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Continued to analyze by issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Went back to first issue – safety – and looked at how to improve it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Political opportunities were both 'events' and 'pre-existing conditions'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified the model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked to see if new design fit the other issues – it did!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Backtracked to ‘drift’ mode

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Went back to look at all the issues to see how they developed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noticed that stakeholder efforts were directed at multiple targets, not just BP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Backtracked to stakeholder theory – construct validity check: is multi-firm, multi-stakeholder model possible for analyzing firm-secondary stakeholder relations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tried out multi-stakeholder; multi-target; multiple issue angle on PPM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-stakeholder, multi-target, multi-issue model works with PPM as a frame; issues nested within larger movement; represents an alternative to firm-centric approaches to analyzing stakeholder-firm relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Altered PPM model to include multi-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>target framing</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Began looking at</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>how social media is used</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked at use of social media within each of the steps of the PPM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social media used for framing and as a mobilization structure; replaces physical protests for many, but not all issues. Altered PPM model accordingly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Another check on issues &amp; stakeholders</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Looked again at issues and stakeholders: too many overlapping issues &amp; inactive stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consolidated issues list; consolidated relevant stakeholders list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Turned to the study of PPM outcomes – looking for conclusion validity</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For each issue, looked at the outcomes for BP and other major stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Saw two types of outcomes – direct outcomes on BP, indirect outcomes that would later impact BP

Modified PPM to include direct and indirect outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Checked for the reliability of the model across issues</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-mapped each issue based on modified PPM; checked for consistency within &amp; across issue maps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Found that all fit except one issue - it was an awkward fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Why an awkward fit?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
3.8 Working Definitions: Framing for theoretical exploration is the political process model. (King, 2008 a) Based on the political process model, some working definitions of key terms were developed for use in this study based on King’s work and extant research.

Social movement (hereafter ’movement’): adopted here is the definition provided by Fox Piven (2006) who explains social movements as ordinary people altering the institutions in which they are enmeshed by getting angry, rising up and ‘disrupting’ things.

Issues: adopted here is Stone’s (2012) perspective on issues and define them as topics around which groups rally and enter into discussion or debate. Issues develop as the result of a divergence of interest and perception about the benefits and costs of a particular event or decision. For the purposes of this study, issues are important because they are shown to contribute to the development of a social movement against BP.

Political opportunities: King (2008 a) adopts the broad definition of political opportunities as being “stakeholders’ response to exogenous opportunities”. He identifies both corporate and industrial opportunities in this category including a change in leadership or the financial standing of the firm, a change in political relationships within the firm, and industry factors and industry competition. This definition is used here.
Framing mechanisms: King draws on Benford & Snow’s definition of framing processes as involving, “the strategic use of shared meanings and definitions to invoke claims on individual’s identity and cultural sense of responsibility to a cause” (King, 2008 a, p. 11). This definition is used here.

Mobilizing structures: King (2008) adopts the definition of mobilizing structures as being, “collective vehicles, formal as well as informal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” based on the work of McAdam (p. 3). This definition is used here.

Secondary stakeholders: Groups or individuals that interact with the firm for the purpose of changing its ethical, societal, and environmental policies and practices (from p. 6 above).

Although these are the initial definitions adopted at the outset of this study, the reader should note that for some of these – political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing structure - new definitions have been developed as the result of the study’s findings. They are presented in the Findings section of this dissertation.

3.9 Research Rigor and Reliability: Several approaches were used to ensure that the findings of this study are reliable and rigorous. They are explained below. That being true, several additional research techniques will be needed to confirm certain findings of
this study. Time and resource constraints did not allow for their completion at this stage of the research.

The approaches that were used to ensure reliability and internal validity include those used at the data collection phase, those used in data analysis, and those used in the scope and design of the study.

Table #4 : Approaches Used to Ensure Reliability and Rigor of the Research in Data Collection, Data Analysis and Study Scope and Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Research</th>
<th>Research Approach</th>
<th>Contribution to Reliability &amp; Rigor of Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Source Choice</td>
<td>Multiple journals; multiple social media sites; sources identified in both systematic and 'snowball' fashion; represents range of political/social viewpoints</td>
<td>Ensures breadth of views are included – objectivity; data collection confirmation and replication is possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Source Variety</td>
<td>Several types of information sources – journals, blogs, videos, TV, websites, etc. Sources are mainstream media, the public, and bloggers.</td>
<td>Data available for analysis is both ‘thick’ and fact-rich. Social media is well-represented. Objectivity and transferability to other contexts is increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Analysis</td>
<td>Use of timeline</td>
<td>Assisted in identifying and structuring events; increases comprehensiveness of analysis and ‘auditability of results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Triangulation of data from different sources</td>
<td>Increases validity of data used to generate findings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Triangulation of definitions and relationships across issues and stakeholders</td>
<td>Increases credibility and reliability of findings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iterative Process of Analysis</td>
<td>Respects interpretive tradition; leads to greater evaluative worth in the analysis; allows for a reduction in bias and the elimination of rival explanations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Scope</td>
<td>Limit to 3-month timeframe</td>
<td>Ensured focus on stakeholder movement emergence; avoided dispersion of efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limit to study of stakeholders – firm relations in the context of the political process model</td>
<td>Ensured focus on one aspect of the BP event; respected integrity of research design.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014) suggest that a qualitative study can be assessed on various facets (Miles et al., 2014). First is the objectivity and confirmability of the study – the degree to which the researcher’s biases have been reduced to a minimum. Included in this category is the degree to which the study and its steps have been carefully laid out and the degree to which the sequence of data collection and analysis can be followed. The process for this study has been carefully laid out in section 3.7 and the study’s methods and approach were determined and presented before data collection ever began. The authors also suggest that rival explanations need to be considered and inconsistencies examined. In the analysis section of this dissertation, approaches for validating explanations has set forth and in particular, in section 5.4, Final Analysis at the holistic case level, inconsistencies are discussed.

Secondly, Huberman et al (2014) suggest that a study should be reliable/dependable and auditable. This principally refers to the research design and execution. In the table above, the approaches used to ensure reliability and dependability of the data and of the analysis are set forth. In particular, the triangulation of data from various sources assisted in the reliability of the data collected and contributed to the dependability of the findings. One area where this study can be improved is in the analysis of data. Reliable analysis is dependent upon the coding of the information and in particular, the coding of the issues, is a sensitive area. This study had only one coder and additional coders would have improved the reliability of the findings.
Thirdly, Huberman et al (2014) suggest that a study should have internal validity/credibility/authenticity. This includes both the degree to which the study’s results are meaningful and rich and present a picture which is coherent and convincing. The interpretive nature of this research has ensured that the presentation of the results is ‘thick’, rich and meaningful. The findings are also well-linked to existing theory in stakeholder-firm relations and social media, and provide a reasonable explanation filling a gap in the existing research on how secondary stakeholders influence the firm. Moreover, as described above in the table, careful efforts were made to limit the scope of the study in order that the research explores specifically those elements relative to the research questions.

Fourth, Huberman et al (2014) write of the external validity/transferability/fittingness of a study. Single case studies in particular face challenges in terms of the transferability of their findings. I address specifically the question of generalizability and transferability of the findings of this study in section 7.1. With regards to data collection, an effort was made to ensure that the variety and breadth of data used in this study was as broad as possible in order to represent many groups and populations that might be concerned by the study’s findings. Additional research will be needed in order to confirm the validity of the approach used here.
Finally, Huberman et al (2014) indicate that the findings should have utilization/applicability/an action orientation. By this they mean that the research should heighten awareness, make a difference in individuals’ perceptions of an issue, or lead to concrete action that alter the course of events. This research contributes primarily to heightening the awareness of business practitioners concerning the role of secondary stakeholders and the potential increase in their ability to influence their corporate targets. More on this subject can be found in section 7.2-7.4. Should the research agenda initiated here be carried to its conclusion, then it will have the potential to alter perceptions and bring about changes in the way in which business leaders manage their relations with stakeholders. More on this topic can be found in section 8 – Further Research Opportunities.

In conclusion, measures have been taken to ensure the reliability and rigor of this study with the exception of one crucial area – that of the coding of the data collected. Due to limited resources, the classification of information into the various categories for analysis was carried out by a single coder. In a second phase, this study’s finding should be confirmed through the use of additional coder or eventually a program-based coding tool (an example is envivo).
Chapter 4: Study Setting – The Deepwater Horizon Spill

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill began on April 20, 2010 following an explosion in the Gulf of Mexico on a rig owned by the Transnational Corporation which was under contract to BP. In the immediate days that followed, the oil rig went up in flames and sank and eleven of the 126 rig workers were declared decreased, but the well was thought to be under control with no major leaking (A.P, 2010). Yet on April 24th, NOAA, BP, and the Coast Guard announced that a leak had been found thereby beginning a dramatic saga extending over three months as BP and its partners attempt to stem what was eventually found to be a massive oil gusher at the bottom of the ocean (A.P., 2010).

The parties implicated in the events leading up to the spill and in the clean-up operations include BP and several of its partners - notably Transocean, Halliburton, Cameron, Anadarko and Mitsui - along with the US government including the Department of the Interior, the Mining & Minerals department, NOAA, the EPA, various Congressional bodies including both the Senate and the House and the relevant committees, and the President Obama and his cabinet team (“Document: BP didn’t plan for major oil spill,” 2010, “Oil Execs’ Celebration Ends; Now Comes the Grilling,” 2010, “Oil Spill Threatens Gulf Coas,” 2010; Trumbull, 2010; Wald, 2010). Also implicated are state and local level officials including, for example, Louisiana’s Governor Bobby Jindal and the Plaquemines Parish President Billy Nungesser (“Here is the latest from Gov. Bobby Jindal,” 2010). Local businesses, fishermen, boat and chartering operations, tourist-based
services, and local citizens were all impacted by the rig explosion and participated to
greater or lesser degrees in the spill clean-up (Harmon, 2010; Robertson, 2010a). Finally,
ecology groups and scientists from around the country were involved in assessing the
spill damage and in organizing and participating in the clean-up efforts (M. Reid, 2010;
Wheaton, 2010).

Concerns over BP’s handling of the spill incident began just a week after the explosion
on April 28th when NOAA indicated that the leak was 5 times BP’s original estimate
(“Five Times the Oil Gushes From Broken Gulf Wellhead,” 2010, “Oil spill could eclipse
Exxon disaster,” 2010). BP rapidly came under pressure from scientists, environmental
groups and other stakeholders for its lack of transparency and then later for its slow
response to cleaning up the damage produced by the spill (Lewison, n.d.; “Public
relations disaster,” 2010; Wang, 2010). Although Transocean, Halliburton and other BP
partners did not escape the eventual legal fallout from the spill, they were largely absent
from a bright spotlight put on BP during the first months of the spill (Lewis, 2012;
Robertson & Fountain, 2010). Leadership at BP was also less than delicate in handling
the affair. In one of several inelegantly phrased remarks that were picked up by bloggers
and the press, Tony Hayward, BP’s CEO of its US operations, called the spill ‘tiny’ as
compared with the size of the ocean (Webb, 2010). Widespread sourcing and subsequent
re-transmission of spill facts and events by individuals, researchers and other third parties
prevented BP from calming concerns about its own actions and from minimizing fears
about the potential impact of the spill on the Gulf Coast (“BP’s Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill
at the Oil Drum Overview - Especially for New Readers - Discussion,” 2010; Sheppard, 2010a). By early May, the spill was beginning to be labeled the ‘BP spill’; critiques of BP could be found in spoof videos and a spoof Twitter account; they reached a fever pitch in late June with widespread condemnation of BP on social media including the sale of anti-BP gear to help fund the clean-up (“Gulf Oil Crisis Inspires Americans to Help Through the Design of Expressive T-Shirts and Bumper Stickers at CafePress,” 2010; Lacombe, 2010; Stelter, 2010)

While much attention was directed towards BP, government officials and the Obama administration were not spared criticism and as the background information on decisions leading up to the spill became available, questions were raised as to whether greater blame should not be placed on lax government oversight at the Mining and Minerals Department (Wang, 2010; Woodard, 2010). Interior Secretary Ken Salazar was obliged to move quickly. On May 12, he fired the new department head who had been put in to bring about reform and re-organized the department into three separate functions so that they would subsequently report to separate parts of the administration in order to avoid potential conflicts of interests between development and oversight activities (“Oil Is Fouling Wetlands, Official Says,” 2010). During the slow-moving clean-up operations, the government faced new criticism on the lack of an effective effort and several wondered whether this was to be “Obama’s Katrina”, making reference to President George W. Bush’s administration’s poor response to the 2005 Katrina hurricane (Hannity, 2010). This prompted new efforts on the part of the administration to re-direct
responsibility for the spill clean-up towards BP by insisting upon BP’s responsibility for managing (and paying for) those efforts (Robertson & Fountain, 2010). In late May, Obama established a bipartisan commission to investigate the spill and, on May 27, the US Interior Department extended a moratorium on new offshore drilling in Gulf & Virginia & halts oil exploration drilling in the Arctic (“Obama clamps down on offshore drilling,” 2010). The latter move was broadly criticized by Gulf residents who depend upon the oil industry, as well as the fishing, tourism and boat industries for their livelihood, leaving the administration in a ‘no-win’ situation between the ecologists on one side and the local Gulf residents on the other (Zeller, 2010).

While certainly the local and national ecology groups were mobilized to help with the spill efforts and remind the public at large of the dangers of off-shore drilling, local residents were even more vocal and more visible. Verbose politicians such as Billy Nungesser broadly condemned BP and, drawing support from his constituents and fellow parish presidents, initiated local plans for coping with the spill effects (“Fishermen May Be Cleaning the Spill That Put Them Out of Work,” 2010, “Go Billy Nugesser: the president is fully engaged update 2,” 2010, “Here is the latest from Gov. Bobby Jindal,” 2010). Boat owners and fishermen were also widely quoted as not having understood why BP didn’t make better use of their skills and availability (Fishgrease, 2010; Robertson, 2010b). Governor Bobby Jindal didn’t hesitate to call a state of emergency and reached out for additional aid from the Coast Guard and the government expressing concerns that, “BP’s resources are not adequate” (Chazen, 2010). Numerous meetings
and gatherings occurred in the Gulf, recordings of which were posted on YouTube, on CNN, and blogged about throughout the social media world. These events, and the media and social media coverage they received, brought to the attention of the public outraged citizens such as Kindra Arnesan whose comments against BP’s handling of the clean-up are both direct and poignant (Gulf Emergency Summit, 2010).

The spill continued for 87 days. Over that period roughly 4.9 million barrels of oil were released into the ocean from a mile deep well; it is the largest recorded spill in US history (Astaiza, 2012). BP and its partners Halliburton and Transocean were ultimately attributed the majority of the blame for the course of events and the US Justice Department has charged the three with gross negligence and willing misconduct. BP and Transocean have since pleaded guilty in their respective criminal cases (“Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill,” 2013, “Judge approves BP’s guilty plea to manslaughter, other charges, in Deepwater Horizon spill; company to pay $4 billion in penalties,” 2013). A civil case against BP for up to $17 billion for violation of the Clean Water Act is still pending and the company continues to pay out reparations to businesses in the Gulf according to an early 2013 settlement. BP has already taken over $42 billion in charges against its accounts and some suggest that the total bill for the spill could be as high as $60 to $80 billion (Eaton, 2014).
Although all the companies involved in the Deepwater Horizon spill have incurred important financial costs, the bulk of the reputational damage fell on BP. Moreover the company’s reputational shortfall continues to dog the company’s development efforts as well as its attempts to present itself in a more favorable light. The Economist (February 2014) recently ran an article entitled, “The Shrunken Giant” that explains just how much BP has suffered financially, but even more so in terms of reputation, due to the label it earned in the Deepwater Horizon crisis for being reckless and having little concern for the impact of its actions on the “small people” (per BP Chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg) (Calnes & Cooper, 2010; “Shrunken Giant,” 2014). The research carried out for this dissertation suggest that stakeholder actions against BP largely contributed to the damage caused to BP’s reputation during those crucial first 90 days of the spill crisis. How that came about is the subject of the subsequent parts of this dissertation. In the Analysis section, the approach used to explore stakeholder actions subsequent to the Deepwater Horizon spill is explained and in the Findings section, examples and conclusions about the events and the methods used by stakeholders in developing their social movement against BP are presented. In Appendix 4, the reader will find a timeline of major events over the course of the first 30 days of the Deepwater Horizon spill.
Chapter 5: Analysis

Analysis of the data gathered in this study overlapped with the data gathering, interpretation, and coding process. As suggested by Bogdan and Knopp-Biklen (2002), the process of searching and arranging facts and information involved a simultaneous process of synthesizing the information, searching for patterns, and identifying what is important. The steps in this iterative process are best described in the Methodology section of this dissertation. Putting aside chronological considerations for the moment, the focus here is on the analyses that were carried out and on the data involved.

5.1 Structuring the Analysis of the Data

Two main considerations arose with regards to structuring analysis of the data from the Deepwater Horizon spill.

First, this is an inductive study, yet the exploration was framed using existing theory, in this case the political process model, a well-developed, reliable and very flexible model used in the social movement literature. How would the boundary where exploration began and existing theory stopped be defined?

Second, given that there are two units of analysis – the holistic social movement against BP, and the issues that fed into the movement against BP – what should be examined at each of these two levels of analysis and how would the two levels be brought together to tell a coherent story. Each question is addressed separately below:
George and Bennett (2005) make it clear that there are many pitfalls for the researcher who uses case studies to develop or test existing theory. They suggest that when using extant theory, the boundary between existing theory and the opportunities, or the gap for future exploration should be very clearly delineated if one is to avoid a situation in which the researcher retests or simply reproduces the existing theory’s structure using new data, thereby displaying a sort of confirmation bias.

The pitfalls described by George and Bennett (2005) were avoided in this study by focusing attention on the way that the elements of the political process model come together or ‘assemble’ to form a social movement in the context of firm-stakeholder relations. In this study, the political process model suggests the form which a social movement will take and it is predictive – it predicts that a social movement will result if certain conditions are present and that the movement will impact the target firm, in this case BP.

In terms of the elements to be considered, the model suggests that there are political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing structures; there could be, however, factors missing. Moreover, not all of these factors may need to be present in order to obtain the end result – a social movement against BP. Searching for missing elements and
checking the need for elements-in-hand is part of the exploratory research objective of this study. It is also necessary to gain a clear understanding of the use and functioning of each of the factors present in the Deepwater Horizon spill or it will be difficult to appreciate whether or not elements are missing or how it is that the resulting model is theoretically reliable.

To summarize, this research with regards to how the social movement against BP came about consists of exploring (or ‘fuddling around with’) the data gathered on the spill to try to understand how the political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and organizing structures contributed to the rise of the movement against BP and whether or not there are factors which have been overlooked and were important to the outcome observed. This study avoids many of the pitfalls of using case studies to develop theory because it clearly defines a zone of opportunity for inductive, interpretive, and/or exploratory research in the ‘assembly’ step of the political process model development. It also clearly identifies areas in which the model should be referred to for structuring inquiry and analysis. As will become evident further on in this section, this clear delineation allowed me to focus in on the more fruitful avenues of investigation in the data and to identify deviant cases for further examination and analysis.

A second main concern with regards to structuring analysis of the data involved the handling of the two levels of analysis concerned by this study. Those two levels are the
holistic case level (Deepwater Horizon spill) and the embedded case level (this issues that arose and contributed to the Deepwater Horizon case outcomes). A frequent error in the analysis of cases with embedded units is to confine the analysis to the level of the embedded units without rolling up the conclusion of those analyses for consideration at the level of the case as a whole (Bollen, Entwisle, & Alderson, 1993; Yin, 2009). This study has avoided that error by adopting the approach shown in the following diagram.

Diagram # 5

As shown by the graph, initial analysis was carried out at the holistic case level. The conclusions and observations at this level led to and were integrated into analyses carried out at the level of the embedded cases. Conclusions from these new sets of observations were then brought back up to the holistic case level and integrated into new analyses, to eventually arrive at the findings explained in the ‘Findings’ section of this dissertation. Following is a description of the analyses that were carried out in each of these three parts.
5.2 Initial analysis at the holistic case level

Three types of analyses were carried out in the initial stage of research at the holistic case level. First, with as open a mind as possible, the data on the Deepwater Horizon spill was arranged into a timeline of what seemed to me to be noteworthy or important events that appeared to contribute in some way to the rise in a movement against BP. Looking at this timeline, it was possible to search for patterns in the data including associations between the stakeholder groups, between events/actions that appeared to connect in an ‘action/reaction’ sort of way, and for the presence of key factors that repeated and appeared to have an important impact on the outcome. The timeline helped to organize the data into narrative description connecting the coded patterns identified (Miles et al., 2014). Although very early in the analysis, this step allowed for the identification of certain key events were followed by significant alterations in stakeholder sentiment. For example, the delay, and then the final refusal, by BP and the US Army corps of engineers to move forward with the installation of a sand-berm sea wall to protect delicate marsh areas was an event that frustrated many of the state and local officials in Louisiana and clearly contributed to their assessment that not enough was being done to protect their state from the impact of the spill (McKinley & Rudolf, 2010).

Second, confirmation of a social movement and some minimal evidence of the presence of political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing structures was looked for.
In this analysis, what George and Bennett (2005) refer to as a congruence approach was used in which, “…the investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome of a particular case.” (p. 181) Of course the goal here is not to test the theory, but, as George and Bennett suggest, to refine it. This approach is thought to work well when using a well-established theory, which is the case here. As the political process model suggests a causal relationship between events and outcome, stakeholder interactions were explored in an attempt to identify a pattern or patterns in which there were both the elements suggested by the model and the causal outcome predicted. The causal relationship to be found was the rise in a social movement against BP and the subsequent condemnation of BP as being the ‘responsible party’ for the spill and all of its unfortunate after effects. Such a relationship was fairly easy to find, but in the search for causal patterns leading to BP’s ‘responsibility’, it also became apparent that many of the same events and circumstances that implicated BP also implicated the Obama administration and Transocean. Any of these three parties – BP, the Obama administration, and Transocean – were in a position to be the object of a protest movement for their responsibility in actions taken before and during the spill crisis. So why was BP the target of that social movement and not the others?

This question led to the third analysis in this initial period – a search for dis-confirmatory evidence of the elements of the political process model for BP, the Obama administration and Transocean. This consisted of studying the data available on all these three parties implicated by the Deepwater Horizon spill and looking for differences in the patterns
connecting the events and the outcome for the parties (or the lack of an outcome in the case of Transocean and the Obama administration). Were all of the elements of the political process model present; were there any significant differences between the relationships; were there any factors that might have been overlooked; might the relationships between the factors and the outcome simply be spurious in the case of the Obama administration and Transocean?

In the case of Transocean what was lacking was a significant mobilization effort by stakeholders. At no point in the period following the spill was there any significant on-the-ground or even social media activity specifically directed against Transocean. They were often mentioned, but rarely targeted. Their own employees, 79 of 126, were by far the most numerous contingent on the Deepwater Horizon rig, yet were notably silent on any faults committed by their managers or company. So while political opportunities existed, and some framing efforts existed in the form of critiques of Transocean’s safety record and its ‘off-shore’ status, these two did not translate into strong mobilization against Transocean.

In the case of the Obama administration, all three conditions were present – there was political opportunity due to documented mismanagement at the Mining & Minerals department and the legacy of Katrina. There were also significant framing efforts made by local and state politicians to transfer blame for a very slow clean-up to the federal
agencies and/or BP, significant efforts by ecologists to frame the blame for the oil spill on lax regulation of off-shore oil drilling and an oil/gas driven energy policy, and significant efforts by local businesses and individuals to blame the government (generally speaking) for their woes. Finally, there was significant mobilization in the form of protest on the group in the Gulf and on the internet. These protests were not specifically directed at the government, but they called on the government to act. One might conclude then that responsibility or ‘blame’ for the spill and its mess might have been more evenly shared between the government and BP. Yet this was not the case.

In searching for an explanation of the difference between the Obama admiration’s handling of the spill, Transocean’s, and BP’s handling of the spill, one significant differences in the pattern of actions/events was found - that being the number of auxiliary issues that were connected to BP and the absence of those issues for the other two. To illustrate, whereas discussions around, for example, BP’s safety record, its misleading estimates of the amount of oil spilled, the manner in which it compensated fishermen and business, its use of dispersants, etc., were numerous, there were markedly fewer discussions around the Obama administration’s actions and very few around Transocean’s actions. In short, BP seemed to have annoyed a lot of different groups in a lot of different ways over those three months, whereas discussions of Transocean’s behavior peaked only three times: first when the rig exploded; second, when its safety record was perused; and third, when its incorporation in Switzerland was questioned for tax reasons. Like BP, the Obama administration was the object of frequent speculation,
discussion, and ‘framing mechanisms’, however, the administration appeared to be quite reactive, even proactive, heading off potential criticism of its actions with measures such as the assignment of additional resources to the spill clean-up or the launching of investigative panels. Whereas the issues for BP would carry on for weeks, the government’s issues were fewer in number and were often resolved within days.

To summarize, at the level of this initial analysis, the political process model appeared to be a relevant analytical tool for assessing stakeholder-firm relations following the Deepwater Horizon spill. All of the elements of the model were easily identified and the predictive capabilities of the model were in evidence. With-in case analysis of two other ‘candidates’ as targets for a social movement – Transocean and the Obama administration - showed that either elements were weak (mobilization in the case of Transocean) or that a social movement was difficult to sustain (due to pre-emptive political initiatives by the Obama administration). From a model-building perspective, one principle difference between BP’s situation and that of the Obama administration or Transocean was the large number, and regular appearance, of auxiliary, yet interconnected, issues that were discussed among stakeholders. These issues and the discussions thereof eventually worked against BP, and in favor of the development of a social movement against BP for its role in the Deepwater Horizon spill. It was concluded that the study of these issues in greater depth was warranted. In addition, the issues as embedded cases allowed for the opportunity to make cross-case comparisons of the different elements of the political process model which would contribute to the refinement of the model.
5.3 Analysis at the embedded case level

Analysis at the level of the issues was to serve a different purpose than the analysis at the level of the holistic case. The evidence used in the analysis of the holistic case suggested that the political process model was a fruitful theoretical framework for the examination of stakeholder-firm relations and that the elements described in the model were easily identified. What had yet to be addressed are the definitions of the elements and the further elaboration of the model for the stakeholder-firm context, taking into account the changes in the model due to the effects of social media and internet connectivity. It was also clear from the initial analysis of the case (above) that close attention should be paid to stakeholders’ choice of targets for their protest efforts – as BP and the Obama administration had been targeted simultaneously - and to the role of smaller interconnected issues in the outcome of a larger social movement against a corporate target.

To address these concerns, four analyses at the embedded case level were carried out:

First, the nature of issues was explored. What aspects of issues resemble elements of the political process model? Might the political process model be sued as an analytical tool to explore these issues? To answer these questions, the list of the 15-16 issues that had come
up in discussions related to the spill was examined. They fell into roughly three categories:

a) those that were already identifiable as separate social movements, or closely connected to social movements, for example, ‘environmental impact’ and ‘off-shore drilling’, are good examples of those that fell into this category;

b) those that were created as the result of outcries or strong reactions to specific decisions or actions taken which were viewed as being reprehensible. Good examples of these include the response to BP’s decision to use chemical dispersants, or the response to Tony Hayward’s behavior including his remark about “wanting my life back” and,

c) those that represent an ‘area of concern’ based on mounting evidence that the outlook in the area was not favorable. A good example here is the topic of ‘oil drilling safety’ for which it became clear that not enough was being done to ensure the safety of the deep water rigs. Another is the topic of the ‘response to the spill’ which was viewed as slow, ineffective and inefficient. A third is the topic of the ‘local economy and well-being’ which was already suffering and which was very negatively impacted by the spill.

Looking at the definitions provided by social movement scholars on what makes a social movement, only the ‘a’ group passes muster, however, from a stakeholder-firm analysis perspective, all three types of stakeholder reactions are important. An analysis using the political process model might provide insight into how issues contribute to the rise of a
social movement against BP (Fox Piven, 2006; McAdam; McCarthy; Zald, 1996). This led me to my second major analysis at the level of the embedded cases.

The second analysis carried out at the case level involved examining the elements of the political process model – political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing structure - as they appear in each of the embedded cases. Were they all present in all of the cases identified? How best could these elements be described and how do they contribute to the model? These analyses led to the principle findings of this study. Each of the issues was studied separately, concentrating on those seven that had the greatest impact on the rise of a social movement against BP. In doing so a thorough understanding of each of the elements was gained and it was possible to clarify some of the most important characteristics. These results can be found in the ‘Finding’ section of this dissertation.

The third analysis done at the level of the embedded cases was to look at how social media and internet connectivity was being used by stakeholders in each of the issues. Social media’s use was studied in two ways. First, social media tools under employ were studied along with the manner in which they impacted elements of the political process model – political opportunities, framing, for mobilization, etc. Secondly, this study examined how social media was being used in comparison and/or alongside traditional communication and mobilization tools. For example, in mobilization efforts, was on-the-
ground protest occurring in combination with social media protest or was only one or the other in use. The situations in which social media was used was also explored to see whether the results were more or less impactful than for the situations in which pre-internet tools were used. Given the nature of this study any controlled comparison of relative effectiveness was out of the question, but with cross-case comparisons, some sense of the way in which social media and the internet were being used and the situations in which it appeared to have worked well were identified. The results of these analyses are also in the ‘Findings’ section of this dissertation.

The fourth analysis that was carried out at the level of the embedded cases was to explore cross-case variations and/or deviations between issues. The data was checked for consistency and for reliability in the definitions developed for each element across all of the six issues. Only one of the six showed signs of deviating from the model characteristics outlined. This was the issue, ‘Local Economy & Well-Being’. The deviant aspect of this issue is as follows: although this issue was perceived to be one of the strongest and most cohesive mini-movements of those studied, there was very little actual mobilization in this movement. Even the activity on social media was subdued and represented essentially an expression of loss. One could argue that it should be integrated as a framing mechanism into one of the other mini-movements, yet the themes and the stakeholders concerned are significantly different from those of the other mini-movements. In term of outcomes, the strong change in sentiment in the Gulf vis-à-vis BP appeared to be a direct result of the sympathy generated by this movement for individuals
living in the Gulf and suffering the aftermath of the BP spill. This anomaly should be left as an opportunity for further research.

To summarize, in the second phase of analysis, exploration was dropped to the level of the embedded cases. At this level it was possible to observe how social media and internet connectivity was being used by stakeholders and consider how the model altered as a result. The embedded cases used were the six issues identified as being the most important to the development of a social movement against BP. Each of these issues was explored using the political process model. These issues also allowed me to better define the elements of a new ‘stakeholder political process model’ taking into account the impact of social media and internet connectivity and clarifying the relationships between parts of the model.

5.4 Final Analysis at the holistic case level

This last phase in the analysis is best described in tandem with its findings, to be found in the ‘Findings’ section of this dissertation. However, it is worthwhile here to explain the considerations that drove this last set of analyses and which allowed me to arrive at the final conclusions of this study.
First, having developed significantly the new ‘stakeholder political process model’ based on the analysis of the embedded cases (the issues) and having now integrated the effects of social media and internet connectivity into the model, it was necessary to reconsider the holistic case using this new model. Did this new political process model for stakeholders allow me to improve understanding of how a social movement against BP arose and resulted in BP being blamed for the Deepwater Horizon spill? Was this new model an adequate reflection of a stakeholder social movement in the internet age or were there still pieces missing in the model or adjustments to be made?

Secondly, although the political process model was used to explore each of the issues for the purposes of the embedded cases analysis, it was necessary to reconsider their role at the level of the holistic case. How did they fit into the Deepwater Horizon case understanding and how should they be accounted for in the new ‘stakeholder political process model’?

Third, it was necessary to compare and contrast the new ‘stakeholder political process model’ with the ‘social movement political process model’ on which it was based. In particular, the respective applicability of each model and the limitations of the new ‘stakeholder political process model’ had to be considered. Which of the differences were
explained by the introduction of social media and internet connectivity and which might be explained by other factors?

The findings for each of the above considerations is presented in the next section of this dissertation, following.
Chapter 6: Findings

The findings from this study are presented below. They begin with an explanation of the new ‘stakeholder process model’ for use in the analysis of stakeholder-firm relations in the internet age. In subsequent sections, the findings with regards to each of the elements in the model are presented together with an examination of one or more of the issues that serves to illustrate the findings. In the last sections of the chapter the relationship between the issues and feedback loops are presented and explained.

6.1 Refinements to the political process model: the new ‘stakeholder process model’

This study set out to explore the way in which social media and internet connectivity has altered firm-stakeholder relations as described by the political process model, a social movement literature theory. It finds that, indeed, the internet age has impacted the firm-stakeholder relations principally by strengthening the influence of secondary stakeholders. The model can still be used effectively to analyze firm-stakeholder relations with some very important modifications. The original model and the revised version – labeled the stakeholder process model – are both represented in the diagrams that follow.
The original model identified three key elements contributing to the rise and success of a protest movement against a firm: political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing structures. The findings of this research suggest a more complex model. First, political opportunities consist of two very distinct elements: pre-existing conditions and disruptive events. Second, framing mechanisms serve the purpose of pulling together disparate
viewpoints and may target multiple parties. Third, mobilizing structures represent a much broader range of actions than in the past and most of these occur on-line or in conjunction with on-line activity. Fourth, successful stakeholder action against the firm is preceded by indirect and direct outcomes which later combine to lead to successful stakeholder action. Finally, there are feedback loops between outcomes and political opportunities.

Many of these changes to the model have been prompted or facilitated by secondary stakeholders’ access to social media and internet connectivity. Below I explain each of the aspects of the revised model using the findings of this study as supporting material. In particular, analysis of the six embedded cases, the issues, provided valuable material for the elaboration of the findings below. The issues chosen were initially those that appeared to make the greatest contribution to the development of a stakeholder social movement against BP and include: ‘drilling safety’, ‘oil drilling’, ‘dispute on oil spill quantity’, ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’, ‘spill response’, and ‘local economy and well-being’. I use one of the issues as an example below to explain each of the revisions to the original political process model; they are therefore presented simultaneously.
6.2 The issue of ‘drilling safety’ and a better understanding of political opportunity

The political process model in the social movement literature has been dogged by a lack of clarity as to the exact nature of political opportunities (Bevington & Dixon, 2005; Goodwin et al., 1999). ‘Political opportunity’ in the case of the French revolution might involve elements as diverse as the prevailing economic conditions at the time and/or the public’s opinion of the royal family. In their critique of the political process model, Goodwin and Jasper (2012) claim that what constitutes a political opportunity for many researchers of a social movement is determined based on the situation and post-hoc, taking away much of the predictive value of the model. The contextualization of this model to firm-stakeholder relations and the acceleration of the diffusion of information possible with the internet appears to have allowed for a more precise definition of political opportunities. To explain, I describe here the findings concerning the issue ‘drilling safety’.

In the course of the first 90 days of the Deepwater Horizon spill, one of the first issues to be raised and discussed in connection with the spill was that of ‘drilling safety’. The Wall Street Journal published an extensive piece just one day after the spill pointing to the increase in dangers involved in off-shore drilling and the poor safety record that BP had gained for itself over the past 10 years (Chazan, 2010). Two major accidents had occurred at BP facilities: one at a Texas oil refinery in 2005 in which 15 people had died, and the second, a major spill in Alaska in 2006 on the Prudhoe Bay area pipeline.
Several articles in subsequent weeks also made reference to lax regulation and evidence that the US Mining and Minerals Service was more concerned with promoting development than with regulating and overseeing drilling practices. The MMS was also viewed as a “revolving door” for oil industry executives (Jonasson, 2010a; Urbina, 2010a; Wighton, 2010). Thus, the safety in off-shore drilling was an issue that had been discussed for some time; the Deepwater Horizon spill was the latest event to contribute to this discussion.

Considering ‘drilling safety’ as a stakeholder movement in its own right and using the political process model as a framework led to the following representation of the situation. I found two types of pre-existing conditions – those connected with the rather slow consciousness-raising development of opinions and views on the topic of drilling safety, and those events that were sudden and unexpected. The latter had the potential to alter existing views on the topic suddenly, either by confirming or dis-confirming prevailing ideas. In a previous era it would have been difficult to know whether sudden events could be separated from the slower consciousness-raising evolution of opinions; both impacted public opinion, yet were opinions evolving naturally or were the events provoking an alteration in viewpoints. Today, the distinction can be made clearer. Information on events small and large are communicated extremely rapidly via the internet to broad audiences; the reactive nature of those audiences on social media allow
us to have a better sense of whether or not an event has had an impact and what that impact has been. The delay between an event and a change in opinion also appears to have shrunk leaving little time for slow consciousness-raising. As such, it is now possible to differentiate at a given point in time between two types of political opportunities: the first of these is ‘pre-existing conditions’ and the second of these ‘disruptive events’. The definitions of each are:

- **Pre-existing conditions**: State of affairs prior to the present time including stakeholders’ positions, and relevant economic, social, and political conditions.

- **Disruptive events**: A disruptive event that creates the issue or significantly alters the state of affairs relative to this issue. Also subsequent events that sustain the development of a stakeholder movement over time and that contribute to the evolution of opinions on the issue.

Below is a visual representation of the stakeholder political process model for the issue ‘drilling safety’.
Figure #1 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Drilling Safety’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Opportunities</th>
<th>Disruptive Events</th>
<th>Framing processes</th>
<th>Mobilizing structures</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-existing Conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BP has had safety record from past – Texas Oil Refinery</td>
<td>• Deepwater Horizon spill</td>
<td>• DWH Horizon suggests that off-shore drilling can’t ever be safe</td>
<td>• Press (Wall St. Journal)</td>
<td>• BP agrees not to fight new regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Safety is issue for oil since 1969 Santa Barbara spill &amp; Exxon Valdez</td>
<td>• MMS found to have waived inspections of DWH</td>
<td>• BP labeled as a sloppy operator</td>
<td>• Blogging discuss BP’s safety record</td>
<td>• Oil companies broke ranks &amp; pointed fingers at BP for poor safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More recent low accident rate favors industry self-regulation</td>
<td>• Spill shows industry can’t self-regulate</td>
<td>• Ecology websites point to inherent risks in offshore drilling</td>
<td>• MMS was re-structured</td>
<td>• Moratorium on new off-shore drilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Under Bush, MMS oversight was relaxed</td>
<td></td>
<td>• and that MMS is lax in its oversight of the industry</td>
<td>• Gulf residents protest moratorium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that the column with ‘pre-existing conditions’ includes the historical reference to the spill off the coast of California in 1969 and the Exxon Valdez spill – both events which marked the public consciousness. It also includes reference to the recent low accident rate in the industry which over the years had begun to move public opinion in favor of relaxing restrictions on off-shore drilling, and the reference to the Bush administration’s policy of minimal oversight of the oil industry (AP, 2010a; Sheppard, 2010a; Vanderklippe, 2010). Public opinion evolves even in the absence of events, as this example shows. All of these circumstances and historical events made up part of the public’s understanding of the issue of ‘drilling safety’ and were referred to several times in the 90 days following the Deepwater Horizon spill.
There were two disruptive events during the 90 days studied. The first was the Deepwater Horizon spill itself which was compared both to the Exxon Valdez spill off the coast of Alaska and to the spill off the coast of Santa Barbara in 1969 that gave rise to the movement against off-shore drilling. The second was the revelation that the MMS had been lax in their oversight of the Deepwater Horizon rig and, in particular, had allowed BP to delay the mandated test of the blow-out preventer just prior to the accident (Urbina, 2010b). These two events led to an adjustment in stakeholder actions and in public opinion that was reflected in blogs on the internet. The first meant that concerns about drilling safety were now once again front and center. Ecology groups revived their traditional stance against off-shore drilling and framed the Deepwater Horizon spill as the result of lax government oversight and an incompetent operator – BP. Also, fellow oil companies pointed the finger at BP’s poor safety record during the congressional hearing and insist that they would have done things differently. The second event – evidence that came forth concerning the role of the MMS in the spill – led to new calls against the agency’s practices and to the re-organization of the department by the Obama administration. The administration split the service into three separate entities and the reporting structure was changed to ensure that there were appropriate checks and balances in the system. Finally, BP was obliged to agree that additional regulation was an inevitable outcome, something that it had strenuously opposed prior to the Deepwater Horizon event. Thus, both of these disruptive events significantly altered the course of the public discussion around oil drilling safety and led to changes for BP, other oil
companies, government agencies, and all other parties concerned with this issue. Such a rapid course of events might have been less likely in a pre-internet era.

In all of the five other ‘issues’ studied, there was a similar pattern with regards to political opportunities being made up of two separate types of elements: pre-existing conditions and disruptive events. With regards to the issues labeled ‘oil drilling’, ‘spill response’ and ‘local economy & well-being’, there were significant historical references that contributed to these topics being raised during the Deepwater Horizon spill event. For the other two – ‘Tony Hayward – CEO’ and ‘dispute on spill amount’, there were fewer historical references; the issues were more context-specific in nature. All, however, had both pre-existing conditions and disruptive events associated with them. The use of social media and blogs, particularly by secondary stakeholders and the public, led to a rapid alteration in public opinion and, often if not always, prompt responses by the targeted entity. The Obama administration was particularly quick to respond during this period. Below is a table with each of the issues and their respective pre-existing conditions and disruptive elements:
Figure #2 Pre-existing Conditions and Disruptive Events for All Six Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Pre-existing Conditions</th>
<th>Disruptive Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Drilling Safety</td>
<td>• BP has had a safety record from past – Texas Oil Refinery</td>
<td>• Deepwater Horizon spill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Safety issues since 1999 Santa Barbara spill &amp; Exxon Valdez</td>
<td>• MMS found to have waived inspection of DWH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More recent oil accident rate favors industry self-regulation</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Under Bush, MMS oversight was relaxed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oil Drilling</td>
<td>• Public views on offshore drilling have softened</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public recognizes US need for more oil reserves</td>
<td>• Deepwater Horizon spill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Growing concern about climate change</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• BP aims to be ‘green’ &amp; has interest in deepwater drilling</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Obama courtesies BP; Shell &amp; ConocoPhillips to support bill</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some Republicans want new oil drilling &amp; ‘will compromise’</td>
<td>• Seniors Lindy Graham backs out of compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some greens will compromise</td>
<td>• Moderate Greens back out of compromise; no longer will support expansion of oil-shore drilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dispute on Quantity Spilled</td>
<td>• Under Oil Pollution Act, BP’s fines will be calculated based on # of barrels spilled</td>
<td>• Scientist disputes BP’s estimate using new satellite tracking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• BP &amp; Transocean are the only ones with access to well site data</td>
<td>• Public gains access to oil flow videos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Publicly relies on its historical accuracy</td>
<td>• Information leaked that BP knew from the beginning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• BP offers more detailed data</td>
<td>that the flow could be as high as 100,000 barrels/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tony Hayward, CFO</td>
<td>• Tony is only known to the business community</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tony is frank &amp; unguarded</td>
<td>• Tony takes personal charge &amp; ‘immediately commits to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tony is British</td>
<td>resolving the spill‘</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gulf residents skeptical of outsiders &amp; politicians</td>
<td>• Tony comments on ‘it’s a big ocean’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gulf residents skeptical of outsiders &amp; politicians</td>
<td>• Tony wants his life back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Spill Response</td>
<td>• First large-scale clean-up in US since Exxon Valdez</td>
<td>• Spill discovered to be much larger than originally thought;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Obama disposed to let BP lead the clean-up – Oil Pollution Act</td>
<td>questions raised about slow response by government &amp; BP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gulf residents well-disposed to oil firms; ‘accidents happen’</td>
<td>• Obama chastises BP for its handling of the spill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• BP has resources available and motivation to show it can be a ‘good green citizen’</td>
<td>• BP asked to stop using chemical dispersants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Katrina legacy is that Gulf views US govt as ineffective in emergencies</td>
<td>• BP/Government criticized for restricting press access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local Economy &amp; Well-being</td>
<td>• Legacy of Katrina</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• West Gulf economy in ‘70s</td>
<td>• Grieving families of oil rig workers – DWH spill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A sustenance existence and lifestyle based on the sea and its fruits</td>
<td>• Oil washing ashore, fishing stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• US Army engineers turn down local plan</td>
<td>• Holiday travel cancellations – economy sinks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pass over compensation requirements</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Splitting political opportunities into the two separate categories of pre-existing conditions and disruptive events allows the following:

- Gain a clearer sense of the historical background to an issue. Pre-existing events represent an assessment of the state of affairs at the time just prior to an event or
the time when the analysis begins. A clear distinction is draw between those events that took place in the recent or distant past and those occurring in the present.

- Appreciate how certain events can alter the course of events. Changes of course in the development of a stakeholder social movement can be more easily associated with an event or occurrence or a change in affairs. Each disruptive event is recorded along with the subsequent changes in public opinion and stakeholder behavior that occur.

- Appreciate the importance of ‘little drops that eventually make the barrel overflow’. This research suggests that a series of small disruptive events building one upon the other contribute to the rise of a stakeholder social movement. By clearly identifying each of those events, it is easier to evaluate their impact on the movement as a whole.

I now turn to the topic of framing mechanisms.

6.3 The issue of ‘local economy and well-being’ and a better understanding of framing mechanisms

According to King, framing mechanisms serve the purpose of imbibing protesting stakeholders with a sense of significance, a common sense of fate, and enable them to communicate their requests to influential allies and to the corporation (King, 2008 a). In
In this research, I observed less of an effort on behalf of stakeholders to communicate their claims and more of an effort to come together around a common language or voice about the major issues they were willing to defend. Most of this activity occurred via exchanges on blogs and social media. Zietsma and Winn (2008) have suggested that stakeholders invest heavily in framing to build alliances and support across groups with diverse claims. This I found to be true in this case as well with bloggers maintaining a strong following of users who reinforce their opinions and would ‘carry’ the commentaries of bloggers and other opinion leaders such as Anderson Cooper across blogs and websites.

From a stakeholder research perspective, what is particularly interesting in the Deepwater Horizon case is the initial lack of a target for many of the framing activities. Protesting stakeholders initially appeared to be focused on raising their issues, but not on making demands or directing their dissatisfaction towards a particular party. This was especially true with regards to the reaction of Gulf residents to the Deepwater Horizon spill. This group of stakeholders was very active about voicing their concerns for the ecology of the Gulf, their livelihood, the impact of oil on their businesses, etc, but they did not go out of their way to accuse BP for their misfortunes – at least not in the early days. In fact, when they did express dissatisfaction, it was directed nearly as much at government officials as it was at BP.
Below is a table of the analysis of the issue ‘local economy and well-being’, once again viewed as a social movement using the political process model. This movement coalesced over time, initially being made up of a collection of concerns expressed individually by various groups – fishermen, boat owners, hotel and restaurant owners, local officials, local ecology groups, etc. Most of these were secondary stakeholders and each group expressed very separate concerns with regards to the impact of the spill on the Gulf region. In terms of a ‘social movement’, it was not at all clear how these disparate groups would come together to form the backbone of a stakeholder movement against BP – which is what eventually occurred. An alternative outcome could have been that each group associated with other similar groups from across the country – for example, the local ecology groups could have tightened their ties to national ecology groups. Yet, the ties between the different Gulf businesses and residents strengthened as time went on and were particularly strong in the Louisiana area. I did not find evidence of a movement of similar strength and cohesion in the other Gulf states, although my study did not concentrate on those other areas either.
In allowing these disparate groups to come together, framing appeared to be very important. One might think that the most logical and effective framing strategy for such an ecological event would have featured oil covered birds, such as the one I have pasted into the text below. The extent of the ecological damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon is truly impressive, surpassing the Exxon Valdez spill in the scope of its reach, yet Gulf residents in particular appeared somewhat immune to the plight of birds, dolphins, and turtles (“More Than Just An Oil Spill,” 2010; Robertson, McKinley, Dewan, & Cave, 2010). In their YouTube videos and when interviewed, Gulf residents most frequently spoke about the loss of their ‘way of life’ in a broader sense and the
threat that the spill represented to their ability to survive independently, living off, and in harmony with, the land/sea (Harmon, 2010). The framing that brought these groups together was therefore very particular.

Figure #4 Oiled Gulf Bird

It initially was expressed as a collective expression of regret – this is a terrible thing to have happened to our dear Gulf region (“Oil spill could eclipse Exxon disaster,” 2010). Rapidly, however, a connection was made between the events following Katrina and the events of the Deepwater Horizon spill. The connection was at the level of ‘why us”? We don’t deserve this! The public as a whole in the US has shown considerable sympathy towards the Gulf coast for the difficulties it suffered post-Katrina - one could label it as a sense of ‘debt-owed’ to the Gulf. So this second phase was manifested by a large number of human interest stories and interviews of people in Louisiana and the Gulf asking how they were coping with this new crisis. Television and journals were particularly strong in providing a regular supply of these stories, but they were also taken up in the blog discussions. In a considerable number of commentaries, the Gulf residents themselves
referred back to their experiences with Katrina, ""It's just like what we saw with Hurricane Katrina,"" said Tesvich, 53. "At first, it was just another storm, just like this was just another oil spill. But by the time they realize how bad it really is, it's too late" (Winter & Jervis, 2010). In the third phase in the development of this movement, Gulf residents begin focusing on what they have lost to the spill. The framing then altered again, now making a connection between the losses experienced and BP as the agent who brought about those losses. A New York Times articles quotes fisherman Donny Campo, "They put us out of work, and now we're cleaning up their mess," he said ("More Than Just An Oil Spill," 2010).

By the beginning of June, the framing for this movement was fully developed around the issue of losses in the Gulf and most of the residents’ fury was being directed at BP. BP’s subsequent mishandling of the payment of compensation to Gulf residents and Tony Hayward’s insensitive comments such as, “…I would like my life back” only added fuel to the fire of Gulf resident’s anger against BP (Durando, 2010). They looked to both the government and BP to provide relief, but the damage to BP was already done and attention now was fully focused on BP as the perpetrator of their troubles. Sentiments created by this largely ‘framing-focused’ movement fed into stakeholders’ response to the clean-up efforts in the Gulf (the ‘spill clean-up’ issue) and to perceptions about who was ultimately responsible for the Deepwater Horizon spill.
In terms of what we learn about the framing mechanisms, it can be concluded from this example, that stakeholders do not always identify the target of their protest in the initial phases of the movement. It may take them some time to coalesce around a set of messages and concerns that will draw the broadest following and that they are willing to move forward. Until they are fully in agreement, messaging around the issue, rather than around the target, will be more important to the movement. In addition, framing was achieved through interaction between the various social media, internet and mainstream communication outlets. Stories provided by television and newspaper journalists were picked up by secondary stakeholders and the public and re-communicated via blogs to support the framing of their issues. In this particular case, framing was particularly effective around the miseries imposed on the Gulf due to the ‘Katrina’ recollection.

In the next example, that of the ‘spill response’, it will be seen that stakeholders will target multiple stakeholders if it serves their purposes of advancing their cause.

6.4 The issue of the ‘spill response’ and multi-target framing

From the discussion above, it appears that the message is more important to stakeholders than the target of that message. Analysis of another example, the issue of ‘spill response’, suggests that secondary stakeholders will target multiple other stakeholders (primary and
secondary) or other possible responsible parties, presumably in the hopes that at least one will be vulnerable to protest and eventually address their concerns.

The inadequacy of the response to the Deepwater Horizon spill was one of the most broadly expressed sentiments of stakeholders that observed in this research. First, there were the facts – it took 87 days to cap the well; then there was the perception gained of an important lack of effective management and coordination by BP, the government, and all other parties involved. That the spill response became a major issue connected with the Deepwater Horizon incident is not very surprising under the circumstances. It is, however, useful to use the political process model to appreciate the various elements that contributed to this issue gaining momentum and eventually being the subject of meetings and protests in the Gulf and on the internet.
Figure #5 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Spill Response’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-existing Conditions</th>
<th>Disruptive Events</th>
<th>Framing processes</th>
<th>Mobilizing structures</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First large-scale clean-up in US since Exxon Valdez</td>
<td>Spill discovered to be much larger than originally thought; questions raised about slow response by government &amp; BP</td>
<td>Gov’t &amp; BP are not letting us help</td>
<td>Local meetings (formal &amp; informal)</td>
<td>BP loses confidence of Gulf residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama poised to let BP lead the clean-up – Oil Pollution Act</td>
<td>BP is inept</td>
<td>Gov’t lets BP lead &amp; BP is in over its head</td>
<td>Press coverage of local officials, local clean-up efforts (CNN)</td>
<td>Obama blames BP, Hayward for lack of adequate response; publically berates him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf residents well-disposed to oil firms; accidents happen</td>
<td>BP asked to stop using chemical dispersants</td>
<td>Like Katrina no one was prepared</td>
<td>Blogs, e.g., on the placing of booms</td>
<td>Local officials try to manage on their own &amp; are chastised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP has resources available and motivation to show it can be a good ‘green’ citizen</td>
<td>BP/Government criticized for restricting press access</td>
<td>Why does BP still lead when they are messing up? (Question to Gov’t)</td>
<td>YouTube videos...no boats, no clean-up crews</td>
<td>BP preparedness &amp; organizational competency is seriously questioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katrina legacy is that Gulf views US gov’t as ineffective in emergencies</td>
<td>BP had no plan</td>
<td>Obama &amp; Katrina?</td>
<td>Gov’t engages in preemptive measures to avoid blame</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pre-existing conditions contributing to dissatisfaction with the spill response begin with the legacy of the Exxon Valdez off the coast of Alaska. The Exxon Valdez clean-up was extremely difficult due to the cold temperatures and the lack of preparation on the part of the firm. ExxonMobil was widely accused of being ill-prepared and reluctant to assume responsibility for the event. Legislations was passed in 1990 – the Oil Pollution Act – which was intended to ensure that history would not be repeated. The legislation specified that the oil company who owed the well or the resource would be responsible for the clean-up. Plans for a clean-up had to be submitted to the MMS as a precaution. This set the stage for the decision by Obama to designate BP as the entity responsible for
the Deepwater Horizon spill clean-up. BP was initially favorably disposed as it was anxious to secure its reputation as a ‘green’ oil company. Gulf residents were also initially well-disposed to BP’s handling of the spill - the Gulf region looked favorably on ‘big oil’ and less so on ‘Washington’ as it had had an unfortunate experience during Katrina with the federal government’s response under George W. Bush.

But what started out as an advantageous setting for BP quickly turned difficult for both BP and everyone involved, including the US government. By April 29th, the spill which had appeared to be manageable in the first week was now growing rapidly, already covering a space the size of Rhode Island. Questions were asked as to why so little was done the first week to stem the spill and why no one was aware of how large the leak actually was. By May 1 Obama is chastised BP for its lack of response while accusations from all parties are being directed at both the government and BP for their lack of preparedness. Obama visits the Gulf several times in an attempt to stem criticisms of the government’s response while BP increases the resources being directed at the clean-up, including calling on its industry partners Shell, Exxon Mobil and others to lend assistance. Despite expense outlays of over $6 million per day and substantial efforts on the part of BP to address concerns about its response to the spill, ultimately BP’s spill response is judged to be lamentable – Billy Nungesser, Plaquemines Parish President, was quoted as saying that BP’s response plans were, “…drawn up on the back of a bar napkin” (Santa Cruz, 2010).
Secondary stakeholders’ framing efforts contributed to this outcome, but they were directed at both the Obama administration and at BP. Referring back to the table with the details of the ‘spill response’ (Figure........above), in red the reader will find the instances in which both BP and the Government were targeted by stakeholder framing efforts. Both the Obama administration and BP were criticized for not making better use of local talent. Both BP and the Obama administration were criticized for the arrangement whereby BP was in charge of the clean-up; and both BP and the Obama administration were criticized for not altering the leadership situation when it was clear that BP was over its heads from a managerial perspective. Ultimately BP became the target of the larger share of stakeholder frustration when it became clear that the plan submitted to the MMS was full of errors and outdated.

The lessons from this example for our understanding of framing are that secondary stakeholder framing may not be initially directed at an identified target. Initially, developing cohesion between various stakeholder groups around a set of common messages and concerns may be more important than identifying the target for those messages. Second, even when the messages and concerns are clear and stakeholders are aligned, framing mechanisms may involve not one, but multiple targets. In the case of the ‘spill response’, both the Obama administration and BP were the targets of stakeholder
fury over the lack of an adequate response to the BP spill. These results therefore suggest that we adopt the modified definition of framing mechanisms that follows:

**Framing mechanisms:** The strategic use of shared meanings & definitions to create messages that evoke an emotional response and encourage affiliation with the view(s) expressed. These messages can be directed at a single target organization or at multiple targets.

To execute framing, secondary stakeholders used almost exclusively social media. The media contributed and supported framing activities by providing material that could be used by secondary stakeholders to support their arguments on various blogs and websites. The mainstream press also contributed by reporting on secondary stakeholders activities and, because of their own following of the social media discussions, by reflecting many of the stakeholders’ arguments in their own stories. For example, in early June reports began surfacing on the blogs and on YouTube about BP restricting the press’s access to the beaches and the wild animal clean-up stations. Anderson Cooper began reporting on the same topic at about the same and ran several footages about both BP’s and the government’s restriction of press access. It’s difficult to identify which came first – mainstream media or individual citizen contributions – but it can be said that once started, the two contributed to a sustained dialogue on the topic.

Next I will address mobilizing structures using the example of the ‘spill response’
6.5 The issues of the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’, ‘Dispute over Spill Quantity’ and mobilizing structures

King describe mobilizing structures as vehicles that pool individual inputs and suggests that without mobilizing structures, protests will fail to materialize even if grievances exist (King, 2008a). He goes on to point out that two types of mobilizing structures have been identified by social movement scholars: formal organizations and informal networks of friends and peers. This research finds that a third type of mobilizing structure is available to protestors through anonymous, virtual discussion on social media and the internet. They represent an important variation on the other two as they require no physical contact, very little resources for participation, and, because they are anonymous, they lower the psychological risk barrier for participation. The other interesting aspect is that organization and protest occur simultaneously. An individual joins a virtual protest by participating in that protest through their posting or contribution to a discussion board. Mobilizing structures are therefore increasingly virtual and mobilization is either virtual and/or a combination of virtual and ‘on-the-ground’.

To illustrate the findings of this study with regards to mobilizing structures, I use the examples of ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ and ‘Dispute over Spill Quantity’. I begin with Tony.
Tony Hayward was BP’s energetic CEO. He had a good reputation within the oil industry and financial communities and had taken over from Lord John Browne several years earlier. He had adopted an agenda in which BP was to turn around its poor safety record, adopt a ‘green’ image, and push forward with aggressive development efforts to identify new sources for oil and gas. Just one week before the spill, BP and three other oil companies had concluded talks with the Obama administration and a bipartisan group of Senators on a deal that would have ensured the company’s support for the energy and climate bill in exchange for access to new sites for off-shore oil drilling, an area in which BP was concentrating its energies and was recognized to be a technological leader. With such a large and attractive deal in the air, it is no wonder that Tony Hayward was anxious to reassure the US government and public that the Deepwater Horizon was a spill that BP could handle quickly and efficiently. Perhaps Tony was just over-anxious, or perhaps he just lacked diplomacy and was overly frank, as suggested by Ed Crooks of the Financial Times when he described Tony as, “unguarded, informal, and passionate” (Crooks, 2010). But very rapidly Tony Hayward’s comments drew the attention of secondary stakeholders and the public becoming a subject of commentary and criticism. Perceived as insensitive and out-of-touch, the New York Times described Tony as “gaffe-prone” (Mouawad & Krauss, 2010). Hayward ultimately represented a huge liability for the company, but this was only the outcome of a huge on-line campaign against Tony that leveraged his less-than-diplomatic comments, his life-style, his British origins, and his less-than-credible assurances that BP would ‘make things right’ for the Gulf. YouTube videos, cartoons, Titter feeds all generously featured Tony Hayward as a subject of
ridicule. An excellent example is the SouthPark cartoon where Tony says “I’m Sorry” many times while in each frame, he is featured in increasingly privileged surrounding pursuing leisure activities such as skiing, horse-backing riding, sailing, etc. The message is that Hayward lives in a world of riches and status and can’t possible relate to the Gulf families and residents who have lost their loved-ones, their livelihoods, and their beautiful coastline.

The campaign against Tony Hayward was carried out exclusively over the internet and through the media. Considered within the framework of the political process model, the ‘Tony issue’ is presented in the following chart. It was an important contributing factor to the development and continuation of the larger movement against BP, but also had a direct result – the replacement of Tony Hayward with Bob Dudley as lead man in the Gulf in late June. Ultimately Tony Hayward was asked to leave the company. Viewed from the perspective of mobilizing structures, the movement against Hayward used only the internet and media outlets as mobilizing structures. Individual participants and humorists individually made contributions to the movement through their internet participation. Their cartoons and jokes and chatter were picked up by mainstream media who provided the means for criticism of Tony Hayward to reach broader audiences, who then later joined in and feed into the on-line chatter.
A second example of the internet and social media as being used as a mobilizing structure is that of the ‘Dispute over Spill Quantity’ issue. This issue rose up in the second week of the spill when it became clear that the information being provided by the authorities about the amount of oil gushing from the undersea well was inconsistent with the facts that indicated a slick the size of Rhode Island. BP and the Coast Guard publically
disagreed on the amount of oil on April 29th just over a week after the rig explosion (AP, 2010b). The same day, the Los Angeles Times published an article pointing out that a group called SkyTruth was using satellite and aerial surveillance technology to estimate the spillage at around 20,000 barrels a day, compared to the 5,000 barrel a day estimate provided by NOAA and the even smaller 1,000 barrel a day estimate provided by BP (Fausset, 2010). The debate over the spill amount continued over the next two and a half months with no agreement on the actual amounts and ever increasing estimates by all parties. By June 15, official government estimates put the amount of oil at 35,000-60,000 barrels of oil per day while recognizing that the amount could be as high as 80,000 (Achenbach & Fahrenthold, 2010). The confusion over the amount of oil spilled became an ‘issue’ primarily because BP was very reluctant to provide any but the most conservative estimates and the government authorities initially appeared ill-equipped and under manned for taking on the task of measuring the oil spill. They had initially relied on BP’s estimates and only began conducting independent assessments after April 29th. The scientific community attempted to fill in the gap left by BP and the authorities by using innovative techniques to measure the oil. Several researchers and scientists contributed their experience and shared their information on-line as well as with the press (Jonasson, 2010b). The dispute over the oil spill amount is presented below as ‘issue’ using the political process model framework.
What is of particular interest in this example for the purposes of better understanding mobilizing frameworks is the following: first, the internet provided scientists who are secondary stakeholders in this situation, access to information and tools that allowed them to study the spill – NASA satellite photos were publically available on-line as was data about the nature and size of the spill, and later, live feeds from the bottom of the ocean provided additional data for analysis. Second, social media and internet sites
provided a way for scientists to communicate the results of their findings to the public at large. In short, social media and the internet didn’t just serve as a mobilizing structure to carry out the protest (as was the case with the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ issue), it also provided the means for there to be a protest in the first place. Without access to information about the spill and the means to communicate with colleagues and the press, the scientists who took the lead in disputing BP’s estimates would never have been able to play this role. The information would have remained in the government and BP’s possession. In terms of mobilizing structures, the internet and social media served two purposes: that of providing the resources to mobilize and that of providing the means though which mobilization occurs.

I now turn to a third example of the use of mobilizing structures using the issue discussed above, ‘Spill Response’. In this third case, virtual mobilization was combined with local stakeholder action to have significant impact. To remind the reader, the ‘Spill Response’ issue involves the development of a stakeholder movement protesting the lack of an adequate response to the spill crisis. The management of the spill response and the lack of resource commitment were concerns expressed by individuals participating in this widespread protest movement. In terms of mobilization, the protest was carried out both on-line and on-the-ground. Mobilizing structures were several – they were informal relationships or connections made through regular contact in meetings, bars, restaurants and locations in the Gulf. They were also the formal groups and organizations that were mobilized to take action on the spill – local ecology groups, business groups, unions, etc.
They were also ad-hoc community and community leader-organized meetings and collective actions, such as those led by the Parish presidents in Louisiana. Finally, they were the on-line communities, blogs, and discussion boards in which information about what was happening on the Gulf was shared with those not on the Gulf including national organizations, the press, politicians, and the public.

Considering these in an attempt to better understand mobilizing structures, it appears that the traditional notion of a mobilizing structure can be found in organizations such as the Gulf Restoration Network, a pre-Deepwater Horizon spill ecology organization dedicated to restoring and maintaining the wildlife and its habitat in the Gulf. The Gulf Restoration Network was very active both in participating in the Gulf clean-up and in criticizing the management of the clean-up. Arron Viles, campaign director, was interviewed many times by the press. The members of his organization held rallies and clean-up events. It has even been suggested that the anonymous author of the spoof BP Twitter account was a member of the Gulf Restoration Network. Organizations such as this one played an active role in mobilizing Gulf residents to protest against the slow and ineffective clean-up efforts in the Gulf.

Another traditional mobilizing structure is represented by the actions of local parish politicians such as Billy Nungesser, Kevin Davis, Michel Claudet, and others. At the state level, Governor Bobby Jindal played an important role in stimulating debate about what
needed to be done and in organizing local officials to cooperate. The result was a regular series of meetings and initiatives that drew the attention of mainstream media and the public to the plight of these communities and to the inadequacy of the response provided by BP and administration officials.

Less traditional mobilizing structures are represented by the use of the internet and social media. As with the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ issue, the internet served as a tool that allowed movement organization and protest simultaneously. Internet sites are mobilizing structures in that they provide the opportunity of ‘self-organization’ to secondary stakeholders concerned by an issue – in this case the Gulf plight. By joining a chat group or protest site, these individuals simultaneously organize with others and protest by posting comments and/or making contributions. On-line discussion and chat during the Deepwater Horizon spill was extensive and both BP and the government were targeted. … Group or community websites were also used to assist in mobilizing individuals to participate in the clean-up and/or in meetings and protests.

To summarize, traditional and non-traditional mobilizing structures were used in tandem to assist secondary stakeholders to protest against BP, the Obama administration, and other government authorities for an inadequate spill response. Other examples in this study, for example the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ and the ‘Dispute over Quantity Spilled’ indicate that it may be sufficient to use only the internet and social media to create and
sustain a social movement. The internet and social media serve simultaneously as a mobilizing structure – by bringing together like-minded individuals – and as protest mobilization – by giving individuals the opportunity to criticize and speak out against their target. With the ‘Dispute over Quantity Spilled’, we also saw that the internet and social media can serve as a means by which a social movement can get started by providing access to information and people that would otherwise be difficult to reach.

I now turn to the topic of ‘Outcomes’ and Successful Stakeholder action.

6.6 The issue of ‘Oil Drilling’ and Successful Stakeholder Action

King’s (2008a) political process model framework posits that once the requisite conditions for stakeholder mobilization have been met, stakeholder mobilization will result in a response by the target firm. King’s argument is consistent with prevailing stakeholder theory which links salient stakeholder protest with firm responses in the form of a change in company’s practices or policies. Based on this research, I found this action-reaction explanation to be too simplistic. In all of the issues studied there were both direct and indirect outcomes from stakeholder mobilization. Also, not all direct outcomes could be described as a change in company policy or practices. Yet the outcomes – direct or indirect were not unsatisfactory from the secondary stakeholders’
perspective. To better understand this phenomenon, I suggest we look closely at the issue of ‘Oil Drilling’.

It is not unusual in the course of human events to discover that an occurrence in one domain has an unanticipated impact on another. This happens to be the case with the issue of ‘Oil Drilling’ which is properly understood as the discussion and events surrounding the failed attempt to create a bipartisan collation to support and pass a climate and energy bill in the face of resistance from a longstanding social movement against off-shore oil drilling. In the first half of 2010, the Obama administration, together with Senators John Kerry, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham were to put forth a bill on April 26th that would simultaneously open up new areas for off-shore oil drilling and put in place cap and trade regime to limit global warming. The bill represented compromises by moderate ecology groups and by the energy industry. A similar bill had passed the House of Representatives the previous year. BP was said to be one of three oil companies that had committed to support the bill and had looked forward to the possibility of accessing the additional off-shore oil reserves that the Obama administration planned to make available to the oil industry for drilling (Cowen, 2010; Sheppard, 2010b).

The Deepwater Horizon spill represented a significant ‘disruptive event’ that contributed to a breakdown in the Senate coalition and was ultimately a major factor in the bill’s
defeat in the Senate (“US Gulf Rig Accident Could Stall Offshore Drilling Proposal,” 2010). The sequences of events contributing to the breakdown in the coalition were as follows: Once the circumstances around the Deepwater Horizon spill became known, ecology groups rapidly withdrew their offer of compromise; they re-stated their traditional positions, siding with the anti-off-shore drilling faction, pointing out that the accident made it clear that the oil industry couldn’t be trusted and that these were the kinds of accidents that were bound to happen if we permitted and resumption/expansion of oil-shore drilling. As a result of the alteration in the position of the ecology groups, democratic politicians in the Senate began to push to remove clauses in the bill that expanded off-shore drilling. Others called for an investigation. Republican Senators and Lindsay Graham, a co-sponsor of the bill, removed their support as the bill was unlikely to include the off-shore drilling provisions. While the actual details of the changes in position vis-à-vis the bill may be more complex, suffice to say that within two weeks of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill, the positions of key constituents had altered considerably and the bill was thought to have little or no chance of success (Dickinsen, 2010).

To put these events in the context of our analysis of the Deepwater Horizon spill using the political process model, one should consider that the debate over the energy and climate bill of 2010 took place on the backdrop of an on-going anti-off-shore drilling movement (Clayton, 2010). The anti-off-shore drilling movement had been successful in maintaining a moratorium on off-shore drilling in California for 27 years and in limiting
The expansion of drilling along the Atlantic Coast. Recently, a strong push had been made to open up new areas to drilling to accommodate national energy requirements. It was thought that after a significant period in which there had been few major off-shore events, off-shore drilling had become safer. This trend towards greater accommodation of off-shore drilling was what prompted the compromise deal included in the bill and led to the events just prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill. The Deepwater Horizon spill represented a disruptive event, not only for the Climate and Energy bill, but for the anti-off-shore drilling movement. It gave new energy to their claims that off-shore oil drilling was not to be entertained as an option. The direct outcome for the movement was the successful defeat of Obama’s plan to open up reserves to new drilling, the defeat of the climate and energy bill, and the reenergizing of anti-off-shore drilling movement.

While the Deepwater Horizon spill significantly impacted the oil drilling movement and the climate and energy bill, the reverse was also true. The indirect outcome of discussions on the climate and energy bill and on off-shore oil drilling impacted the course of events with regards to the movement against BP. It did so in two ways: first, it altered the political calculation for Obama with regards to BP. While the bill was still in play, BP was an ally in Obama and the administration’s efforts to push through the climate and energy bill. Once prospects for the bill receded and the usefulness of having BP as an ally was gone, Obama had less reason to support BP in its efforts to deal with the Gulf crisis. The change in Obama’s stance can be seen taking place in the week of April 26th, just after it was announced that Senator Lindsay Graham was pulling his support for the
climate and energy bill. Of course the timing also coincides with the discovery that the amount of oil gushing in the ocean was much greater than thought so it’s difficult to draw direct inferences based on Obama’s behavior. None-the-less, the importance of the change in Obama’s political calculus shouldn’t be ignored. The second impact of the oil drilling discussions occurring in Washington was the decision to put in place of a six-month moratorium on deep water drilling in the Gulf until an investigation into the deep water horizon had been completed. This was not a popular move on the Gulf; however it was very popular with the ecology groups and the anti-off-shore drilling coalition. The arguments put forth by these groups in the days following the BP spill were effective in convincing a number of Senators and administrators to support a moratorium.

With all of the elements now explained, I present below the complete table for the issue ‘oil drilling’ within the framework of the political process model.
As the table above shows, ‘outcomes’ have been separated into two parts – direct and indirect outcomes. Considering direct vs. indirect outcomes, an important observation is that outcomes need to be considered in view of the entity that has been the target of stakeholder action. Direct outcomes impact the target of the social movement; indirect outcomes do not. The definitions for each of these are:

- Direct outcomes: An action taken, an event, or an alteration in position or perception that has a direct impact on the company or organization targeted by the social movement. These could be a response by the firm to stakeholders’ specific requests or claims, if the issue concerns a request. It could also be direct action taken by others as a result of stakeholder mobilization on the issue.
• Indirect outcomes: An action, event or significant alteration in perception, stated positions, or practices with regards to the issue in question. An indirect outcome does not necessarily impact the targeted firm or organization; it may impact other people or events which have an influence on the firm or on subsequent events of concern to the firm.

BP was not the targeted firm for all of the issues we have looked at in this dissertation. As explained in the section on framing, in some cases, multiple entities were targeted by stakeholder mobilization. In the example above, BP was a stakeholder, but not a target of the social movement against deep water drilling. The Obama administration and the US congressmen were the immediate targets of the anti-off-shore drilling movement leaders as they attempted to thwart passage of the climate and energy bill. The direct outcomes of this issue, thus concern the government. The bill was defeated (direct outcome) and the anti-off-shore drilling movement in the halls of government was revived (direct outcome). The indirect outcomes listed above concern BP. Obama withdraws support from BP as it struggles to handle the Gulf crisis and a moratorium is placed on deep water off-shore drilling, an area in which BP has significant resources committed. This example suggests that both indirect and direct outcomes can have significant impacts on a firm. Moreover, it suggests that the most important outcomes from stakeholder movements are not always those that result in a decision or action by the targeted firm. Change can come from elsewhere, such as when the Obama administration puts in place a moratorium on oil drilling which ultimately impacts BP’s operations in the Gulf. Below
is a table with the outcomes from the other issues broken into the two groups - direct and indirect. The target of each issue is listed for reference.

Figure #9 Direct and Indirect Outcomes for all Six Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drilling Safety – Target is BP &amp; Govt</th>
<th>Oil Drilling – Target is US Govt</th>
<th>Dispute on Oil Spill Quantity – Targets BP</th>
<th>Tony Hayward, CEO – Target is BP</th>
<th>Spill Response – Target is Govt &amp; BP</th>
<th>Local Econ &amp; Well – Target is Govt &amp; BP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• BP agrees not to fight new regulation</td>
<td>• BP’s administration &amp; Coast Guard lost trust in BP as a partner</td>
<td>• Obama administration &amp; Coast Guard lost trust in BP as a partner</td>
<td>• Tony Hayward is dismissed</td>
<td>• BP loses confidence of Gulf residents</td>
<td>• Gulf residents look to the US government and BP to resolve the problems created by the spill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MSS waste-structured</td>
<td>• BP lost credibility as a source on spill</td>
<td>• BP’s credibility as a partner is diminished</td>
<td>• Tony is replaced with Bob Dudley</td>
<td>• Obama blames BP’s Hayward for lack of adequate response; publicly late on his hands</td>
<td>• Public develops strong sympathy for Gulf residents – see them as unworthy victims of the spill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oil companies shake hands &amp; pointed fingers at BP</td>
<td>• BP’s public relies more on scientific community than ‘central command’ to provide accurate data on spill</td>
<td>• Lots and lots of Tony jokes ...</td>
<td>• BP goes on record as a partner</td>
<td>• Local officials try to manage on their own &amp; are chastised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Moratorium on new-off-shore drilling</td>
<td>• NOAA established independent information sources on spill; no longer relies on BP</td>
<td>• BP prepares to respond &amp; organizational competency is seriously questioned</td>
<td>• Spill Response</td>
<td>• BP’s Hayward is dismissed</td>
<td>• BP holds BP’s Hayward for lack of adequate response; publicly late on his hands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gulf residents protest moratorium</td>
<td>• BP issues new off-shore drilling moratorium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Public develops strong sympathy for Gulf residents – see them as unworthy victims of the spill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To conclude, the outcomes of stakeholder movements do not always result in an action or change in policy being taken by the target firm. In some cases, stakeholder movements can result in an alteration in the view of others on the target firm or it can result in changes that ultimately impact the company, but though the actions of other parties.

When considering social movements and attempting to differentiate direct from indirect outcomes, the target of the social movement should also be taken into account. As in the situation described above with the climate and energy bill and the anti-off-shore oil drilling movement, the target was not BP but the US government, yet the outcomes of
that event had significant impacts on BP. The role of social media and the internet should not be ignored here either; both direct and indirect outcomes include alterations in public opinion with regards to the issue, the target firm, or the stakeholder concerned. By splitting outcomes into direct and indirect outcomes, it becomes easier to appreciate the complexity of the relationships in which the firm is involved and to tease out a little more clearly the pieces that ultimately result in changes in policies and practices in the firm.

6.7 The stakeholder movement against BP and the stakeholder process model with feedback loops

At this point in the presentation of the findings, it is perhaps useful to remind ourselves of the purpose of this research – that being the exploration of the role that social media and internet connectivity play in the stakeholder movement against BP subsequent to the Deepwater Horizon spill, using the political process model as a framework. Examination at the level of the embedded cases - ‘issues’, above, has led to a building out of the political process model to include additional factors and more detailed explanations of each part of the model. Below is a table integrating all of the elements of the revised model – a stakeholder process model for the internet age.
I now propose to use this revised model to explore the Deepwater Horizon incident at the level of the holistic case. Some explanation of the model is necessary first. Reading from the left, the model starts with pre-existing conditions. As discussed earlier, pre-existing conditions are aspects of the state of affairs existing prior to the rise of the stakeholder movement that have particular pertinence to the movement. It is assumed that once the movement has started these remain stagnant for the immediate period in which the movement takes hold and develops. Although not explicitly shown in this representation, feedback loops are conceptually included in the model because outcomes feed back into the model altering pre-existing conditions over time and, thus, stakeholders’ assessment
of the situation. This model does not explicitly include changes to pre-existing conditions in order to differentiate more clearly between the long term trends and conditions that prevailed prior to the rise of the movement and the disruptive events that represent short term events and changes in circumstances that impact the course of the movement. It was noted that social media and internet connectivity was critical to the differentiation between a pre-existing conditions and a disruption event as it allowed for a rapid assessment of a disruptive event on changes in public opinion. Yet if a movement extends over several years, it would make sense to integrate changes to pre-existing conditions as from disruptive events.

Disruptive events regularly feed the movement and are listed in chronological order. Such events can be of a varying nature – speeches, physical happenings, decisions, changes in policy, discoveries of new information, shocking behavior, etc. They differ from other activities and happening because they have pertinence for the stakeholders and are likely to enhance their ability to achieve their goals. Reactions to disruptive events can be tracked via social media, providing an estimate of their impact on public opinion. Often disruptive events are the subsequent target of framing activities and/or later mobilization.

Framing is shown in the model as it evolves over the life over the movement with the initial framing represented on top and the final framing on the bottom. What is presented
here is the essence of the many messages communicated by activist stakeholders with the intent of rallying support for the cause. Changes in the framing demonstrate an evolution in stakeholders’ position vis-à-vis their target. It may also represent an alteration in the chosen target, say from being the government to BP. Framing is almost exclusively achieved through the internet, social media, and mainstream press through a process whereby they each supply the other with material to report on or to use to support their respective arguments.

Direct and indirect outcomes can occur at any point in the stakeholder movement and are shown from top to bottom in chronological order. This research has suggested that many outcomes are not changes in the target firm’s policy or practices, but rather changes made by other parties that have an indirect impact on the target firm. Direct outcomes are changes either by the firm or an alteration of opinion directed at the target firm. Indirect outcomes are those that are not directed at the target firm, but which have a significant impact on the target firm. Successful stakeholder action results from both direct and indirect outcomes and can be considered any alteration that moves stakeholders closer to achieving their objectives. Secondary stakeholders are satisfied with both direct and indirect outcomes that go in the direction they have charted and may leverage indirect outcomes to use against the firm.
Below is Deepwater Horizon incident viewed as stakeholder movement against BP. That can best be understood as the events contributing to the movement against BP. Outcomes and events associated with each of the ‘issues’ examined earlier in this section contributed to the development of the stakeholder movement against BP outlined below.

Figure # 11 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Deepwater Horizon Reporting’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Opportunities</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Indirect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-existing Conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oil Pollution Act of 1990 makes equity owner responsible for clean-up sets stage for Obama ‘responsibility of BP’ comment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BP had poor safety record &amp; wants to be ‘green’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legacy of Katrina in the Gulf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruptive Events</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deepwater Horizon well is leaking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BP estimate of spill amount challenged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Obama says BP is responsible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Locals take actions on their own</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tony says spill is tiny compared to the Gulf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BP owns the well</td>
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<tr>
<td>• BP is responsible for the clean-up</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The MMS let BP do whatever they want</td>
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<tr>
<td>• This wouldn’t have happened if BP didn’t go drilling in the Gulf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• BP did this to us</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilizing structures</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Press</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Social media</td>
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<td>• Blogs &amp; discussion boards</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Protests in the Gulf</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Outcomes |        |          |
|• BP stock declines to less than 50% of its value |
|• Spill is labeled ‘BP spill’ |
|• US Attorney General opens criminal & civil investigations |
|• Tony Hayward, CEO steps down |
|• BP reputation loss |
|• BP banned from additional US contracts |
|• Moratorium on off-shore drilling |
|• Increase in industry regulations on oil industry |
|• Re-organisation of the US Mining and Minerals Service |
|• Defeat of Senate Climate & Energy bill |
There were several important pre-existing conditions that contributed to the development of a stakeholder movement against BP following the Deepwater Horizon spill. The first of those was the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This act was passed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster and mandated that in the case of an accident or ecological event, the entity who owned the oil would be responsible for paying for damages and removal costs associated with the event. It also required that states, government agencies and individual oil companies develop preventive plans and a detailed containment and clean-up plans.

The importance of this legislation for the Deepwater Horizon case is that it placed the financial burden for the clean-up efforts on BP. It also set the stage for a tug of war between the state and federal authorities on the one hand and BP on the other as concerns responsibility for managing the clean-up. According to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, the National and Regional Response Teams are to coordinate and direct efforts to respond in the case of an important oil spill. Yet according to the plan that BP submitted to and approved by the US Mining and Minerals Service, BP was prepared to deploy a massive clean-up effort in the case of a spill.

A second important pre-existing condition was the poor safety record that BP had gained over the previous 10 years. Discussed above in the section on ‘Drilling Safety’, I explain how BP’s safety record was a result of two major accidents – the 2005 Texas oil refinery accident and the 2006 leak in the Prudhoe Bay pipeline in Alaska. Despite BP’s claims that they had resolved these issues, the Deepwater Horizon spill came too quickly after the other two major accidents for BP’s claims to hold a great deal of weight.
The third important pre-existing condition was that this event came on the heels of Katrina. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 had devastated the Gulf, in particular Louisiana, leaving in its wake major ecological, economic, and property damage. The region was only just beginning to recover. One of the features of the Katrina event was the lack of preparedness of the state and federal authorities to provide disaster relief to its citizens. President G. W. Bush’s administration was widely criticized as having failed the residents of the Gulf Coast. Local politicians such as Governor Bobby Jindal have been noted for their outspoken skepticism with regards to aid coming from Washington.

On this backdrop, the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill came as a vivid reminder of the past inadequacies of the federal government, the past mistakes made by BP, and the responsibility that both parties have for ‘making things right’ for the people of the Gulf. It is perhaps to their credit that the Gulf citizens responded stoically to the early news of the spill. Yet it was, perhaps, disquieting to learn a week later that the leak was not under control and was spreading. Even more so to learn that there were disagreements between government authorities and BP on the amount of oil spilled, as was the case by April 29th. Up to this point, it had appeared that the government and BP were cooperating, that they were on the ‘same team’; yet here was evidence that the two entities on which the Gulf population was relying most to deal with the spill were quibbling in their corner. It is at this point that President Obama steps in and announces that BP is responsible for the
clean-up. "While BP is ultimately responsible for funding the cost of response and clean-up operations, my administration will continue to use every single available resource at our disposal, including potentially the Department of Defense, to address the incident," President Barack Obama said yesterday. The announcement was a game-changer in terms of framing BP for responsibility for the spill; it came across in the headlines and Tweets as, “BP is responsible” (CEO Wire, n.d.; Lewis, 2012).

And yet it was not the only piece of information that made its way into the public consciousness that contributed to the impression of BP being responsible for the spill. Despite protestations from BP that the rig was owned by Transocean, the fact that the well was owned by BP and that Transocean was under contract from BP seemed to have more impact. It was ‘BP’s well’ and thus ‘BP’s spill’. In the search for understanding as to how this catastrophe could have come about, curious stakeholders and the press learned that the Mining and Minerals Service may once again have been derelict in their duties. Already under scrutiny for highly compromising behavior in Colorado, it appeared now that the MMS was in the pocket of BP management and could be guilty of lax oversight in the Deepwater Horizon case (Urbina, 2010a). In an effort to deflect criticism against the government and also with the aim of resolving what was increasingly becoming a liability, the Obama administration immediately stepped in and announced the re-organization of the MMS. This tacit admission of guilt by the US government left BP, not in a better, but in a worse position, as it made it appear that indeed BP had been violating mandated operating procedures and had gotten away with
it. The loss of legitimacy of the MMS left BP with no ‘covering blanket’ to support their claims that all necessary and adequate procedures had been followed with regards to the rig.

The chatter in social media and the tone of the comments on the Deepwater Horizon situation turned continuously more critical of BP. A title of a blog comment on April 29th on ProPublica was, “Gulf Oil Spill Puts Spotlight on Regulator With Mixed Record”. On May 1st on Daily Kos, one blogger’s title was, “BP is a syphilitic infection” and on May 25th by ‘troutfishing’ on Daily Kos, another was entitled: “BP’s accidental terrorism brings silent spring to America”. An important contribution to the impression of BP’s duplicity was its own behavior with regards to the spill quantity estimates. As discussed in the section on ‘Dispute on Quantity Spilled, BP was continually communicating only the most conservative estimates even when it became very clear through the contributions of scientists across the US that those estimates were totally unrealistic. While objectively speaking, one could be sympathetic to the plight of BP who were well aware that their liability under the Clean Water act would depend upon the calculation of the amount of oil spilled; it was not in the company’s interest to provide data that would simply serve to increase the cost to the company of an already very expensive disaster. That being said, their handling of the ‘quantity dispute’ simply contributed to the impression of the company’s lack of transparency and unwillingness to cooperate.
By the time that protests were beginning on the Gulf against BP, the company had been framed as being ‘liars, cheats, and money grabbing oil tycoons who cared very little for the people of the Gulf’. The anti-off-shore drilling movement’s efforts also began to have an effect focusing attention on the US’s unhealthy dependence on oil and the inherent dangers of off-shore drilling. Below I have pasted in two photos of the BP protests that took place around the world found on the internet.

Figure #12 BP Protestors

Certainly some of the fears about BP’s lack of concern for the impacts of their activity on the environment and the people in the Gulf were confirmed by the words and actions of Tony Hayward, BP’s CEO. Although certainly he had attempted to transmit a very down-to-earth and sympathetic image to people on the Gulf, the gap between his reality and that of residents living on the Gulf was perhaps too wide to allow that approach to work. His comments came across as exaggerated and his gaffs were widely quoted. As explained above in the section on ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’, there was even a mini-movement against
Tony Hayward, the person, with jokes and videos filling the web pages of social media. Hayward himself talks about being vilified upon stepping down from BP. "This is a very sad day for me personally," Mr [Tony Hayward] said. "Whether it is fair or unfair is not the point. I became the public face [of the disaster] and was demonized and vilified. BP cannot move on in the US with me as its leader . . . Life isn't fair" ("Hayward pay-off fury after BP posts GBP 11bn loss," 2010).

I have described above how stakeholders used disruptive events, framing, and mobilizing structures to damage the image of BP and reinforce its responsibility for the spill. In terms of direct outcomes from primarily secondary stakeholder actions, first, BP suffered at one point a more than 50% decline in its stock price from the period just prior to the spill. Second, the spill was labeled the ‘BP spill’ early on by stakeholders, a name that has stuck to this day. A search in Google for ‘BP spill’ will bring up over 28 million entries starting with those on the Deepwater Horizon spill. In addition to the reputation damage which is still evident today, BP is has suffered considerable financial damage ("Shrunken Giant," 2014). Over $42 million has been set aside to cover the costs of the spill. As there are still major court hearings pending, the cost is expected to exceed this amount with the total bill reaching nearly $60 million. Around $38 million in assets has already been sold. BP is also still barred by the US environmental protection agency from bidding on new oil drilling and related contracts.
In terms of indirect outcomes, the BP stakeholder movement led to a temporary moratorium on deep water drilling. Very unpopular with Gulf residents, but strongly supported by the ecologists and anti-off-shore oil drilling advocates, the ban was lifted earlier than the six months allowed as soon as the US Department of Interior had completed its assessment and announced new regulation of oil drilling activities. The new regulation, another indirect outcome of the Deepwater Horizon incident and stakeholder protest, included new standards for well design, blowout preventers, safety certification, emergency response and worker training (Baker & Broder, 2010). Two other indirect outcomes include the defeat of the Climate and Energy bill in the Senate, discussed in the section above on ‘Oil Drilling’ and the re-organization of the Mining and Minerals Service.

Both the direct and indirect outcomes must have given some satisfaction and assurance to secondary stakeholders in the Gulf and elsewhere that measures had been taken to prevent a ‘BP-type’ occurrence in the future. Although BP has borne much of the brunt of the blame and reputation damage in this affair primarily through its stakeholders’ framing and mobilizing efforts, it is not clear that the full weight of guilt lies with BP. Both Transocean and Halliburton have been found guilty of wrongdoing in their respective court hearings and the US government was clearly at fault for lax oversight due to mismanagement at the Mining and Minerals Service. This story is therefore a cautionary tale for other corporate managers about the dangers associated with secondary stakeholder movements, such as the one that was launched against BP. Whatever may be
the circumstances, should the right elements (pre-existing conditions, disruptive events, framing mechanisms, and mobilization structures) be present, there is the possibility of the development of a stakeholder movement with all of its unfortunate consequences.

6.8 The Stakeholder Process Model – the Holistic Movement

Stepping back now from the ‘tale’ of the Deepwater Horizon spill, let’s now turn to the findings of this study with regards to holistic case, taking into account what has been learned at the level of the embedded cases.

Based on the findings of this study, the movement against BP could best be characterized as a collection of issues and stakeholders that came together at this point in time to contribute to the protest against the actions of BP in regards to the Deepwater Horizon spill. Each issue appears to contribute something different to the larger movement. Some issues were more important for the framing of the larger movement, some for driving and leading to mobilization, others for their pre-existing conditions or disruptive events. For example, the ‘Local Economy and Well-Being’ issue was very important in creating sympathy for inhabitants of the Gulf. The impact of the oil spill was framed not simply as an environmental disaster but as an attack on the livelihoods and lifestyles of people on the Gulf. This careful framing brought together diverse groups who may not have otherwise been willing to protest against an oil company who also provides a career and
revenues to many in the Gulf. The issue ‘Spill Response’ that pointed up the inefficiencies of the government’s and BP’s response to the spill was extremely effective in terms of mobilizing structures. It brought together those that were helping in the clean-up with those who were living on the Gulf and were concerned for its wildlife and welfare. It also provided a regular store of examples of how BP was not stepping up to the task of cleaning up the Gulf. The ‘Drilling Safety’ issue with its focus on BP’s poor safety record was crucial as a pre-existing condition that set the stage for BP being framed as a poor operator while the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ issue provided excellent fodder for messages framing BP as a profits-hungry firm with little consideration for the damage its leaves in its wake.

The timing of issues and the connections between issues does not appear to occur in a haphazard fashion, although the pattern does display some degree of circularity with feedback loops. While pre-existing conditions always precede the beginning of a movement, disruptive events, framing efforts and mobilizing activities can occur throughout the timeframe of the movement and be repeated multiple times. In particular, the relationship between disruptive events and framing efforts is highly repetitive and circular. A disruptive event will generate a reaction within the concerned stakeholder population to be followed by efforts to frame the event in the context of larger movement. Mobilization can occur in reaction to the new framing and, if it occurs on-line, it follows closely the disruptive event. On-the-ground mobilization implies logistical organization and may occur some days, weeks, or even perhaps months after an event.
The course of the development of a stakeholder movement can be impacted by the order in which events occur. For example, if the dispute over the quantify of oil spilled had occurred a month or more later, Senator Markey may not have been successful in making the case to Congress for the release of BP’s underwater videos. And, it was the combination of the scientific analysis of aerial photos together with the videos of the underwater well that so discredited BP’s technical reputation in the eyes of the public. The regular reframing of messaging following disruptive events can serve to broaden the appeal of the movement and draw in new active participants. With each new disruptive event concerning Gulf residents, the messages on social media and in the press were re-framed. Initially concerning only the families for fishermen, the commercial community was later implicated, and still later, Gulf residents and vacationers were affected. As new issues and new stakeholders become involved, the framing expanded and found solid footing in messaging that echoed the Gulf’s Katrina experience and emphasized how unfair it was that Gulf residents’ lifestyle once again become threatened.

Below is a graph illustrating the timing aspects of the stakeholder process model. These initial impressions will need to be confirmed in further studies of the model.
To summarize, a stakeholder movement does not appear to be a cohesive entity but is made up of several smaller issues which come together to make a whole. The stakeholders involved, particularly in the case of secondary stakeholder movements, are likely to be diverse and the targets not necessarily uniform across the various stakeholder groups. A stakeholder movement may also draw strength from a larger social movement; in this case the movement against BP drew strength from the anti-off-shore drilling movement, for example. It is the coalescing of the different movements and issues together that allows the movement as a whole to take form and eventually identify a unique target(s) for their actions.
As the moment begins to take form, timing becomes important with regular feedback loops between disruptive events and the framing of those events in the larger movement. Mobilizing can occur on-line or on-the-ground and therefore can be closely linked with framing efforts if they are on-line, or more removed in time, if they are on the ground. In the case of the BP spill, there were several disruptive events and several framing efforts as well as a number of mobilization activities.

Below is a graph that depicts the interlocking nature of the issues connected with the Deepwater Horizon spill. It suggests that outcomes from several different stakeholder discussions taking place on social media and in the press eventually combined and interacted contributing to movement against BP and the overall pejorative impression that was retained by the public. The size of the arrows in the diagram below indicates the level of influence each of the issue outcomes had on either on other issues or on the movement. For example, the outcome of the dispute over the quantity of oil spilled had a direct influence on the impression gained about BP’s trustworthiness, but it also influenced how people viewed BP’s spill response efforts. Because of the inaccuracy in BP’s estimates of the amount of oil spilled, the public lost trust in BP’s claims as to the amount of oil there was in marches and on beaches, as to the amount of oil that had been cleaned up, or as to the efficacy of the company’s clean-up efforts in general. One particularly interesting observation that can be made, illustrated below, is that while Tony
Hayward’s undiplomatic behavior had devastating effects, it did not appear to directly contribute to the public’s impression of BP’s responsibility for the spill. It did, however, substantially impact the public’s impression of BP’s handling of the clean-up efforts and of its level of concern for Gulf residents. In the end, Tony Hayward was not viewed as an incompetent or dishonest CEO, but rather as a remote CEO who had little or no sensitivity for the impact of his firm’s actions on the outside world.

Figure # 14 Public Perceptions on Issues Combine/Interact, Contributing to a Social Movement against BP.
6.9 Summary of the Findings, the Impact of Social Media and Internet Connectivity on the Political Process Model

Social media and internet connectivity had an important impact on the unfolding of the events following the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill. These tools were widely used by the media, the public and stakeholders for information gathering, information sharing, and in framing and mobilizing activities. While these tools were available and used by all stakeholders, those that benefitted the most were secondary stakeholders, in particular scientists, the Gulf residents and communities, and the concerned public.

Results of this study include a revised ppm for use in the internet age – a stakeholder process model. The model reflects the process through which stakeholders gain influence over their corporate target and are able to influence events. Unlike many other frameworks developed to explain stakeholder-firm relations, the stakeholder process model refined here takes into account the increased influence that secondary stakeholders are able to wield as a result of their use of social media and internet connectivity. The model also accommodates primary stakeholders integrating the nature of their pre-existing relationships with the firm and their own efforts to influence the firm. It therefore takes into account both the ‘power, legitimacy and urgency’ connected with primary stakeholders’ demands on the firm and the rapidly evolving influence that secondary stakeholders are able to accumulate as the consequence of disruptive events,
framing, and social mobilization (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). In short it is a more dynamic representation of firm-stakeholder relations suitable to the internet age.

What follows is summary of how social media and internet connectivity contributed to secondary stakeholders’ efforts in the Deepwater Horizon crisis and to the development of a social movement that ultimately had a strong influence on the course of events. Social media and internet connectivity was impactful, 1) by allowing for a clear definition of political opportunities and a differentiation between pre-existing conditions and disruptive events; 2) by being the principle mechanism through which secondary stakeholders were successful in framing their issues; 3) by simultaneously providing a vehicle through which secondary stakeholders could organize mobilization and mobilize; and 4) by increasing information symmetry so that secondary stakeholder with diverse interests might inform one another of their efforts and then combine their efforts for greater impact.

The information is broken down by element in the stakeholder process model. A table summarizing the effects follows the explanation.

1) Political opportunities: Pre-existing conditions and disruptive events

The political process model was criticized for its inability to clearly define what would constitute a political opportunity. The findings of this research suggest that there are two
types of political opportunities: pre-existing conditions that contribute to consciousness-raising in public opinion with regards to a particular issue, and disruptive events, that represent opinion altering occurrences. The latter can be differentiated from the former because a clear change in public opinion can be traced to the event. This research suggests that the alteration in public opinion can be identified through social media. Reactions to events and/or decisions are reflected in blog posts and social media comments, thereby assisting in differentiating pre-existing conditions from disruptive events.

2) Framing:

Social media and the internet were used by secondary stakeholders and the public to frame BP - providing their observations and sentiments on the events related to the Deepwater Horizon spill. Extensive blogging, tweeting and commenting on social media and websites contributed heavily to secondary stakeholders’ efforts to frame BP as a sloppy and duplicitous operator that was only interested in profits. Successful framing efforts appear to have been primarily a result of internet and social media activity. Those efforts were supported and extended by the mainstream media which provided additional outlets for the views of secondary stakeholders and material which could be used to support the efforts of bloggers and social media commentators.
Framing efforts were not so much uni-targeted at BP as they were multi-targeted at several entities that could be held responsible for the spill and for the unsatisfactory clean-up efforts. Social media facilitated both the multi-targeting, but also left open the possibility that the public and other secondary stakeholders could contribute to the evolution of framing efforts through their individual participation on websites and social media pages. As it happens, framing efforts increasingly were targeted at BP as the outcomes from ‘mini-issues’ contributed to the discourse around the Deepwater Horizon spill.

3) Mobilization:

Social media and the internet were also used heavily in mobilization around the spill. In contrast to tradition mobilizing structures for social movements in which a) affiliation with the movement and b) mobilization or protest are separate activities, with social media, those two activities occur simultaneously. A would-be protestor who begins to comment on a discussion board protesting BP, has at once become a member of the movement against BP and participated for the first time in a protest. Mobilization around the BP spill on social media and the internet was intense. As early as May 1, reporters were commented on how extensive the activity was on social media concerning BP. It also wasn’t very flattering. Doug Lacombe of the Star-Phoenix wrote, “BP may have an easier time capping the gushing well than the toxic word-of-mouth that is
spewing forth on social media” (Lacombe, 2010). If social media and the internet were any indication of the size of the movement against BP, then it was very big indeed.

In terms of how these tools were used, social media and the internet were used differently for each of the issues I studied. In some cases, an internet campaign was combined with an on-the-ground campaign (involving meetings and protests and the like). That was the case with the issue of the BP ‘Spill Response’ efforts. On-the-ground activities were picked up and communicated on-line giving further credence to the protests and dialogue posted on social media. In other cases, the movement was strictly internet based. The ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ issue, for example, was an almost exclusively on-line affair featuring videos, cartoons, and quips about Tony. Social media and the internet were also effective as an information gathering and network building tool. For example, the scientists that stepped forward to challenge BP’s estimate of the spill amount were using the internet to access satellite photos, video feeds from the bottom of the ocean, and the networking capabilities of the internet to access other colleagues with the needed tools and skills to complete their analyses.

4) Indirect/direct outcomes, feedback loops, and interlocking issues

While the impact of social media and internet connectivity on the political process model is less evident than with the other elements of the process, what can be said is the
importance of its role in overcoming information asymmetry. Consistent with economic theories on the importance of having access to information for investing, purchasing, and other decision-making purposes, secondary stakeholders need access to information on issues concerning the firm in order to make informed decisions about the groups’ influence strategies. The results of this study suggest that social media and internet connectivity facilitated the transfer of information concerning one issue/event to the discussion of another and thereby increasing the likelihood that one secondary stakeholder group would be aware of and sympathetic to another’s issues. Take, for example, the events related to the use of chemical dispersants in the Gulf. Fishermen who were hired to assist in cleaning up in the Gulf began having respiratory problems which they attributed to the dispersants. Their concerns might have remained isolated to the fishing community; however, the issue became a topic of discussion on social media thereby drawing attention to the use of dispersants and the nature of the dispersants. Ecology groups already were expressing concerns about the use of this particular brand of dispersants. The additional information from the fishing community reinforced their concerns and ultimately led the EPA to ask BP to stop using the dispersants. Timing is also important; while the information from the fishermen would probably have reached the EPA at some point anyway, it may not have reached it in time and in enough quantity to sufficiently to reinforce the environmentalists’ demands and to allow for prompt and appropriate action.
Below is a table summarizing the impacts of social media and the internet on the elements of the stakeholder process model:

Table #5

**Contribution of Social Media to the Stakeholder Process Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Opportunities</th>
<th>Framing</th>
<th>Mobilizing structures</th>
<th>Indirect Outcomes</th>
<th>Direct Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-existing Conditions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disruptive Events</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indirect Outcomes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Direct Outcomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allows for clear delineation between slow consciousness-raising in public opinion and dramatic shifts due to disruptive events</td>
<td>Allows for multi-targeted framing and, as the movement grows, for the emergence of broad-based messaging acceptable to many stakeholder groups</td>
<td>Allows for coordination of on-ground &amp; on-line efforts in which protest affiliation and protest actions sometime happen simultaneously</td>
<td>Reduces asymmetry in information access across stakeholder groups; stakeholders are more and better informed about the actions/reactions of the target firm</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7: Limitations of this Study and Discussion

The limitations of this study concern primarily the degree to which its findings can be generalized to other contexts and situations. This point is addressed below. A discussion of the implications of the findings for stakeholder theory research and for managerial application follows in sections 7.2-7.4.

7.1 Generalizability of the Findings

One challenge for researchers using the single case method is to show external validity with regard to the explanation or relationships found in the study (Yin, 2009). This study is focused on exploring the political process model in the context of firm-stakeholder relations. In particular, its contribution concerns the initial steps in the building of a mid-range theory of firm-stakeholder relations in the information age – the stakeholder process model. Efforts were made in the data collection phase to ensure that a wide variety of populations and data sources were included in the study, something that will contribute to the transferability of the findings. In addition, the richness of the study’s data has facilitated a better understanding of how the stakeholder process model operates and has contributed to the model’s development, yet this study is neither a controlled experiment nor a test of the model’s predictive capabilities. The principle contribution of this study to the development of this theory concerns the clarification of the definitions, the identification of important elements, and a better understanding of the relationship
between those elements. The study has also integrated the aspects of social media and internet connectivity in order for the model to more accurately reflect firm-stakeholder relations in the information age. While the findings suggest a causal relationship between certain events connected with the Deepwater Horizon spill and the rise of a social movement against BP, it has not been the purposes of this study to test that relationship. That can be the purpose of other studies using the political process model.

The model developed as a result of the findings in this study is applicable to the study of firm-stakeholder relations. This study’s findings can be generalized insofar as they represent stakeholder-firm relations following a major ecological or safety incident or another major incident in which the legitimacy of the company’s internal practices are questioned. Additional research will be required to determine whether the stakeholder process model introduced in this study can be developed for use in other circumstance. For example, this study’s findings may be relevant, but incomplete, if used to examine other types of firm relationships or when there is no major incident or event to serve as a trigger for the re-configuration of stakeholder positions and relationships. An event where there is less media coverage or social media activity may also alter the transferability of the model. In addition, this study looked at a foreign company operating in a US context. The findings may be different should a US firm be studied or should the event occur outside the US. The industry context in which this occurred is also of importance. The oil and gas industry has had several incidents involving ecological damage and the credibility of the industry as a whole can be suspect. A comparable incident within
another industry may not be the object of a social movement. In summary, several factors have yet to be tested before it can be said that the stakeholder process model has strong generalizability across many sectors, conditions, and situations.

With regards to this study’s findings on the use of the internet and social media, they concur with several others showing that these tools appear to be altering power relationships between the firm and its consumer stakeholders and have the potential for increasing the effectiveness of political activist organizations that target firms (Baron, 2001; Pitt, Berthon, Watson, & Ewing, 2001; Rezabakhsh et al., 2006; Walgrave et al., 2010). The limitations of this study with regards to the internet and social media is that it did not look at the use and comparative effectiveness of other non-internet based tools, nor does this study concern itself with the use of social media and internet related tools outside the confines of the stakeholder process model. The technology in this area is evolving very rapidly, as is the manner in which the technology is being used. It is not clear that if a similar spill occurred today, the events would evolve in a similar manner. Further study would therefore be useful in this area. One possible avenue for further research could be to study the comparative effectiveness of non-internet tools with internet and social media tools in a social movement, as it appeared that not all of the online or on-the-ground mobilization efforts were equally impactful.
7.2 Implications - Primary vs. Secondary Stakeholders, Two Approaches for Influence

Extent research on stakeholder-firm relations suggests that primary stakeholders will have greater influence than secondary stakeholder over the firm due to the resource dependent nature of their relationship with the firm (Agle et al., 1999; Frooman & Murrell, 2005; Mitchell et al., 1997). It additionally suggests that influence over a firm is based almost exclusively on resource-based connections or relationships. This research suggests that social media and internet connectivity may be altering the nature of firm-stakeholder relationships by making it easier for secondary stakeholders to have access to relevant information, to frame the discussion, and to mobilize against the firm – and thereby being able to increase their influence on the firm.

In terms of gaining access to relevant information, secondary stakeholders and the public were able to gain access to valuable information through the internet that allowed them to engage in the public discussion about the BP spill in a timely and highly effective manner. The most notable example of this was the access scientists gained to satellite images, underwater oil flows from the well and other data which they then analyzed and shared amongst the community in order to comment upon, and in this case, refute BP’s and NOAA’s own estimates. The importance of their contribution is most significant because it arrived in a timely manner. Had their concerns been raised several weeks later, then their information would have been primarily useful in eventual court discussions. What transpired was that the scientists’ sharing of information, 1) led to a change in
NOAA’s own policy for the way it was collecting information on the amount of oil spilled (they stopped using BP’s estimates and developed their own), 2) initiated a discussion around BP’s motivation for obscuring information on the amount of oil spilled, and 3) engaged other scientists and layperson to contribute to vibrant discussions on social media and the internet on all matters of scientific data concerning various aspects of the BP spill. To conclude, these secondary stakeholders actively contributed to the on-going debate about how to deal with the spill and its consequences. They were able to do so because they had access to information that hitherto would be reserved to the authorities or the company involved. Public sharing of information increases information symmetry between parties and contributes to equalizing the relative power position between stakeholders and the firm or between primary and secondary stakeholders groups.

Social media and internet connectivity also contributed to secondary stakeholders’ ability to frame their issues, and to identify areas in which the interests of several different stakeholders could find common ground. The best illustration of this was the way in which Gulf residents, fisherman, and businessmen were able to accommodate their different interests, combining to put forth a cohesion message about their position vis-a-vis BP and their demands of the firm. These efforts were facilitated through social media conversations and the reinforcement of framing by the mainstream press. These internet based techniques for the finding of common ground between groups does not require the mediation of the groups’ leaders, but occurs through fluid on-line dialogue.
Finally, social media and internet connectivity largely contributed to secondary stakeholder mobilization. It represents both the mechanism through which mobilization is organized and the mechanism through which it occurs. Secondary stakeholders can mobilize on-line by contributing to a blog, or posting a picture or a video on YouTube. The possibilities are extensive and while they may not require quite the level of commitments that a march on Washington DC (for example) might require of its participants, on-line mobilization is open to a wider audience and can bring into the movement a broader representation of the general public. In this study, internet mobilization was used extensively and was highly effective in both attracting participation and getting its message across.

To summarize, the three manners in which social media and internet connectivity was used by secondary stakeholders in the Deepwater Horizon spill aftermath suggests that these tools have strengthen and broadened the reach of secondary stakeholders relative to primary stakeholders and the firm. Primary stakeholders rely primarily upon one-to-one contacts and privileged communication and information channels to influence the firm. Secondary stakeholders previously had limited access to these channels and to the information that might pass through them. With the internet and social media, secondary stakeholders have gained access to alternative channels for information and communication that are increasing these stakeholders ability to act in a timely manner.
and to influence opinion on important issues. This represents a significant change from the status-quo state of relations between secondary stakeholders, primary stakeholders, and the firm, by increasing the relative influence of secondary stakeholders.

The implication of this access to influence by secondary stakeholders is that it potentially alters the dynamic of firm-stakeholder relations. While primary stakeholders’ relations with the firm are based on stakeholders’ control of vital resources, it now appears that secondary stakeholders’ relations, are based on secondary stakeholders’ ability to influence public opinion and other stakeholders’ views of the firm through its manipulation of firm reputation and social legitimacy. Several researchers have looked at the growing importance of reputation and legitimacy for corporation’s successful operations (BG King & Whetten, 2008; Maak, 2007; J. Vergne, 2012; J.-P. Vergne, 2010). The conclusions are that these factors are not solely important as a firm resource, but that corporate reputation and legitimacy relates to the identity and social acceptance of the firm in its institutional environment. Bitektine, for example, has proposed a process model of how individuals make a social judgment of a corporation that involves moral, regulatory, managerial, technical, and media-based legitimacy among other factors (Bitektine, 2011). Thus, it would be erroneous to characterize secondary stakeholders’ influence on their corporate targets reputation as uniquely an increase in their resource-based power over the firm. Reputation and legitimacy appear to have a much broader scope of importance and the nature of secondary stakeholders’ influence appear to relate
more closely to institutional issues of peer-group acceptance, status, and imitative behavior.

To summarize, the findings of this research suggest that secondary stakeholders have developed the capacity to influence firms in new ways. Some of this ability has been made possible through access to social media and internet connectivity. At first glance, it could be said that secondary stakeholders have simply become more powerful, power being one element in the resource dependence-based toolkit used by primary stakeholders. A closer look suggests that secondary stakeholders have gained access to a different type of influence – that of institutional-based acceptance and legitimacy for the firm. Through their ability to influence public opinion and other stakeholders’ views of acceptable behavior and practices, secondary stakeholders are able to influence firms in a very different manner. Further research will be needed to clearly differentiate reputation and legitimacy-based influence from resource dependence-based influence on the firm.

7.3 Implications for Managers

If stakeholder theory is to depart from a uniquely resource dependence-based approach in which firm-stakeholder relations are determined by the power, legitimacy and urgency of stakeholders based on the firm’s dependency on stakeholder resources, to encompass a reputation and legitimacy based approach including secondary stakeholders, then we need also to reconsider stakeholder management practices. Extant practice for
stakeholder relations involves a one-size-fits-all approach. Firms are to reach out to stakeholders, attempt to assess their needs and demands, and respond according to their ability to do so and the firms’ strategic interests. Firms, such as BP, faced with a stakeholder protest movement in development may not identify it as such; the characteristics of good stakeholders relations in the event of a social movement appear to be very different that those prevailing when such a moment does not exist. Several factors are concerned – in a social movement, secondary stakeholders are dominating the dialogue with the firm. In a business-as-usual context, primary stakeholders are dominating the dialogue with the firm. In a social movement, the legitimacy of the firm is being questioned; in a business-as-usual context, the legitimacy of the firm is intact. Finally, in a social movement, the issues involve calls for justice, equality, fairness, respects – values that are important to the stakeholders; in a business-as-usual context, much of stakeholder-firm interactions involve discussions around how to share the economic pie created by the firm’s business ventures and stakeholders’ support of those ventures.

If indeed stakeholder relations does involve secondary stakeholder-based influence, as found by this research, then it follows to reason that the management of those situations must involve careful management of secondary stakeholder groups. During the Deepwater Horizon spill, BP followed with relative precision a textbook approach to traditional stakeholder management – and failed miserably. BP expended much time and energy engaging with its primary stakeholders – the investment community, the
government and regulatory authorities, its partners, suppliers, state officials, and industry specialists. It even engaged with some ecology groups in the clean-up. However, the groups it ignored and/or treated poorly were the Gulf coast residents, fishermen, boat owners, businessmen, residents, oil workers, and the general disenfranchised public. These were precisely the stakeholder groups who rose up and fueled the social movement against BP.

What BP managers could have done better to manage its stakeholders includes the following. First, they should have recognized that the Deepwater Horizon spill threatened not only their own firm, but also those firms and organizations to which they were connected including the Obama administration, NOAA, the Mining and Minerals Service, the Coast Guard, its industry partners, its investors who supported BP’s high risk strategy, and its partners who provided the financing such as Anadarko and Mitsui. Devoting time and effort to appeasing this group of stakeholders was time poorly spent. Both the Obama administration and other industry players including Shell, Chevron and ExxonMobil were very quick to point out BP’s failings; the first did so in press briefing just two weeks after the rig explosion and the other did so in congressional hearing when asked whether their manner of handling the rig would have differed.

Second, BP managers should have recognized that they would be the target of social media and internet guerilla tactics by secondary stakeholders. Social movements are
driven by secondary stakeholders and these groups of stakeholders require access to communication outlets in order to attract disenfranchised individuals and fuel the movement. By ignoring social media and internet channels, BP made a serious mistake and left open the possibility for secondary stakeholder to coalesce on a framing for their grievances. Secondary stakeholders were also able to engage the interest of the mainstream media in their plight and to engage in on-line mobilization.

Third, BP managers focused on attempts to appease Gulf residents’ dissatisfaction with monetary compensation. They also responded to Gulf residents’ criticisms of their handling of the clean-up by donately money to funds for the clean-up. None of this appeared to have a positive impact. What BP neglected to consider was the nature of these secondary stakeholders’ complaints; in a social movement, stakeholders are concerned with fundamental values. They question the legitimacy of the firm and expect the firm to be willing to re-negotiate its ‘social contract’ before they allow it to re-gain the legitimacy that it has lost. BP’s efforts to compensate these secondary stakeholders only served to reinforce these groups’ impression of BP’s illegitimacy.

To conclude, one of the important implications of this research is that stakeholder management may require a very different approach in the circumstances of a secondary stakeholder social movement than in ordinary circumstances with primary stakeholders. BP followed standard guildeines for managing stakeholder relations and their approach
failed miserably. Further research will be required to determine exactly what managerial techniques might be better suited to managing stakeholders in a stakeholder protest environment. In the next section, additional research opportunities are listed and explained.
Chapter 8: Further Research Opportunities

In 8.1 below, unanswered questions and the challenges connected with future research and study to develop the stakeholder process model are outlined. In 8.2 below, an agenda for further research with a potential timeline is presented.

8.1 Unanswered questions

There are several unanswered questions from this research. The first relates to the study’s limitations and the need to confirm these initial findings. As indicated in the methodology section, one major concern encountered in the execution of this research was the need to increase the reliability of the interpretation of the data. The interpretation of the data is vital as the structure of the stakeholder process model depends upon the interpretation of the events and their classification into various elements of the model. In this study, once the data was collected, it was coded according to the issues that were identified in each of the communications (published articles, blogs, YouTube video, etc.).

Due to nature of the data and the nature of the coding required, the use of a textual analytical software program proved to be impractical. The logical alternative was the use of multiple coders. Unfortunately, they were not available. The next steps in this research therefore involve the introduction of one or more additional coders for all or parts of the data. One approach to doing this might be to provide a second coder with all of the data for a defined time range and ask that the coder identify the issues they find in the data. A second and complementary approach might be to ask another coder with the
information pertaining to a single issue and to identify the elements of the model in the data. Both of these approaches should be used to refine and confirm the findings in this study and represent the next step in the research.

Another unanswered question concerns the degree to which this study’s findings can be generalized to other contexts. While a single case study provides substantial richness to the exploration of a given topic, it leaves open the possibility that the findings apply only to the case studied. The Deepwater Horizon case represents a crisis environment, with the size of the ecological disaster increasing on a daily basis. Not all stakeholder protest movements are triggered by a defining event that draws major media attention. An additional concern is that this movement concerned the oil and gas industry and occurred in the US. Would the process have been the same if the movement concerned the plastics industry in Japan, for example? To address these concerns and in order to validate and extend the findings of this study, several additional field-based case studies will be needed. The logical next step in the research agenda would be to look at not one, but several cases to explore how the stakeholder process model applies to stakeholder-firm relations in a variety of contexts. Such a study should involve firms from several industries and countries, stakeholder protests dealing with a variety of topics (not just ecology), and those that are both crisis situations and slower-moving protest movements. Cross-case comparisons in such a study would allow for a verification of this study’s findings with regards to the elements in the model and how they interact to create a stakeholder movement. In particular, some of the points that should be addressed include:
A) A clarification on the definition of the moment when stakeholder demands become a ‘stakeholder protest movement’. Can we clearly identify a bifurcation and if yes, what signs are associated with that transition?

B) Greater clarity on the nature of pre-existing conditions across several cases. Is it possible to identify and classify types of conditions?

C) A clarification of the role of disruptive events in the stakeholder movement. Are they in fact triggers allowing the movement to take form and develop?

D) A better understanding of the role of framing mechanisms and an appreciation for how framing mechanisms work in the absence of extensive press coverage of an event. What is the role of social media in the framing process?

E) Likewise, a better understanding of how mobilization occurs, how it occurs in the absence of extensive press coverage, and of the relationship between on-line and on-the-ground mobilization.

F) Finally, a better appreciation of outcomes and the role of direct vs. indirect outcomes in a social movement.

The results of this research have led to an initial understanding of the stakeholder process model, yet more work is needed before the model can be considered generalizable across all types of firm-stakeholder relationships.
Beyond questions concerning the generalizability of the model, there also remains considerable work to develop the model into a mid-level explaining/predicting theory for firm-stakeholder relations. One issue to be handled carefully is the structure of the model which is presently a mixture of ‘process’ and ‘variance’ aspects (Gregor, 2006). The model has process aspects in that the development of a stakeholder movement against a firm occurs over time and in phases. There are also variance aspects to the model in that there are distinct elements that have been identified that are presumed to be necessary for the predicted result (although these still need to be tested). With both process and variance elements present, there may be ‘sequence’ implications to be considered – certain elements may need to occur in a particular sequence in order to have the predicted result. Gregor has suggested that this is not necessarily an impediment to the development of a theory, but she also recognizes that not all researchers are comfortable with the mixing of these two types of theory structure (Gregor, 2006). Testing the variance aspects of the model suggests that the next steps might involve statistical or factor analysis. The process structure of the model suggests that further qualitative research may be needed with the aim of clarifying the possible sequences in the predicted relationship.

Another research challenge involved in developing the theory is related to the dual role that certain entities or events can play in the model. For example, we know from the social movement literature that a social movement organization is considered to be a mobilizing structure, yet recent research and the results from this study also suggest that
these organizations can be *pre-existing conditions* as well (McCammon & Campbell, 2001; Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008; Schneiberg, 2013). An second example is social media. In this study, we saw social media playing a role as a framing mechanism and as a mobilizing structure, sometime simultaneously. Teasing out which role a particular organization or event is playing in a social movement may be a challenge. The focus of analysis should therefore move from general classification to careful interpretation of the contribution that particular elements play in the model while recognizing that such elements may take very different forms and make multiple contributions. Ideally, very precise definitions in terms of contributions to outcomes will be needed for each element of the model. This suggests that any further research should involve an important qualitative aspect that explores more thoroughly the contribution of: *pre-existing conditions, disruptive events, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing structures* in the model and its outcomes.

A third research challenge relates to *outcomes*. In the stakeholder process model, outcomes are both *direct* and *indirect*. Sequentially, no consistency was observed in this study. Sometime indirect outcomes came before direct outcomes; in other cases, it was the reverse. For the stakeholder process model to become a well-supported theory, there needs to be clarity on the nature of the ‘dependent variable’ and on the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The model suggests some relationship of causality, so if we take the firm view and label *direct outcomes* as a dependent variable, then any role that the *indirect outcomes* plays in direct outcomes will need to be clarified.
The use of quantitative methods to establish correlation between the variables, for example, will not be enough to support the theory’s development and may even lead to misleading conclusions, therefore qualitative research is suggested. Process-tracing, a technique developed by George and Bennett (2005) may be an appropriate tool for this purpose. Process-tracing allows for the careful and precise elaboration and testing of causal theories using qualitative methods. It is useful in cases where there may be reverse causality or incidental association and allows for several alternative hypotheses to be tested simultaneously (Crasnow, 2012; George & Bennett, 2005).

In summary, the nature of the questions that yet need to be addressed and the need for further validation of the coding used in this study suggest that additional qualitative research is called for as a next step to developing the stakeholder process model as mid-range theory for stakeholder-firm relations. In the next section, I present a research agenda aimed at addressing some of the questions raised here.

8.2 Future Research Agenda

The additional research outlined above represents a significant, but potentially rewarding, research agenda. The results of this research on stakeholder protest movements may have an impact of how firms manage stakeholder-firm relations under these conditions and represents an important departure from the relatively homogenous approach to stakeholder relationship management presently suggested in the literature. The research
agenda suggested as a next step to developing the stakeholder process model into a mid-range explaining/predicting theory is summarized in the table below.

Table #6 Research Agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Article Title</th>
<th>Target Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fall 2014</td>
<td>Complete 2nd/3rd Coding</td>
<td>Summary of Findings – A Case study of Secondary Stakeholder Influence in the BP Oil Spill</td>
<td>Social Science Research Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall/Spring 2015</td>
<td>Implications for executives of an increase in secondary stakeholder power based on reputation and legitimacy concerns</td>
<td>Secondary Stakeholder Influence in the 21st Century</td>
<td>Business Horizons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 2015</td>
<td>Historical account of BP Spill with added stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>Chronicle of the BP Oil Spill from the Stakeholders’ Viewpoint</td>
<td>Business History</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendices

### Appendix 1:

**Table of Typical Differences between Primary & Secondary Stakeholders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Stakeholders</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Secondary Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial or material Gain</td>
<td><strong>Aims in Engaging with the Firm</strong> (Clarkson 1995; Goodpaster 1991; Delhod &amp; De Bakker 2007; Winn 2001)</td>
<td>Institutional or field-level change; righting of perceived wrong-doings by the firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct; exchange of resources: contract or agreement based</td>
<td><strong>Nature of relationship between Parties</strong> (Pedersen 2006; Zietsma &amp; Winn 2004; Yaziji 2004; Gebhardt 2011)</td>
<td>Indirect – through the media, or at ‘arms length’ and managed the firm’s PR or corporate relations department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Influence Approach</strong> (Frooman 1999; Frooman &amp; Murrell 2005; Sharma Henriques 2005; King &amp; Soule 2007)</td>
<td>More likely to be indirect and coercive e.g. public protest; attempt to influence public opinion and/or primary stakeholders’ perception of their strategic interests in order to influence the firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Nature of Issues Most Often Raised by Stakeholder</strong> (Winn 2001; Arruda Fontenelle 2010; Gebhardt 2011; Hart Sharma 2004)</td>
<td>Ethical/moral issues related to the firm’s responsibility in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Bargaining Strengths</strong> (Mitchell, Agle &amp; Wood 1997; Eesley &amp; Lenox 2006; Perrault 2012; Frooman 1999)</td>
<td>Potential for influencing the media, public opinion, and primary’s stakeholders and thereby impacting the legitimacy, reputation, and competitive advantage of the firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Bargaining Weaknesses</strong> (Mitchell, Agle &amp; Wood 1997; Eesley &amp; Lenox 2006; Perrault 2012; Frooman 1999; Sharma &amp; Henriques 2005)</td>
<td>Relative lack of legitimacy with the firm and in society; possible lack of power or resources to carry out influence strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More likely to be direct and cooperative – e.g. discussion; latent threat of withholding of resources

Strategic; related to the parties’ competitive advantage and/or the condition of association/exchange

Most likely to be seen as legitimate claimants on the firm; explicit power based on the resource dependence of the firm

Dependence upon the resource exchange relationship with the firm
### Appendix 2

**A Suggestive List of Coercive and Compromise Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Strategy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compromise</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Letter-writing campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrity approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Green” alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially responsible investing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free advertising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community investing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation/help in projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codes of Conduct (inclusion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easing of restrictions/oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coercive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Letter-writing campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests/ Demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrity condemnation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video, film distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflammatory posters, books, pamphlets,…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockage of firm facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage of firm property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work stoppage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work slowdowns</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sit-ins or vigils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music, painting, poems or other art forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder resolutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divestitures of stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codes of Conduct (exclusion)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3

Overview of Four Predictive Models on Stakeholder Influence Strategies

**Frooman (1999):**

*Research scope: Applies to stakeholders*

*Taxology:*

1. Direct vs Indirect:
   - **Direct** – stakeholder manipulates the flow of resources to the firm
   - **Indirect** – stakeholder works through an ally, by having the ally manipulate the flow of resources to the firm

*Predictive logic: Access to/influence with the firm management. Low access/influence predicts indirect strategy.*

2. Usage vs Withholding:
   - **Withholding** – stakeholder discontinues providing a resource to a firm
   - **Usage** – the stakeholder continues to supply the resource but with strings attached

*Predictive logic: Level of stakeholder dependence on firm. High dependence will predict that the firm will use usage strategy in order not to threaten its own interests.*

**Frooman, Murrell (2005):**

*Research scope: Applies to stakeholders*

*Taxology:*

1. Direct vs Indirect:
   - **Direct** - same as Frooman (1999)
   - **Indirect** - same as Frooman (1999)

*Predictive logic: same as Frooman (1999)*

2. Coercion vs Cooperation:
   - **Coercion** – negative strategies involving either a threat to reduce a benefit or increase a cost. Note: withholding strategies are a type of coercion.
   - **Compromise** – positive in nature and involve an offer to increase a benefit or reduce a cost. Note: usage strategies are a type of compromise.

*Predictive logic: Level of stakeholder dependence on firm. High dependence will predict that the firm will use compromise strategy in order not to threaten its own interests. see Frooman (1999)*
Zietsma, Winn (2008):

Applies to secondary stakeholders

Taxology:

1. Issue Raising Strategies:
   - Direct action
   - Framing
   - Indirect action
   - Allying
   - Issue linking

Predictive logic: Used when competing for issue salience

2. Positioning Strategies:
   - Movement, coalition formation
   - Framing
   - Issue linking
   - Indirect action
   - Direct action for issue-raising

Predictive logic: Used when competing for power and legitimacy

3. Issue Resolution Strategies:
   - Negotiating
   - Offering
   - Compromising
   - Complying
   - Joint learning

Predictive logic: Used when working with firm for Solutions

Also: tie-severing – used in transitions between stages

Den Hond, De Bakker (2007):

Applies to secondary stakeholders, notably activists

1. Damage vs. Gain:
   - Damage – damaging property or increasing the cost of the unwanted activity
   - Gain – rewarding of offering to reward the firm for wanted behavior.

Predictive logic: Based on phase of de-institutionalization/re-institutionalization – damage for de-institutionalization, particularly by radical groups

2. Material vs. Symbolic:
   - Material – focuses on subversion, appropriation or destruction of organizational technology and resources.
   - Symbolic – attempts to subvert dominant meanings, ideologies, and discourses (e.g. firm reputation).

Predictive logic: Based on phase of de-institutionalization/re-institutionalization – symbolic will be used first by both reformists and radicals

3. Participatory vs. Non-participatory:
   - Participatory: actions that rely on large numbers of participants…marches, boycotts, etc
   - Non-participatory: actions that do not require large numbers of participants.

Predictive logic: Based on phase of de-institutionalization/re-institutionalization – non-participatory initially by both groups. Later reformists will use participatory more than radicals.
Appendix 4 –

A Chronological Listing of Key Events in the Three Months following the Deepwater Horizon Explosion

Tuesday April 20, 2010  Rig Explodes - Environment News Service wire  

around 9PM

Wednesday April 21  BP oil drilling safety record raised by WSJ

Wednesday April 21  Families of rug-necked oil rig workers pray for their survival – Christian Science Monitor

Thursday April 22  Rig Sinks – Gannett News wire

Thursday April 22  Bipartisan climate/energy bill to be supported by BP, Conoco Philips & Shell; Impact of spill on questioned – CNN; MotherJones

Friday April 23  Tony Hayward has BP reputation challenge - the Times (UK); Tony flies to Louisiana to oversee the response -WSJ

Friday April 23  BP activated “extensive” spill response - Environment News Service wire
Lawmakers suggest the industry suffers from “myth of safety” – Christian Science Monitor

Environmental situation looks optimistic; no major leaks – The Courier, Houma, LA (AP)

Tony Hayward, CEO of BP, reassures the public, “There should be no doubt of our resolve to limit the escape of oil and protect the marine and coastal environments from its effects." - The Daily Telegraph

Leak discovered; 1000 barrels/day – Ocala Star Banner, Ocala Florida

Spotlight is put on Tony Hayward and the BP spill response – Daily Telegraph

11 of 126 rig workers presumed dead; Coast Guard search ends – NYTimes

Slick is the size of Rhode Island (1800 sq. miles) - AP

Bobby Jindal asks for help from the Coast Guard to deploy booms in fragile wildlife preserves –The Ledger, Lakeland, FL
Monday April 26  Discussion in the Senate on the compromise climate and energy bill are overshadowed by calls for an investigation of the Deepwater Horizon incident – Oil Daily

Tuesday April 27  Cost on incident to BP estimated at $1.6 billion - Daily Telegraph UK

Tuesday April 27  Debate over the BP spill and Obama’s plans to extend off-shore oil drilling spread to the House as the Energy & Commerce Commission announce plans for an investigation – WSJ

Tuesday April 27  Locals in hotel, tourist, boat & fishing industries watch anxiously to see if spill can be contained – Bennington Banner

Wednesday April 28  NOAA revises estimates on oil leaking to 5000 barrels/day – Gainesville Sun, Florida (reported on 04/29/2010)

Wednesday April 28  Climate &Energy bill stalled in Senate – Gannett News Service

Wednesday April 28  Royal Dutch Shell steps in to help clean-up efforts – FT.com

Wednesday April 28  A dispute over the amount of oil leaking begins as BP’s estimate stays at 1000 barrels per Associated Press
Thursday April 29  President Obama says BP is responsible for cost of spill cleanup – Christian Science Monitor (reported on 04/30/2010)

Thursday April 29  Locals wonder why it took BP so long to react to the spill and so long to reach out to locals, “It’s just like Katrina” – Gannett News Service

Thursday April 29  ‘Vessels of Opportunity’ program is launched by BP – The Courier, Houma, LA

Thursday April 29  BP praised for its efforts by Rea Admiral Landry – Environmental News Services

Thursday April 29  Florida State University’s Ian MacDonald confirms a report by SkyTruth that oil is leaking at the rate of 25,000 barrels a day – LA Times

Friday April 30  Oil washes ashore in Louisiana; Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida have all declared states of emergencies – CEO Wire

Friday April 30  In an open letter, four New Jersey law makers join Senator Bill Nelson in urging the President to reverse plans to drill in coastal waters – Christian Science Monitor
Friday April 30  Pentagon orders plans to begin distributing chemical dispersants; BP still in charge – CEO Wire

Friday April 30  Coast Guard’s Landrieu acknowledges that local officials need more specific information – The Courier, Houma, LA

Friday April 30  Questions are raised about Obama Administration’s slow response to spill - Finance Wire

Friday April 30  Echoing the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana residents meet in a local gym to be trained in hazardous waste management – The Christian Science Monitor

Saturday May 1  President Obama puts a temporary halt on all new exploratory off-shore drilling on the US continental shelf pending an investigation – Christian Science Monitor

Saturday May 1  Obama chastises BP by for its response; questions are raised as to BP’s ability to handle the spill response – NY Times; The Courier, Houma, LA

Saturday May 1  Governor Bobby Jindal together with Parish leaders announce spill response measures and plans for protecting coastlines and wetlands – The Courier, Houma, LA
Saturday May 1  The Financial Times does a story on Tony Hayward finding
him to be, “unguarded, informal, passionate, … and
ruthless” FT.com

Saturday May 1  Spill given ‘BP’ label on social media – Star Pheonix,
Saskatchewan CA

Sunday May 2  Obama visits the Gulf Coast for the first time; inability to
contain spill explained by failure in the blow-out preventer
– NY Times

Monday May 3  Hayward defends BP’s role and points finger at Transocean
– “This wasn’t our accident. …It was their people. Their
systems. Their processes.” – Daily Kos

Monday May 3  More than 70 environment groups urge Obama to take off-
shore oil drilling out of the climate & energy bill – Mother
Jones

Tuesday May 4  Local groups work with national ecology and wildlife
groups to recruit volunteers for clean-up; wait on BP for
green light – Times Picayune

Wednesday May 5  BP announces $25 million block grants to each of four Gulf
states impacted by the spill – Rigzone
Thursday May 6
Locals contribute time and materials to create ‘natural’
booms – NY Times

Friday May 7
BP and Transocean are named by Coast Guard as
‘responsible parties’ meaning that they are responsible for
the clean-up – NY Times

Saturday May 8
Mining and Minerals Service comes under attach for lax
oversight – NY Times

Sunday May 9
First Containment Dome fails to stop gushing oil – NY
Times

Monday May 10
Reports surface about BP asking employees and boat
owners in Vessels of Opportunity to sign waivers of
liability/responsibility – NY Times

Monday May 10
BP to pay “legitimate claims”. When asked about
illegitimate claims, Tony is quoted by the Times of London
as saying, "This is America -- come on. We're going to
have lots of illegitimate claims." – NY Times

Monday May 10
Transocean’s safety record is scrutinized and found
wanting – WSJ
Tuesday May 11  Senate Committee hearing begin: Transocean and
Halliburton accounts questions BP cement plug procedures;
3 parties blame each other – WSJ

Wednesday May 12  The Obama announces a decision to break up the Mineral
& Mining Management department – NY Times

Wednesday May 12  A CBS poll finds sharp drop in public support for increased
off-shore oil drilling – Daily Kos

Wednesday May 12  Modified climate & energy bill unveiled; expanded
offshore drilling provisions have been left off; republican
support eroded – NY Times

Thursday May 13  The Gulf is a big ocean. On asked about the spill, Tony
explains, “The Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean. The
amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into
it is tiny in relation to the total water volume.” – The
Guardian (UK)

Thursday May 13  Newest estimates by Purdue University’s Steve Wereley
estimate spill at 10x official estimate: 50-60,000
barrels/day - NPR
Friday May 14 | Internal investigations highlight MMS’s conflicts of interest, rubber stamping of approvals, and overruling of scientific staff recommendations – NY Times

Saturday May 15 | More safety culture issues raised about BP – Washington Post

Sunday May 16 | BP begins paying for personal injury and economic losses out of its 13 claims offices across the Gulf Coast – Times Picayune

Tuesday May 18 | Senator Markey succeeds in requests to BP to make available live feeds of the oil spill from the floor of the Gulf – NY Times

Wednesday May 19 | NOAA expands fishing ban to 19% of the Gulf –NY Times

Thursday May 20 | Scientific community criticizes NOAA and Obama officials for not thoroughly investigating impacts of spill including spill size, spread, oil plumes, and other data – NY Times

Thursday May 20 | Louisiana’s Bobby Jindal berates US officials & BP for not moving forward on protective berms. Oil now seeping into delicate marshes – NY Times

Thursday May 20 | Reports surface of fisherman becoming sick from working on BP spill clean-up – Daily Kos; CNN
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friday May 21</td>
<td>Desperation as oil covers 50 miles of Louisiana coastline; “It seems like BP doesn’t care” says police chief – NY Times</td>
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<td>Saturday May 22</td>
<td>Louisiana state officials try to convince BP and the US government to build sand berms and plug holes to save marshes – NY Times</td>
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<td>Sunday May 23</td>
<td>Obama establishes bi-partisan commission to investigate drilling practices – NY Times</td>
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<td>Monday May 24</td>
<td>Locals Officials in Jefferson Parish threaten to commandeer idle boats to fight effects of the spill – NY Times</td>
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<td>Tuesday May 25</td>
<td>BP is asked by EPA to stop using the highly toxic dispersant Corexit…and ignores request – NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday May 27</td>
<td>US Interior Department extends moratorium on new offshore drilling in Gulf &amp; Virginia &amp; halts oil exploration drilling in the Arctic - CNN</td>
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<td>Thursday May 27</td>
<td>Plaquemines Parish’s Republican mayor, Billy Nungesser, says of meeting with Obama, “He was solid on it; didn’t back down on the issues…” – Daily Kos</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Friday May 28  
BP attempts using ‘top kill’ and “junk shot’ to stop oil leak  
– NY Times

Friday May 28  
Dispersants are suspected as possible source for sick  
fishermen and dead dolphins – NY Times

Friday May 28  
Oil spill leak rate officially increased to 12-19,000 barrels a  
day – NY Times

Sunday May 30  
BP’s Tony Hayward denies existence of plumes –  
Huffington Post

Sunday May 30  
Internal BP documents show longstanding safety concerns  
with Deepwater Horizon rig and “special permissions”  
from MMS – NY Times

Sunday May 30  
Lack of clarity on compensation payment calculation  
leaves fishermen worried – NY Times

Sunday May 30  
BP announces that ‘top kill’ and ‘junk shot’ have failed –  
NY Times

Tuesday June 1  
BP Tony Hayward apologies for spill and would, “…like  
my life back.” – USA Today

Tuesday June 1  
BP announces a new attempt to stop leaking oil with dome  
– NY Times
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<td>Tuesday June 1</td>
<td>US Attorney General announces opening of civil and criminal investigations into BO oil spill – Washington Post</td>
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<td>Thursday June 3</td>
<td>Earthjustice files suit in federal court against the Mining and Minerals Management Service’s approval of BP’s clean-up plan – Targeted News Service</td>
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<td>Thursday June 3</td>
<td>BP launches ad with Tony, “We will get this done; we will make this right.” – ThinkProgress.org</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday June 5</td>
<td>A cap is successfully installed over BP well – NY Times</td>
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<td>Sunday June 6</td>
<td>More criticisms by local officials surface over BP’s handling of the spill response – NY Times</td>
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<td>Sunday June 6</td>
<td>Public officials say of BP, “When I ask a Question, I don’t get an answer” – NY Times</td>
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<td>Monday June 7</td>
<td>Locals are dissatisfied with BP payments, assuming they got them – NY Times</td>
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<td>Monday June 7</td>
<td>Capacity of tanker ships storing well oil are ‘maxed out’. More will be brought in – NY Times</td>
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<td>Tuesday June 8</td>
<td>Going against ‘Unified Command’ in an Alabama coastal community – NY Times</td>
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<td>Wednesday June 9</td>
<td>Plumes of oil below the surface are thought to be large and growing – NY Times</td>
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<td>Thursday June 10</td>
<td>Multiple reports coming to light about BP restricting press access to spill sites – Daily Kos, CNN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday June 11</td>
<td>Official government estimate of oil leak officially increased to 25-30,000 barrels a day – NY Times</td>
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<td>Saturday June 12</td>
<td>Locals protest Administration’s moratorium on deep water drilling – Times Picayune</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monday June 14</td>
<td>Obama outlines plans to create BP funded ‘Escrow Account’ to compensate business &amp; individuals impacted by the spill – NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuesday June 15</td>
<td>Official government estimate of oil flow rises to 35-60,000 barrels per day – Washington Post</td>
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<td>Wednesday June 16</td>
<td>Oil executives testify in the Senate hearings. Exxon Mobil, Shell, Conoco Philips, and Chevron insist they would have done things differently – NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday June 17</td>
<td>Spill aftermath takes toll on Gulf workers’ psyches – NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday June 17</td>
<td>Obama administration and BP lawyers announce agreement to create $20billion fund to pay damage claims – NY Times</td>
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<td>Thursday June 17</td>
<td>Overall cost of spill to BP is now estimated to be $62.9 billion by securities analysts – NY Times</td>
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<td>Thursday June 17</td>
<td>Tony Hayward testifies to Congress, “I was not involved in the decision-making.” – Huffington Post</td>
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<td>Thursday June 17</td>
<td>Republican Joe Barton apologizes to BP and faces huge backlash on social media – Daily Kos</td>
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<td>Friday June 18</td>
<td>State officials claim that their clean-up efforts have been continually stymied by BP and federal officials, “…you have a big mess with no command and control” – Times Picayune</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday June 19</td>
<td>BP reports that it captured a record 25,290 barrels of oil in its containment efforts on Thursday – NY Times</td>
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<td>Saturday June 19</td>
<td>BP announces that it will replace Tony Hayward as point person on the BP spill response with Robert Dudley, an American – NY Times</td>
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<td>Saturday June 19</td>
<td>BP accused of dragging its feet on paying claims – NY Times</td>
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<td>Saturday June 19</td>
<td>Tony Hayward attends private yacht race in UK – Daily Kos</td>
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<td>Monday June 21</td>
<td>Two reliefs wells being drilled to resolve oil spill predicted to reach bottom of Gulf by late July/early August – NY Times</td>
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<td>Monday June 21</td>
<td>Anderson Cooper reports on BP internal documents showing early estimates of oil flows as high as 100,000 barrels a day – CNN</td>
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<td>Tuesday June 22</td>
<td>Poll shows that local Gulf residents disapprove of BP’s handling of the spill. They trust the government over BP 2-to-1 – NY Times</td>
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<td>Wednesday June 23</td>
<td>A federal judge in New Orleans blocked a six-month moratorium on deep-water oil drilling from going into effect – NY Times</td>
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<td>Thursday June 24</td>
<td>Containment cap on BP well has to be removed – NY Times</td>
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<td>Thursday June 24</td>
<td>Local ban on drilling will affect over 10,000 Gulf workers – CNN Money</td>
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<td>Saturday June 26</td>
<td>All clean-up handled by paid BP workers, leaving untrained volunteers with little to do – Times Picayune</td>
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<td>Wednesday June 30</td>
<td>BP share price fall, 50% since April, may slowing – NY Times</td>
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<td>Friday July 2</td>
<td>BP and Coast Guard reach settlement with environmental groups to cut back on sea turtle burnings – Bloomberg</td>
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<td>Sunday July 4</td>
<td>Louisiana federal judge works on streamlining lawsuits arising from ineffective BP claims process – NY Times</td>
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<td>Monday July 5</td>
<td>BP demands $400 million from Deepwater Horizon well partners to pay spill costs – The Guardian</td>
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<td>Wednesday July 7</td>
<td>US Army Corps of Engineers denies permit for local plan to preserve tidal estuaries – NY Times</td>
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<td>Thursday July 8</td>
<td>BP holds up checks for fishermen due to process change and more stringent requirements – Ed Schultz show MSMBC; CNN Money.com</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday July 9</td>
<td>A Federal appeals court has turned down the Obama administration's effort to enforce a six-month moratorium on deep water drilling – NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday July 10</td>
<td>BP will fit new cap on well, hoping to eliminate leakage and funnel 35-60,000 barrels a day into surface ships – NY Times</td>
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<td>Sunday July 11</td>
<td>Plaqueman’s Parish Nungesser, labeled ‘frontman’ for the Gulf, describes BP’s clean-up plan as “drawn up on the back of a bar napkin” – Los Angeles Times</td>
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<td>Tuesday July 13</td>
<td>US Interior Department revises rules on drilling moratorium to facilitate its enforcement – NY Times</td>
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<td>Wednesday July 14</td>
<td>“I live week to week”, says on local resident – NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday July 15</td>
<td>BP’s new cap is in place and tests are under way to see if it will hold – NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday July 16</td>
<td>Well leak is officially stopped and oil spill is under control – NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday July 17</td>
<td>Skepticism and a shrug; locals react to news of leak stoppage – NY Times</td>
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<td>Friday July 23</td>
<td>Climate &amp; Energy bill is effectively ‘dead’ in the Senate –</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thursday August 5</td>
<td>Deepwater Horizon well officially ‘killed’ – Washington Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunday September 19</td>
<td>Deepwater Horizon well officially declared ‘dead’ by Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen – Boston Globe (AP)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


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Tarrow, S. (1996). No Title. In D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, & M. N. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative Perspectives in Social Movements*.


Curriculum Vitae

Michele Jurgens is Chair of the Master’s Program for Business Ethics and Compliance at NECB. She has more than 20 years of experience in executive leadership in strategy, marketing, and management consulting. Ms. Jurgens previously served as an executive with the ACCOR Group, one of the world’s largest conglomerates in the services and hospitality industry.

As Harvard Business School’s Director, Custom Programs, in Executive Education, she collaborated with the school’s corporate clients and faculty to design and deliver leadership development programs to senior executives.

In addition to her administrative and educational activities at NECB, Ms. Jurgens teaches corporate social responsibility, strategy, and management to executives and graduate students for Harvard Business Publishing, Hult International Business School and Harvard Extension School. She is also a research fellow with the Harold Geneen Institute for Corporate Governance at Bentley University and a candidate for a PhD degree in business. Ms. Jurgens graduated from the University of California at Berkeley with a BA degree in economics and from INSEAD with an MBA.
Ms. Jurgens research interests include corporate social responsibility, business ethics, stakeholder management and the management of multinationals. Her dissertation is on the impact that social media is having on stakeholder influence strategies. Her published writing credits include co-authoring a book and publishing cases, online tutorials and articles. They include:

**Articles:**
- “Four years later… Do I feel sorry for BP?”, Pensacola News Journal (to be published April 2014)

**Cases:**
- “Strategic Outsourcing at Bharti Airtel Ltd.” (A) & (B) (with VG Narayanan and Asis Martinez-Jerez), HBS. 2006. Named to HBP Premier Case Series.
- “eBay Inc.: Stock Option Plans - C” (with Mark Bradshaw), HBP. 2005.
- “Executive Compensation at GE - B” (with VG Narayanan), HBP. 2005.
- “ACCOR in Asia” (with Hellmut Schütte), INSEAD. 1997.

**Books:**
- *Strategic Issues in Information Technology* (author Hellmüt Schütte, INSEAD), Pergamon Press....edited conference proceeding for publication